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ABSTRACT 
 
SUSANNE GOMOLUCH: Redeeming the Imagination: The Case Study, Literature, and 
Medical Discourse around 1800 
(Under the Direction of Jonathan Hess) 
 
 
This dissertation studies the role that the case study and literature played in establishing 
a new, positive, valorization of the force of the imagination in German literature and 
culture around 1800. Based on a survey of articles from Karl Philipp Moritz’s Magazin 
zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde (1783-93) as well as a selection of novels such as Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre (1795), F.W.J. Schelling’s Clara 
(1809), and plays such as Heinrich von Kleist’s Das Käthchen von Heilbronn (1807-08) 
and Prinz Friedrich von Homburg (1811), my dissertation explores works that 
foregrounded the curative effects of the imagination. Setting these texts in dialogue with 
medical discourses on the imagination in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the 
dissertation brings to light ways in which literature intervened in the physiological 
discourse of the day to encourage using one’s imaginative power to restore health, and 
thus renegotiate the boundaries of medicine around 1800. I explore how a redefinition of 
popular literary and scientific genres facilitated curative effects of the creative 
imagination imagination. I argue that in contrast to the dominant medical discourses on 
the imagination in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, these works encourage 
using one’s imaginative power to restore physical and mental health.  
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INTRODUCTION: 
THE STRUGGLE FOR A REVALORIZATION OF THE IMAGINATION 
 
Imagination and the Recent Media Hype 
 
It is April 17, 2012. The Colbert Report airs. Its guest is Jonah Lehrer, a 
journalist writing for magazines and newspapers such as Wired, The American Scientific 
Mind, The Washington Post, and The New Yorker on issues revolving around 
psychology, neuroscience, and particularly the relationship between science and 
humanities.1 The reason for his television appearance is Lehrer’s latest book Imagine: 
How Creativity Works.2  Before that night, Lehrer’s book had spent weeks in the top ten 
rankings of Amazon and The New York Times book charts. Disregarding the isolated 
critical voices, the general public and an overwhelming majority of scientists received 
Lehrer’s book with much praise and favor. Clearly, Lehrer’s book hit a nerve. Millennia 
after Plato’s and Aristotle’s debates on the nature and function of the imagination, the 
origins of creativity and imagination are still as fascinating as they were around 400 BC. 
The wonders that the creative imagination seems to work range from small personal aha-
moments while taking a shower to million-dollar inventions in the corporate world. 
 Whichever perspective a reader can relate to most or whichever opinion we may 
hold of Lehrer’s Imagine: How Creativity Works, the sparse criticism voiced regarding 
                                                 
1Jonah Lehrer “About/Contact,” Jonah Lehrer, n.d., Web, May 23, 2012.  
2Jonah Lehrer, How Creativity Works (Boston and New York: HMH Books, 2012).  
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Lehrer’s publication never questioned the undoubtedly positive effects that a creative 
imagination has. Today’s understanding of the creative imagination as a gift that propels 
its own path toward innovation and achieves constant progress in most areas of life is 
not unique to Jonah Lehrer. On the contrary, the majority of psychological reference 
works, even the most basic ones, regard the creative imagination as “the basis for 
achievements in the realms of both art and science.”3 The flood of manuals promising to 
boost their readers’ creativity by simply following their 21-step-program appears almost 
natural in this light.4 The prospect of boosting one’s creative powers suggests that 
creativity can be trained and formed like a muscle. If this is so, then it had better be 
trained on a regular basis because a liberated and thriving imagination can be the 
decisive factor in creating one’s own success; it is the extra twist that distinguishes good 
from great. Be this as it may, the success of publications such as Lehrer’s Imagine: How 
Creativity Works show that today’s approach to the imagination is free of hesitation and 
prejudices, a stance that—as this dissertation demonstrates—was not always taken for 
granted.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
“Imagination,” Gale Encyclopedia of Psychology, 2nd Ed. 2000.  
4See for example: Shelley Carson, Your Creative Brain: Seven Steps to Maximize Imagination, 
Productivity, and Innovation in Your Life (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010); Dewey Friedel, Imagine 
That: Unlocking the Power of Your Imagination (Shippensburg, PA: Destiny Image, 2007); Eric Liu and 
Scott Noppe-Brandon, Imagination First: Unlocking the Power of Possibility (San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass, 2009).  
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The Discourse on the (Creative) Imagination – A Brief Overview 
 On the very first page of the introduction to his 2007 monograph, Stewart Clark 
quotes Norman Bryson’s 1988 essay “The Gaze in the Expanded Field.”5 The quote 
reads: 
For human beings collectively to orchestrate their visual experience together it is 
required that each submit his or her retinal experience to the socially agreed 
description(s) of an intelligible world. Vision is socialized, and thereafter 
deviation from this social construction of visual reality can be measured and 
named, variously, as hallucination, misrecognition, or ‘visual disturbance’. 
Following this assumption, what this means for the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century is that as important as vision was it was by far not the only way of seeing. In 
addition, the material world was only one of potentially many worlds that could be 
discerned. The fact that thus far science only had focused on seeing and analyzing the 
material world does not mean that other realms do not exist, but rather that those others 
still wait for their discovery. At the same time, this does not mean that seeing with our 
eye and perceiving the material world is insufficient either. In fact, as Goethe’s work 
shows observation is a legitimate approach to scientific progress. However, the 
rediscovery of the (creative) imagination adds a new set of eyes that unveils immaterial 
dimensions and enables the observer to see the whole picture, rather than a fragmented 
puzzle.  
                                                 
5Norman Bryson, “The Gaze in the Expanded Field” in Vision and Visuality, Hal Foster (ed.), Seattle: 
The New Press, 1988, cited in: Stewart Clark, Vanities of the Eye. Vision in the Early Modern European 
Culture, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
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 With this endeavor, thinkers of the long eighteenth century launched an attempt 
to redefine the dominance of the physical eye over every other sense. As this dissertation 
shows, the path they had chosen was not an easy one. The aspired reevaluation of the 
senses entailed a radical dialogue with and, at times, against theories of perception and 
cognition that go back to those of Aristotle that in turn fed the Renaissance and Early 
Modern periods. As Clark elaborates “[t]he very opening of of Aristotle’s Metaphysica 
spoke of love of the senses, ‘above all other the sense of sight’, preferred because it 
‘makes us know and brings to light many differences between things’.”6 “Plato’s 
Timaeus,” Clark continues, “was equally favorable, describing sight as ‘the source of the 
greatest benefit’ to men by enabling them to grasp number, time, and philosophy… .”7 
These passages identify sight as the single most important capacity that simultaneously 
generates and guarantees the ability to see and interpret what we see. Seeing assumes 
thus a function that is concomitant to reasoning and analyzing. In other words, in this 
function the (creative) imagination becomes a partner to our reason. Consequently, it is 
quintessential for our cognitive processes, but also the concepts that we hold of 
ourselves as human beings.  
 In Renaissance Europe, the eyes “were organs of power, liveliness, speed, and 
accuracy.”8 Without the sense of sight, there was hardly any possibility to get a full and 
accurate grasp of our surroundings. All other senses, including hearing, were important, 
yet not sufficient in this respect. The eyes were the direct link between the external 
                                                 
6Clark 9 
7Clark 9.  
8Clark 10.  
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world and the soul. In turn, the soul was linked to the imagination so closely that a great 
number of Renaissance and even Early Modern scholars believed the imagination to be a 
part of the soul itself. With respect to Renaissance and Early Modern medicine, the 
imagination was “ein wichtiger medizinischer Begriff, der Krankheit und ‘Mißgeburten’ 
durch Ein-Bildung erklären sollte” [“an important medical concept supposed to explain 
disease and monstrosity”].9 Paracelsus, and later the Paracelsians, “assumed that 
imaginatio [Latin for imagination] was a natural vital power including cosmic, mental, 
psychical, and physical dimensions.”10  
 Outside of the medical discourse, the imagination was believed to entice “the 
understanding with ‘matter of invention’ and the will with persuasive arguments.”11 Yet 
it was not until Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1470-1533) that a more nuanced 
understanding of fantasy and imagination came into being. In his works, Mirandola 
observes that “tied to the body as it was, the soul could not ‘opine, know, or comprehend 
at all, if phantasy were not constantly to supply it with the images themeselves’.”12 Thus, 
as Stewart Clark elaborates, the imagination was “required to complete both a sequence 
and a hierarchy; before and below it came sense, after above it, intellect.”13 In other 
words, the imagination became an intermediary between the external and internal worlds 
to the same degree as between the sense and the intellect.  
                                                 
9Heinz Schott, “Imagination—Einbildungskraft—Suggestion: Zur ‘Scharlatanerie’ in der neuzeitlichen 
Medizin,” Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 27 (2004): 99-108: 101. 
 
10Schott 99. Translation taken from the article’s English summary.  
11Clark 44.  
12Clark 44.  
13Clark 44.  
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 While for many Renaissance and Early Modern scholars, imagination had become 
a positive, yet normative function that exhibited unlimited range, liveliness, and 
creativity, the German discourse on the imagination takes an entirely different turn in the 
early eighteenth century. In his The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to 
Romanticism, James Engell identifies Christian Wolff (1679-1754) as the one who 
“distinguishes between imaginatio, phantasma, phantasmata, and the Facultas 
fingendi.” The discourse on the imagination becomes thus more nuanced and less 
positively normative. “Wolff’s work is remarkably fertile,” Engell continues, “for he can 
be interpreted as distinguishing the reproductive from the productive imagination.”14 
This dissertation shows that Wolff’s distinction not only is a valid and important 
discovery, but also inspires the interventions suggested by Moritz, Goethe, Kleist, and 
Schelling. As Engell claims Wolff’s “imaginatio and facultas fingendi point to all later 
divisions in German criticism, psychology, and philosophy between the power of 
reproduction and the different, higher power that shapes new ideas and images, a power 
variously called Dichtkraft, Dichtungskraft, or Dichtungsvermögen, a power that alone 
produces that artistic and aesthetic acts of the mind.”15 The force of creativity and the 
call for originality, which become central in the renegotiations of the creative 
imagination, are fueled and maintained by Wolff’s groundbreaking thought.  
  
 
                                                 
14James Engell, The Creative Imagination: From Enlightenment to Romanticism, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1981, 95. 
 
15Engell 95. 
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Of Fantasts, Dreamers, and Heretics—The Creative Imagination and the Long Eighteenth 
Century 
 
In light of its recent success, it is hard to believe that the success story that the 
creative imagination promises would be anything but the actual history of understanding 
and thinking about creativity and imagination. Looking up the term “Phantasie” 
[“fantasy”] in Zedler’s Universallexicon, one of the most popular reference books of the 
eighteenth century, we find the following entry:  
 
--[Phantasie] heisset in sittlichem Verstande … die Wahl und Neigung des 
Verstandes oder Willens, die bloß auf den Eindruck und Regung der äußerlichen 
Sinnen gegründet ist, wodurch aber leicht und mehrentheils von der Vernunfft ab 
und in Eigensinn oder Thorheit verfället. Solche werden Phantasten genannet, 
und wo nicht vor Narren, doch der Narrheit sehr nahe geachtet. (27.1741-42) 
 
[--in the moral sense, fantasy is called the choice and propensity of the mind or 
will, which is rooted solely in the impression and impulse of the external senses, 
whereby one drifts away easily and often from reason into obstinacy and 
foolishness.] 
  
Unlike memory, the reproductive part of the imagination, fantasy is its creative side and 
does not receive a warm welcome here. Fantasy is based neither on reason nor on the 
will, which are both rational components of the mind, and thus posits a danger of losing 
sanity and drifting into obstinacy and foolishness. Those indulging in fantasy are called 
Phantasten. For those who want to know more about Phantasten, the next entry 
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describes them as “Ketzer” [“heretics”].16 Though religion was only one element among 
many in the discourse on fantasy and imagination, using the term heretic to describe 
someone with an active and creative imagination shows that the force of the creative 
imagination constituted a real danger, rather than a mere whim. Naturally, there was also 
an entirely different side to this discourse. In contrast to fantasy, imagination, though 
hotly contended, was somewhat more acceptable as it integrated the physiological 
aspects of mental imagery and appeared thus more scientific. Many Enlightenment 
scientists who researched this issue, such as Albrecht von Haller, also had a strictly 
reproductive approach to the imagination.17 By reducing imagination to functioning as a 
cache for memories, scientists like Haller tamed its potentially overwhelming force and 
made it more graspable and containable. This tendency among scientists put the creative 
imagination on one level with mirage: illusive, deceptive, and dangerous. Whoever was 
tempted to think outside this box had to battle against cold winds.  
 Despite, but also due to its negative reputation, the creative imagination makes an 
appearance in many literary works in the course of the long eighteenth century. A 
moving story of a religious enthusiast, or a prince’s dramatic struggle for the answer to 
what is true not only attracted a wider audience, but also tempted many authors to tackle 
the hot topic of the creative imagination. One possible explanation for this phenomenon 
lies in the nature of the discourse on the (creative) imagination. Like a kaleidoscope, it 
                                                 
16
“Phantast,” Johann Heinrich Zedlers Grosses vollständiges Universallexicon aller Wissenschaften und 
Künste, vol. 27, 1741, Web, May 25, 2012. 
 
17Zedler’s in fact makes a strict division between the terms fantasy (Phantasie) and imagination 
(Einbildungskrafft). Contemporary scientists, however, did not maintain this strict division. Fantasy and 
imagination are oftentimes used interchangeably and the lack of consistency frequently becomes apparent 
within one document, written by the same author.  
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intersects with a multitude of other discourses and rearranges them every time one looks 
at it. Aesthetics, religion, medicine, and philosophy are the main pillars that buttress the 
discourse on imagination. The origins of creativity and art production are as much part 
of it as is religious enthusiasm and the quest for the origins of what we know. Whether 
we consider imagination from an aesthetic or epistemological point of view, the creative 
imagination always plays a polarizing role; it blurs exactly those qualities each 
intersecting discipline is eager to determine. For example, whether we attempt to outline 
psychological processes that lead to or out of a mental disease or those that make an 
artist create a piece of art, and a critic perceive it as such, it becomes obvious that the 
faculty of the creative imagination does both: fuel these processes, but also render them 
entirely subjective, and thus blurry, vague, and perhaps even incomprehensible to others. 
 A great number of literary examples of the creative imagination are cautionary. 
The potential danger to overindulge in worlds created by the creative imagination was 
often deemed too high. For example, Karl Philipp Moritz’s psychological novel Anton 
Reiser (1785) portrays a young boy whose sole point of reference in life is his own 
imagination, isolating him from the world outside, whereas Johann Heinrich Jung-
Stilling’s Theobald oder die Schwärmer (1784) illustrates the negative side effects of 
seeking salvation through the means provided by the creative imagination. According to 
these warning voices, the mentally created worlds, as enticing as they may seem, are a 
maze out of which only few can escape as only few can actually control this force. 
Ultimately, those few literary figures who appear to be able to control it often abuse 
their power and their defenseless protégés, as E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Der Magnetiseur 
(1814-15) graphically demonstrates. Though all these works approach the imaginative 
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faculty from different angles, all of them share the common elements of warning with 
regard to the negative effects of overly indulging in the imagination. 
Amid all controversy, the dialogue between science, the creative imagination, and  
literature appears as particularly polarizing, but also highly productive.18 Two opposing 
schools of thought additionally fueled the debate on this controversial topic: the 
materialists and the idealists. While for materialists the imagination should only be 
approached through the lens of physiological processes, the idealists sought to construct 
the imagination as a spiritualized element of the soul that, in contrast to the materialists, 
was not be reduced to bodily processes, and “nerves and fibers” only.19 The idealists 
regarded the creative imagination as a means of expressing the human soul, a sort of 
language that the soul could use to communicate with the conscious self. In other words, 
the materialists equated the imagination with any other bodily organ. Thus, it could not 
only be (verbally) dissected to arrive at the aspired results, but also deemed sick or 
healthy. Accordingly, imaginative malfunctions such as overt enthusiasm [Schwärmerei] 
and eccentricity [Grillenhaftigkeit] could now be treated and maybe cured.   
 For the idealists, the faculty of imagination similarly posed many questions, 
albeit with a different outcome. Turning their backs on materialism, idealist thinkers 
acknowledged the fact that the status quo of contemporary science did not allow us to 
measure the nature and function of the imagination due to its exclusively introspective 
nature. In order to narrow down the field of possible answers, many idealists took the 
                                                 
18The term science here includes not only natural scientific disciplines, but also disciplines such as  
medicine, psychology, psychiatry, or anthropology.  
 
19Gabriele Dürbeck, Einbildungskraft und Aufklärung: Perspektiven der Philosophie, Anthropologie 
und Ästhetik um 1750 (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1998) 230.   
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path of observation and abstraction. Thoughtful extrapolation from frequently 
introspective observation became the main approach to unveiling the mysteries 
surrounding the imagination. To be sure, despite all their grave differences, most 
thinkers were cautious, some even suspicious of the force of imagination. The discourse 
on imagination produced discussions not only on, say, divine inspiration, but also 
broader ones on frenzy, mesmerism and magnetism, religious zeal and enthusiasm. 
Scientists and lay audiences alike feared these phenomena and the loss of control and 
agency, which they represented.20  
Some of the topics and aspects of the discourse on the (creative) imagination 
strike today’s readers as more esoteric than scientific. The already mentioned animal 
magnetism, ghostly apparitions, and clairvoyance constituted this discourse as much as 
symptoms that, about a century later, were to be termed neurosis and psychosis. The 
methods and instruments to gather data pose another set of problems from today’s point 
of view. To a great extent, the data collected and evaluated stem from observations made 
in dreams, visions, reveries, and daydreams—in short, the data and the evidence came 
from introspective observations. If they did not originate in a rather amateurish self-
analysis, they were arrived at by the observation of others, and even simple hearsay at 
times.  What from today’s perspective would more likely constitute a methodological 
problem rather than an ample body of evidence, was for scientists in the long eighteenth 
century the only way of collecting data on a phenomenon that obviously includes 
exceptional brain (mind) activity. More than a century before the first EEG in 1924, 
                                                 
20Laura Otis, “Sciences of the Mind” in Literature and Science in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Laura Otis 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002) 329. 
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scientists at the turn of the eighteenth century eagerly sought out ways of expressing 
conditions and issues they believed were strictly tied to brain function. Resorting to 
dream reports, for instance, proved helpful and productive as it rendered the abstract 
idea of imagination material and manifest. Hence, in analogy to today’s scientists’ 
reading and interpreting the curves and graphs of an EEG record, scientists then resorted 
to the description of dreams and visions.     
 
Literary Playgrounds 
 In this dissertation I shed light on those authors who narrated the positive aspects 
of the imagination. I trace the ways in which these authors set literature in a dialogue 
with science on the one hand, and the creative imagination on the other, establishing 
thus a new, positive, valorization of the force of the imagination in German literature 
and culture around 1800. In an analysis of a survey of works from Karl Philipp Moritz’s 
Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde (1783-93), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Wilhelm 
Meisters Lehrjahre (1795), Heinrich von Kleist’s Das Käthchen von Heilbronn (1807-
08) as well as Prinz Friedrich von Homburg (1811), and F.W.J. Schelling’s Clara—
Über den Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt (1809), I explore how a variety 
of texts intervened in the discourse on imagination to foreground the curative effects of 
the imagination. I argue that in contrast to the dominant cautionary medical discourses 
on the imagination in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, these works encourage 
using one’s imaginative power to restore physical and mental health. The selection of 
texts examined in this dissertation emphasizes the variety of different approaches to the 
intersection between science, imagination, and literature. Moreover, these texts also 
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represent the most popular genres of that time. The novel and the psychological case 
study constitute two rather new yet highly popular genres around 1800, and supplement 
the confessions, the philosophical dialogue, and naturally, the play to represent the 
preferences of that time. The play, Kleist’s medium of choice for the instantiation of 
syncope and imagination demonstrates clearly, for example, that by incorporating most 
of the portrayed fainting spells into his theater plays Kleist finds a way of portraying 
what did not have a name until almost a century later: the unconscious. Though Moritz’s 
case studies and Goethe’s “The Confessions of the Beautiful Soul” all foreshadowed 
what Freud develops and names, in The Unconscious for example, it is Kleist who 
acknowledged, and perhaps even yielded, to the inadequacy of words to represent the 
motifs of mind-body issues at the turn of the nineteenth century. As the following 
chapters demonstrate, these authors not only renegotiated the boundaries of literature 
and science at their time, they also set science in dialogue with literature, and in the 
process reevaluated both. In each of my chapters, I highlight how the visualization of the 
curative process of imagination pushes the boundaries of science and literature alike. To 
be sure, the driving force behind the reciprocal exchange between science and literature 
is the creative imagination. As a result, this dialogue interweaves science, literature, and 
the creative imagination to make an intervention in the ways we perceive each of these 
discourses.  
In the process of seeking new modes of communicating philosophy, medicine, 
and psychology, literature became instrumental in revalorizing the positive effects of the 
creative imagination by showing in what way and to what end readers can make use of 
the creative imagination in a productive and positive way. In the same processes, the 
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otherwise dry and inaccessible philosophical or scientific treatises or psychological case 
studies, come to life in an entirely new way—one that in style and form revealed more 
parallels to literature and fiction than the original academic writing. The audience now 
faces characters, rather than statistical and nameless patients, whom they can identify 
with and learn from. During the same reading and learning process, the readers are 
exposed to the redefined thinking patterns that were necessary for each author to create 
their work the way they did. Intuitively, the readers can then assume and appropriate the 
same pattern. Thus, it is a critical moment that brings science to life for experts and 
amateurs of science and literature alike. Though the integration of the creative 
imagination into everyday thought begins for many readers with an imitation of what 
they have read, the nature of this process leads them beyond the point of imitation. Due 
to the fact that the creative imagination manifests itself in dreams, daydreams, or 
reveries, they can neither imitate nor enforce this experience. It is a process as natural as 
any other physiological one and requires therefore the same attention and care.  
Narrating this process creates a possibility of a first encounter with the creative 
imagination. The readers can easily become authors of their own narrative, and thus 
guarantee a constant exchange with the creative imagination. Engaging in the creative 
process of writing, be it in the form of a case study or a confession or diary entry, 
secures this creative process and keeps the creative imagination alive. This search for the 
right words, an adequate verbalization of one's observations, forces the writer to regard 
the subject matter from a number of perspectives in order to be able to represent it 
correctly. Approaching scientific and philosophical genres through the lens of a 
narrative results in a perpetual development and extension of both the way of 
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communicating contents and the contents themselves. From the point of view of the 
readers, the engaging literature is equally productive as it encourages the same 
playfulness and creativity in the interpretation of scientific and philosophical texts as in 
that of fictional narratives, poetry, or drama.  
As the following chapters show, many of the phenomena toward which Moritz, 
Goethe, Kleist, and Schelling worked were almost impossible to put into words due to an 
insufficiency of language. This again, goes back to the fact that many inventions that 
today allow scientists to express certain phenomena in words, tables, and diagrams 
(EEG, for example) had not yet been invented at the time. Using literature to portray 
science, and vice versa, that is employing science in literature, was a means of 
understanding current truths and facts as yet another version or interpretation of the facts 
accumulated up to that point. That way, writers and readers alike can reinterpret and 
renegotiate the current truths and avoid thus the standstill they feared. 
 Structuring this dissertation in chronological order foregrounds the evolution of 
this idea. Beginning with Karl Philipp Moritz’s collection of articles, this dissertation 
contends that the most significant contribution lies in the deliberate redefinition of the 
case study, launching thus an entirely new and radical intervention into the way science 
was communicated and propagated. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s revisiting of the 
genre of confessions makes a similar move encouraging its readers to see old facts in a 
new light and generate progress through a new interpretation. Though Goethe uses 
psychology as an example, he reaches out to science in general and not only the mind-
body issues. Heinrich von Kleist attempts to provide answers and clues through 
visualization of what is not linguistically conveyable. Using drama as a preferred genre, 
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Kleist chose to stage both the breakdown of language and the force of the imagination to 
overcome the gaps that linguistic communication creates. Ultimately, for Schelling, the 
only way to progress through the brief reveries is experienced in the moments before 
waking and sleeping. His model focuses on the force of feeling and thus knowing the 
spiritual realm beyond. Schelling redefines the philosophical dialogue and turns it into a 
novel, and this allows him to showcase the clarity of the experience through the clarity 
of the structure and the language of his new mode of philosophic dialogue. This 
trajectory outlines the gradual disposal of mediation between creativity and the 
addressee/recipient, meaning that for Moritz, for instance, the dialogue with the creative 
imagination had to be expressed through the medium of a case study. Schelling’s Clara, 
on the other hand, shows the far end of this trajectory, and requires neither mediation 
nor expression. Rather, the all-encompassing cognition finds its immediate application 
in life.   
 
Research Overview 
Scholars have not failed to note how, in the late eighteenth century, literature 
began to incorporate the discourse on the medicalization of the imagination. According 
to recent scholarship, medical didactic poems by physicians such as Johann Christian 
Ackermann (1746-1801), and plays such as Friedrich Schiller’s Die Räuber (1781) were 
a popular medium in the process intertwining literature and medicine.21 Most of all, 
                                                 
21The physician Johann Christian Gottfried Ackermann (1746-1801), for example, was one of the most 
prolific writers of medical didactic poems (medizinisches Lehrgedicht). On a thorough analysis of 
Ackermann’s work see chapter two and three in Julia Schreiner, Jenseits vom Glück: Suizid, Melancholie 
und Hypochondrie in deutschsprachigen Texten des späten 18. Jahrhunderts (München: Olderbourg 
Verlag, 2003). With regard to Schiller’s work see Marianne Schuller, “Körper, Fieber, Räuber: 
Medizinische Diskurs und Literarische Figur beim jungen Schiller” in Karl Pestalozzi, Wolfram 
Groddeck, and Ulrich Stadler, Physiognomie und Pathognomie: Zur Literarischen Darstellung von 
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however, the novel became the preferred medium for depicting and discussing the 
imagination and the processes revolving around it. Many current scholars locate mid-
eighteenth century medicine and psychology in direct proximity to the development of 
both the case study and the novel.22 Although case histories have existed since antiquity, 
they experienced a reinvention with regard to their popularity, style, and form in the 
course of the mid and late eighteenth century in journals published by Johann August 
Unzer and Moritz.23 In the eighteenth century, case histories become a popular genre to 
narrate all kinds of physiological, psychological, and behavioral anomalies. However, 
regardless which of these three aspects they narrate, the primary emphasis always rests 
on the psychological processes accompanying those anomalies. While in the past, the 
case history was narrated by the physician and served as a summary of external 
physiological facts, in the eighteenth century it is not only the physician, but also the 
patients who narrated their own story. The focus is now on the experiencing and 
perceiving of the ailment either by the patient or a bystander.24 The eighteenth-century 
novel joins the redefined case study in the pursuit of psychological processes. In both 
the case study as well as the novel the individual and subjectivity become points of 
reference for all that is narrated.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Individualität (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994).    
 
22For example, Andreas Gailus, “A Case of Individuality: Karl Philipp Moritz and the Magazine for 
Empirical Psychology,” New German Critique 79 (2000): 67-105.  
 
23Hippocratic case studies in Books I and III of his Of the Epidemics (400 B.C.E.) are probably the most 
prominent examples of traditional case studies. 
 
24The crucial thing is that these reinvented case studies are to greatest extent written for and by laymen, 
who narrate their observations in regard to themselves and their surroundings. In the German context, the 
first to introduce a substantial collection of such case studies to the general public was Johann August 
Unzer in his journal called Der Arzt (1759-64). 
 
 
 18
Consequently, many scholars see the case study as a precursor to the novel. The 
stance that scholars take is as multifaceted as the mind-body-problem itself.  Andreas 
Gailus, for instance, draws a strong connection between the novel and the case study. In 
his 2000 article “A Case of Individuality: Karl Philipp Moritz and the Magazine for 
Empirical Psychology,” Gailus regards the psychological novel as an almost logical 
extension and consequence of the case study.25 He further identifies the case study as a 
“blend” of discourses on “ethics and biopolitics, literature and science” and as a 
consequence of Moritz’s ambition to “find a mode of writing that does justice to the 
idiosyncrasies and detours of the individual's life, find a language that is commensurate 
with the singularity of the self.”26  Dietrich von Engelhardt’s Medizin in der Literatur 
der Neuzeit27 (1991) and Peter Heusser’s “Goethes Wissenschaftsmethode und die 
moderne Medizin”28 (2005) contend that in and through literature the human mind and 
body can strive for a balance, which is the ideal that eighteenth-century literature 
establishes as desirable. In order to achieve the desired balance, the body had to be in 
the scientific spotlight, as it was the platform on which human soul had a explicit 
influence and functioned thus as a vehicle of expression for the soul.29 Katherine 
                                                 
25Andreas Gailus, “A Case of Individuality: Karl Philipp Moritz and the Magazine for Empirical 
Psychology,” New German Critique, 79 (2000): 67-105. 
 
26Gailus 69-70. According to Gailus, Moritz’s psychological novel Anton Reiser (1785-90) visualizes best 
his attempts to bind the “basic threads” of one’s life into a continuous act of “narrative (self) reflection.” 
 
27Dietrich von Engelhardt, Medizin in der Literatur der Neuzeit (Hürtgenwald: Guido Pressler Verlag, 
1991).  
 
28Peter Heusser, “Goethes Wissenschaftsmethode und die moderne Medizin,” in Peter Stulz, Frank Nager, 
Peter Schulz, Literatur und Medizin (Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 2005).  
 
29Both scholars put an emphasis on the holistic approach of medicine, which they identify to be a 
subcategory of anthropology at that time and find best depicted in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s novels. 
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Kickel’s 2007 monograph titled Novel Notions examines the relationship between the 
medical reinvention of imagination as an organ in the seventeenth century and the 
eighteenth-century rise of the novel in England.30 This reinvention created the 
foundation for a change in our consideration of authors and narrators, and thus helped 
the English novel come to prominence. The idea of the author/narrator as someone who 
“reflect[s] on [his or her] own acts of authorial creation” is at the heart of Kickel’s 
work.31 It is this authorial awareness in creating an imaginative object that Kickel 
distinguishes as the crucial element of eighteenth-century English fiction.  Catherine 
Minter presents the other side of the coin. While most scholars map out the socalled 
process of Physiologierung of the imagination, Minter’s 2002 The Mind-Body-Problem 
in German Literature traces the exact opposite of that process, namely a movement 
towards a “gradual spiritualization” of the focus within the mind-body context.32 Minter 
postulates that “the development away from sensationalist and materialist theories 
towards a vitalist and then idealist monism in German philosophical anthropology 
between Enlightenment and Romanticism exemplifies the desire for compromise during 
this period.”33  
                                                 
30Katherine Kickel, Novel Notions -- Medical Discourse and the Mapping of the Imagination in 
Eighteenth-Century English Fiction (New York and London: Routledge, 2007). 
 
31Kickel contends that the medical discourse on the “organ” of the imagination can be regarded as the 
cradle of the English novel. Furthermore, the chosen examples of fiction prove that the medical discourse 
launched by these seventeenth century doctors continues to exist in eighteenth-century fiction, and there 
especially in the role of the authors who contemplate “their own roles as authors of imaginative objects.” 
 
32Catherine J. Minter, The Mind-Body Problem in German Literature 1770-1830. Wezel, Moritz, and Jean 
Paul (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002). 
  
33Minter 163. While in Moritz’s work Minter still finds a certain necessity of a physical medium for the 
soul to be able to realize its intention, she interprets Jean Paul’s utilization of phenomena such as 
magnetic sleep as obvious evidence “of the idea that everything is spiritual.” 
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Betsy van Schlun’s 2007 Science and the Imagination focuses on the literary 
analysis of the phenomenon of mesmerism in English and American fiction.34 Van 
Schlun explores works by a number of English and American authors, such as Edgar 
Allan Poe, Charles Dickens, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Wilkie Collins—to name but a few. 
According to van Schlun’s analysis, the phenomenon of mesmerism, and in particular 
the disembodied journeys of the spirit, functioned as a means to manipulate public 
imagination, provide cures for various symptoms, or explore the conscious and 
unconscious mind. Van Schlun claims that “the nineteenth century underwent a 
transition from the material towards the immaterial and spiritual” and that these changes 
and experiences had to be “transmitted by a medium (human or other).”35 Due to a lack 
of technological possibilities the imagination was the driving force as well as the 
medium for virtual journeys. With the increasing permeation of technology in our 
society imagination has been gradually superseded by technology as medium for virtual 
journeys. Building on van Schlun’s research I would like to expand her analysis of 
virtual journeys. As a look at German literature around 1800 unmistakably shows, 
mesmerism is not the only vehicle to undertake such journeys. Deep daydreams, waking 
dreams, reveries, but also self-magnetizations bring many literary characters to distant, 
exotic, and spiritual places. Furthermore, these journeys do not merely function as a 
form of escape as van Schlun implies. Rather, many of them have a very distinct 
objective: to generate a highly individualized cure, idea, piece of information or advice 
for the particular literary figure.  
                                                 
34Betsy Van Schlun, Science and the Imagination: Mesmerism, Media, and the Mind in Nineteenth- 
Century English and American Literature (Berlin; Madison, Wis.: Galda + Wilch Verlag, 2007).  
35Van Schlun 309. 
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Van Schlun’s line of argument states that the spiritual imagination gradually 
underwent a process of materialization until it finally was superseded by technology. In 
other words, this technology has assumed the role imagination once played. At this 
point, I suggest a different reading of this process of materialization, which Dürbeck 
suggests as well and calls “Physiologisierung” [“the process of become a physiological 
phenomenon”]. Unlike van Schlun, I claim that the imagination as it is depicted in 
German literature around 1800 should not be read as superseded by technology of the 
20th- and 21st-centuries. Casting a look at, for example, video games as one new 
technology that provides opportunities to escape reality, may offer great new insights. 
For even though we may be able to undertake virtual journey in a more convenient ways 
than our Victorian predecessors, these journeys do not serve the same function. If we 
revisit the example of the “medical mission” of many of these journeys, it becomes clear 
that neither of the new technologies facilitates virtual journeys today that can provide 
such a “healing” option. The question that I want to ask, therefore, is what was different 
about the imagination and the contemporary reception and discourse of it that facilitated 
such a novel and radical change in this thought.  
 
 
Methodological Approach 
 This dissertation is divided into four chapters. Each chapter is devoted to one 
particular author and a selection of his literary and theoretical works. With respect to the 
methodology and structure of this dissertation, I have found that embedding the primary 
texts into theoretical texts of their time facilitates the most productive analysis due to 
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many reasons. First, the definitions and approaches to concepts involving dreams, 
imagination, or the unconscious differed vastly from today’s interpretations of the same 
issues. Thus, setting literature in dialogue with contemporary scientific and 
philosophical texts provides a nuanced and thorough understanding of how significant 
and radical the intervention made by Moritz, Goethe, Kleist, and Schelling were at their 
time. Second, the close relation between the literary text and the theoretical one by the 
same author emphasizes the rationale that, as I show, compelled each author not only to 
verbalize, or in Kleist’s case additionally to stage, their intervention, but also to choose a 
particular genre for this reason. Both aspects of the authors’ oeuvre, the literary and the 
theoretical, can thus be recreated and reevaluated in a new light, and the impact their 
works had on their contemporaries becomes more evident. Third, this approach situates 
the concepts central to this dissertation in a historically nuanced way. Understanding the 
differences between the nature and the function of the creative imagination, for instance, 
and the different approaches and conclusions of scholarship then and now, revalorizes 
the debates on eighteenth-century mind-body issues to greatest extent.   
Centering each chapter on a different author and a different genre reveals the 
different aspects of the creative imagination that each author represents called for a 
particular genre to facilitate a way of communicating the content with means that 
exceeded a mere verbalization of them. In addition, each chapter highlights a different 
aspect of the imagination, yet the common ground is that all of them equivocally 
embrace the therapeutic aspects of the creative imagination. In this light, I emphasize the 
usefulness of the dialogue between literature and science, and the significance of 
literature in this discourse, with regard to the discourse on the creative imagination 
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because it creates new ways of communicating complex subject ways in the same way as 
it enhances reflecting on these matters from entirely new perspectives. With this 
methodology, I trace the movement in German literature, culture, and thought that 
countered the warnings and criticism of the creative side of the force of imagination. As 
the example health demonstrates, mental and physiological salutary improvements 
constituted one of the major benefits the creative imagination was considered to have, 
yet by far not the only one. The active dialogue with the imagination unleashed forces in 
each individual entering this dialogue that enable him or her to solve problems and 
questions that reach far beyond the level of health.  
My dissertation establishes that all facets of dreams had a determining influence 
on the success of this dialogue as it was the key vehicle facilitating the mutual 
communication as it encompasses different kinds of communication: verbal, visual, or 
emotional, for instance. In this light, it additionally emphasizes that literature served a 
similar purpose. By intertwining literature and discourses on psychology, science, or 
philosophy—all of which intersect in the discourse on the imagination—the creative 
force of the author as well as the reader creates a platform that is able to convey more 
and better than traditional scientific writing ever could. Therefore, my method to 
examine an author’s literary work side by side with his theoretical work, underscores 
this relationship and sheds a new light on their respective works as well as the 
relationship between science and literature in general.   
 
Chapter Overview  
Chapter One: 
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Redeeming the Imagination: Karl Philipp Moritz’s Journal for Empirical Psychology 
and the Reinvention of the Case Study 
 
 In the first chapter of my dissertation, I shed a different light on the matter by 
suggesting that Moritz’s Magazin be read as a collection of fictional texts, rather than as 
a survey of articles whose main function was the communication of scientific facts. 
Accordingly, I will engage a selection of articles in a literary analysis that focuses on 
both the formal aspects of the case study as a genre as well as the content that Moritz’s 
Magazin communicates. More importantly, this chapter demonstrates that the 
redefinition of the case study enhanced the dialogue between the form and the content. 
As will become evident in my close analysis in this chapter, this redefined case study 
had a radical impact on two major questions: first, how do we think about and express 
science, and second, which role does literature play in the narrativization of it.  
In this light, Moritz’s genre of choice—the case study—becomes instrumental in 
this process. Rather than calling for an increased production of novels or poems dealing 
with the mind-body-issue, for example, Moritz offers an uncomplicated genre that lends 
itself on several levels to help further his cause. Departing from the strictly Hippocratic 
case study that solely focused on the results from an external observations of a patient’s  
 
symptoms, Moritz’s Magazin renegotiated the formal rules to include narratives based  
on external as much as internal observations. Moritz’s Magazin substitutes the rigid lists,  
charts, and tables that we find in Hippocrates’ book III and IV of his On the Epidemics with  
highly flexible ones whose dominant rule is the narrativization of the content. This  
flexibility not only allows lay writers to contribute to the discourse, but more significantly,  
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it generates a space for scientific exchange on the one hand, and creative playfulness on the  
other. Moritz’s case study release the authors from their obligation to follow the rules of a  
particular genre and harness thus the creativity and expressive power, that, as I claim, is  
such an important factor in Moritz’s intervention. 
 
 Chapter Two: 
Metamorphosis of Understanding: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s “Confessions of the 
Beautiful Soul” and the Healing Force of Daydreaming 
 
With regard to the beautiful soul’s narrative, its position within the frame 
narrative, its nature and function in and for Wilhelm Meister triggered admiration and 
criticism alike, among both Goethe’s amateurs as well as Goethe scholars. Generally 
interpreted as either a neurotic loner, or the prototypical independent woman who 
assumes the control over her own life, I focus on the relationship between science and 
literature that I argue Goethe explores in “The Confessions of the Beautiful Soul.” As 
this chapter shows, Goethe’s genre of choice, the confessions, alludes as much to the 
previously discussed case study as to religious writing. The fact that the alleged author 
makes a confession places her in the same position as the contributors in Moritz’s 
Magazin as it implies that the narrator truthfully reports facts. At the same time, the 
obvious and playful allusion to the reinvented case study suggests that, here too, the 
author chooses a genre that invites creativity, flexibility, and imagination in order to 
frame her confessions. The tension that arises out of this apparent contrast is crucial for 
Goethe’s suggested approach towards furthering science. In analogy to Moritz’s cause, 
Goethe suggests that understanding human nature is key for understanding the world on 
a bigger scale. Yet, while Moritz’s cause targets mainly the perpetual exploration and 
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experience of the faculty of creative imagination, Goethe instrumentalizes “The 
Confessions of the Beautiful Soul” for the process of seeing old things in an entirely 
new light.  Furthermore, I interpret “The Confessions of the Beautiful Soul” as a 
narrative that showcases the usefulness of the creative imagination in many aspects: the 
beautiful soul’s own process of self-realization is as much positively affected by the 
imaginative faculty as is the process of her own literary production. Similarly to what 
this dissertation concludes with regard to Moritz’s renegotiation of the case study, in the 
case of the beautiful soul the structure of the chosen genre enhances the dialogue with 
and the application of the creative imagination. The formal flexibility of the genre makes 
for an adequate platform for the beautiful soul to communicate her healing process. The 
accessible language and detailed depictions of her physical and emotional condition 
facilitate a quick grasp and comprehension of the materials conveyed on the side of the 
readers. By engaging in the writing process of her confessions, the beautiful soul once 
more receives the chance to reconsider her life, and see it from a different perspective.  
The same creative process is valid for the reader. During the reading process of 
both narratives, the frame and the embedded one, the readers encounter a redefinition of 
a well-known and popular genre. The disruptive nature of each of the narratives presents 
these narratives in a new light imposing thus the new perspectives Goethe calls for in his 
work. As I emphasize in this chapter, by renegotiating the boundaries of literature and 
science, Goethe does not intend to unearth entirely new ground altogether. Rather, he 
calls for a rediscovery of facts, truths, or genres. In other words, Goethe’s cause is to 
promote learning to see anew, that is, seeing old and well-known subject matters in a 
new light.  I further argue that these disruptions visualize the discontinuities of thought. 
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Disrupting the structure of a narrative, or similarly, indulging in verbal imagery, 
expresses the observed status quo, and makes it universally comprehensible at a point 
where the expressive force of language fails or breaks down. This failure of language is 
represented through structural disruption, which in the case of the beautiful soul is 
accompanied by an exceedingly vivid mental imagery. For example, for the beautiful 
soul’s creative imagination, the preferred way of expression is through buoyant 
daydreams that she experiences since her childhood. Every such episode interrupts the 
progress of the narrative and that of her life creating excursions and facilitating side 
glances that do both: provide remedy and relief, and depict her reality in a new light. 
That way, the beautiful soul’s narrative emphasizes the fact that it is not meant to 
instruct its readers, as the genre would imply, but rather animate them to engage in a 
similar dialogue with the creative imagination. A mere imitation of the mechanisms at 
work for the beautiful soul’s improvement does not suffice. What is crucial is the 
genuine engagement in this dialogue with the creative imagination, an act of original 
creation of those shifts of perspectives that were crucial in Goethe’s writing. 
 
 
Chapter Three: 
Filling the Blanks: Restorative Effects of Creative Imagination in Heinrich von Kleist’s 
Das Käthchen von Heilbronn and Prinz Friedrich von Homburg 
  
In this chapter of my dissertation, I examine two of Kleist’s works: Das Käthchen 
von Heilbronn und Prinz Friedrich von Homburg. Both theater plays explore the 
complexities of the mind-body-issues and foreground the vagueness of the source and 
the nature of knowing. My examination of these two works focuses on the intervention 
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made through the content and through the choice of genre with regard to the discourse 
on the creative imagination.  I argue that Kleist purposefully combines the motif of the 
fragmented consciousness—fragmented through dreams, fainting spells, or sleepwalking 
respectively—with the theater play as a genre. To be sure, Kleist’s prose is not free of 
characters with such altered states of consciousness. Yet with a few exceptions and in 
contrast to those instantiated in a play, their counterparts play a less dramatic and 
pronounced role. Consequently, I suggest that Kleist utilized the structure of a theater to 
emphasize and illustrate the continuity within the disruption that the majority of his 
works exemplify. My analysis proves that acknowledging the creative imagination as a 
natural faculty one receives at birth is the crucial difference between Käthchen and 
Friedrich. In that light, I argue, Kleist portrays the force of the creative imagination as 
the only means that can be instrumental in completing the big picture that he strives to 
gain in and through his work. In addition, Kleist uses the theater play as a genre to make 
a contribution to the psychological discourse on the mind-body relation. This chapter 
suggests that these interruptions in consciousness be read as an attempt to visualize what 
language fails to express, and therefore cannot be verbally communicated. The creative 
imagination is in Kleist’s works the visual language that facilitates the understanding of 
the contents and ideas communicated through dreams and foregrounded by the visual 
nature of communication in theater plays. 
 
 Chapter Four: 
“Bilderloses Anschauen”—Creative Imagination and Immediate Cognition in Friedrich 
Wolfgang Johann Schelling’s Clara 
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 The first half of the chapter devoted to Schelling’s Clara—Über den 
Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt examines the structure and character 
constellation, as well as the language used in the novel, while the second half delves into 
the discussion on the importance of creative imagination that I contend Schelling 
foregrounds in his novel. Clara’s focus on the transition states into and out of sleep 
makes Schelling’s novel a unique text. To be sure, as this dissertation shows, dreams 
were a topic of high interest in German literature and thought during the long eighteenth 
century and beyond. Yet in contrast to the traditional literary representation of dreams, 
Schelling’s take on the topic stands out as it concentrates on the emotional and cognitive 
aspect of dreams rather the visual. Unlike any other dream and vision report explored in 
this dissertation, the importance of creative imagination comes into bearing not through 
visualization, but through a bestowing of the state of cognition in which the knowledge 
is transmitted through feeling. This experience is only possible in the brief moments 
before awakening or falling into a deep slumber and it facilitates an exchange between 
the physical and spiritual dimension of existence. To strive for a lifestyle that 
encourages such an exchange on a regular basis is what humanity should do according to 
Schelling. It is not only useful in finding one’s way around in the afterlife, but more 
importantly, it is crucial for improving our life in the physical world here and now. As 
this chapter demonstrates, Schelling’s proposed immediate cognition triggers 
improvement of quality of life in general, yet in particular the quality of one’s mental 
and physical health. In fact, the dialogue between the spiritual and the physical world is 
so beneficial that mere thinking or talking about can already have a positive impact on 
all kinds of salutary issues. As the heroine Clara shows, the conversation about these 
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issues with the two other characters enables her to abandon the physical and mental 
constraints, and move powerfully into a new future. The crux is to comprehend oneself 
as an intersection of the physical and the spiritual realms and thus incorporate these two 
dimensions into one’s quotidian life as far as possible.  
The intersection of the two worlds, the physical and the spiritual one, is mirrored 
in the reciprocity of the content and the structure of the novel constitutes the core of this 
chapter’s analysis.  The chapter illustrates that the reciprocity conveys additional content 
and meaning through structural and stylistic means. For instance, setting the chapters of 
his novel in relation to the order of the seasons allows Schelling to illustrate that the 
spiritual imaginary world is as much part of nature as the seasons. It follows the same 
laws and rhythms that rule the rest of the world and are thus to be treated in the same 
way. In other words, I contend the way Schelling wants his readers to interact with the 
physical world should be indicating and modeling the way they approach their imaginary 
worlds. Furthermore, by using clear conversation language Schelling not only facilitates 
a better understanding of his philosophy, but additionally imitates the directness, 
simplicity, and clarity of the immediate cognition that characterizes the dialogue with 
the imagination. The character constellation further emphasizes the tripartite structure of 
Schelling’s envisioned world. With a priest, a physician, and Clara, Schelling mirrors 
the trinity of the spiritual world, the natural scientific world, and the space of their 
intersection. Clara, the character, functions as this very intersection and exemplifies the 
benefits of the exchange between the two worlds. Ultimately, I argue, that her ability to 
integrate both aspects into her thought fuels the healing of her health and her financial 
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problems, making her thus the only character to reach the state of clarity that all other 
can only experience in their dreams.
CHAPTER ONE: 
 
REDEEMING THE IMAGINATION: KARL PHILIPP MORITZ’S JOURNAL FOR EMPIRICAL 
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE REINVENTION OF THE CASE STUDY 
 
Introduction: The Rediscovery of Imagination   
In 1782, after returning from his walking tour in England, Karl Philipp Moritz 
believed himself to be fatally ill. Accepting his unfortunate fate and untimely death, he 
lay in bed for days, expecting his life to end any moment. For months, his body was 
stricken with fever, coughing, and an irregular heartbeat. Being the difficult patient that 
he evidently was, Moritz did not fail to overindulge in his stubborn refusal of even the 
most basic medical cures that his physician friend Dr. Marcus Herz had prescribed to 
him. Moritz believed he was dying of something he himself diagnosed as “Polypen im 
Herzen” [polyps in his heart”], and his physician was unable to convince him otherwise. 
Months of fruitless attempts of reasoning with Moritz, threats to abandon him as a 
patient, as well as numerous physical cures drove Herz to a decision that was as 
unorthodox and drastic as it proved to be successful: he decided to convince Moritz that, 
indeed, he was dying and to seek to cure him that way.36 In his musings on this case, 
“Moritz’s Krankenakte,” published in 1805 in the Journal der practischen Arzneykunde 
und Wundarzneykunst (1795-1836), Herz writes:  
                                                 
36Marcus Herz, Philosophisch-medizinische Aufsätze (St. Ingbert: Rohrig, 1997). 
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Einige Minuten Nachdenken brachten in mir das Resultat hervor, daß es 
unmöglich sey, dem heftigen Fieber zu steuern und meinen Freund zu retten, 
ohne ihn vorher aus dem zerrüttenden Zustand zwischen Furcht und Hoffnung 
mit Gewalt zu reissen, und daß ich ihn, da das Gefühl seiner Krankheit und seine 
lebhafte schwärmende Phantasie allen meinen aufrichtigen Versicherungen von 
Gefahr trotz bieten, vielmehr von der gewissen Gefahr überzeugen müsse (Herz 
71-72). 
 
[A few minutes of contemplation brought to light the conclusion that it was 
impossible to fight the fever and save my friend without prying him previously 
violently out of the hands of the state between fear and hope, and that I had to 
convince him of this certain danger because the feeling of his disease and his 
lively enthusiastic fantasy defied all my honest affirmation of this danger.] 
 
As Herz notices, the heart of Moritz’s struggle is not Moritz’s heart organ at all. Despite 
all its evidently physical manifestations, it is not Moritz’s heart that was afflicted, but 
rather his imagination, as Herz concludes in his case study. Herz was determined to cure 
Moritz by rescuing him from the “lebhafte schwärmende Phantasie” [“lively enthusiastic 
fantasy”] that constitutes the core of all his ailments.37 Snatching him out from under the 
grip of his raving, sickening fantasy is not an easy task, as Moritz’s patient record 
proves. Reasoning him out of this fantasy has failed, and physical facts seem to have 
neither power over nor any particular value for Moritz. What Herz therefore launches is 
                                                 
37Herz 72. 
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a deliberate and thorough infusion of what in fact is simply yet another fantasy. Unlike 
Moritz’s primary fantasy, the one implanted by Herz comes from without, a fact so 
obvious that it is astounding it escaped Moritz’s attention. Herz thoroughly orchestrates 
this illusion as he believes it to be the only possible remedy for Moritz. The progression 
of Moritz’s disease from the moment of Herz’s death warrant proves the physician right. 
Only eight days later, he finds Moritz “in Beinkleidern und Schlafrock, frisirt, die Feder 
in der Hand am Tische sitzen.” [“in trousers and dressing gown, coiffed, the quill in his 
hand, sitting at the table.”]38  Upon Herz’s inquiries, Moritz’s states he  “befinde [s]ich 
leicht und wohl, ... habe die ganze Nacht nicht gehustet.” [“was well, … not having 
coughed in the course of the night”].39 Herz’s unorthodox remedy had kicked in and 
yielded precisely the result he expected: Moritz’s recuperated entirely from a (not so) 
fatal disease.  
 Herz’s case study of Moritz’s wondrous illness and the ensuing recuperation 
bears witness not only to the long eighteenth century’s prevailing interest in medical and 
psychological research—in hypochondria for example—but also to the revised form of 
the case study, which is the focus of this chapter. Herz’s case study stands in contrast to 
mainstream psychological research at that time. Following their British colleagues, who 
at the beginning of the eighteenth century were convinced to have discovered the organ 
of the soul and imagination, German physicians and philosophers alike picked up the 
trails that British scientists had blazed with their work. Among Germany’s most 
prominent and devoted scientists querying the workings of the human imagination and 
                                                 
38Herz 83. 
 
39Herz 83. 
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its relations to the human body were Albrecht von Haller and Christian Wolff.  They not 
only inspired many of their contemporaries; their work also represents the two different 
strands in the research on the mind-body-problem at that time.  
Basing his work on physical and material factors, such as “nerve fibers” and 
“tissues” for instance, von Haller sought to account for the tangible nature of the human 
imagination, rather than offer an explanation grounded in religious or metaphysical 
views. 40 His ideas and discoveries made him one of the main interlocutors in the mind-
body discourse throughout the eighteenth century and beyond. Despite the fact that many 
of his medical discoveries have become obsolete by now, Haller’s long-lasting devotion 
to matters of the imagination [Einbildungskraft] illustrates the importance of this 
discourse for eighteenth-century progress in the fields of medicine and psychology. In 
the debates over the constitution and workings of the human soul and imagination, 
Haller’s numerous publications promoted what scholars today refer to as a 
Physiologisierung, a process of materialization which categorized the soul as yet another 
human organ and integrated it into the same category as the kidneys, liver, or lungs.41 
Explaining the human soul by means of anatomy and physiology was in the eighteenth 
century a radical step that renegotiated its then-current apprehension as it sought to 
dethrone the human soul, which for millennia was believed to be of divine origin, and 
                                                 
40For further reading on Albrecht von Haller´s medical approach see Gabriele Dürbeck, Einbildungskraft 
und Aufklärung: Perspektiven der Philosophie, Anthropologie und Ästhetik um 1750 (Tübingen: M. 
Niemeyer, 1998).   
 
41Gabriele Dürbeck, “’Reizende’ und reizbare Einbildungskraft: Anthropologische Ansätze bei Johann  
Gottlob Krüger und Albrecht von Haller,“ in Jorn Steigerwald, and Daniela Watzke, Reiz, Imagination,  
Aufmerksamkeit: Erregung und Steuerung von Einbildungskraft im klassischen Zeitalter, 1680-1830  
(Wurzburg: Konigshausen & Neumann, 2003) 227. 
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make it entirely human and material.42 The brief glimpse into Moritz’s medical records 
shows that Haller’s standpoint, albeit seminal and prevailing, did not remain 
uncontested, for it is Moritz’s belief, a mere fancy, that launches his recovery.   
 Christian Wolff represents the other end of the spectrum as he extensively 
explores the mind, though not its divine, but its mysterious and seemingly infinite 
nature. Since the invention of the term psychologia is generally ascribed to sixteenth-
century German humanists, it is difficult to consider Wolff one of the founding fathers 
of psychology. It is safe to say, however, that Wolff promoted and dispersed “his” 
psychology in an unparalleled manner.43 Wollf’s chair at the University of Halle 
attracted many students, who, after Wolff’s death, continued his work and became 
leading thinkers in the mind-body discourse around 1800. Wolff’s work and intellectual 
heritage influenced public figures such as Herz, Johann Christian Reil, Karl Abraham 
Zedler, or Johann August Unzer, and helped establish Halle as the intellectual center of 
mind-body issues.44 In addition, Zedler’s Universal-Lexicon (1732-54) was written “in 
the shadow of the philosophical system of Christian Wolff” and guaranteed thus a 
“prominent place” to psychology—rather than physiology—as well as its wide 
dissemination.45 
                                                 
42Dürbeck 234. 
 
43Matthew Bell, The German Tradition of Psychology in Literature and Thought, 1700-1840 (Cambridge;  
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 18. 
 
44Alexander Košenina, Literarische Anthropologie. Die Neuentdeckung des Menschen (Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag, 2008) 12. 
 
45Bell 13. 
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 Haller and Wolff were the pioneers of a particular strand of the mind-body 
research in the eighteenth century. The common ground that both scholars share is their 
devotion to scientific progress and the elucidation of the mysteries surrounding the 
human soul. Despite the fact that they represent opposite ends of the spectrum in the 
mind-body dichotomy, they both came from a natural-scientific and academic 
background and wrote for an academic audience. In contrast to Herz’s case study, Haller 
and Wolff’s publications were written from the scholarly standpoint of a physician, and 
as their terminology and methodology reveal, they were meant to be read solely by an 
academic audience. The patient was merely an object to be described, a source of 
symptoms posing questions and unable to provide any answers that could further our 
knowledge about mind-body interrelations. In this regard, the treatises written by Haller, 
Wolff, as well as their predecessors and successors, resemble the traditional case study, 
informed by ancient examples such as Hippocrates’s Books I and III of The Epidemics.46 
Like the academic treatise, the traditional case study is written from the perspective of 
the attending physician or analyzing scholar for an expert audience. The patient, again, 
is merely a playground for the physician to observe, analyze, experiment, and, hopefully, 
cure. Certainly, the patient does not have the agency to collaborate with the treating 
                                                 
46One of the most widely cited works portraying ancient medicine and case study is Book III of The 
Epidemics by Hippocrates. Throughout all of the case studies presented in this work, Hippocrates 
provides information solely on strictly bodily symptoms such as fevers, bleeding, or sweating. Each case 
study gives the number of days from the outbreak until the end of the disease, which usually ends with 
the patient’s death. Crises are of utmost importance to Hippocrates as he denotes every crisis. The only 
piece of information that Hippocrates’s case study reveals which is not a physical symptom is weather 
and climate, both of which appear to bear a great influence on the patient’s state of health. There is no 
hint of the patients’ personal information, neither their background, not their past patient history. Not to 
mention, the patients are not given the opportunity to describe their own perspective of their disease, how 
they feel, or what it is that they exactly feel—a stark difference from the eighteenth-century case study. 
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physician, not to mention provide the correct diagnosis or the remedy himself.47 All this 
is due to change in the course of the eighteenth century. The physician’s voice, once the 
only thinkable narrator, includes statements and observations made by the patients. 
Oftentimes, the physician as narrator becomes entirely obsolete and is replaced by the 
patients themselves or other laypersons such family and friends. The patients’ feelings, 
dreams, and anxieties appear to be of as much importance as actual bodily symptoms. As 
the quick glimpse into Moritz’s medical record reveals, even if a physician is present, he 
is likelier to listen to the patient and include the patients’ observation into his account, 
and this changes the case study substantially. The restriction of scientific progress is one 
of the main issues Moritz’s project tries to rebut. As this chapter will illustrate, with his 
reconceptualization of both the imagination as well as the case study as a genre, Moritz 
seeks to combat the elitism of the early Enlightenment scientific project in order to 
disseminate Enlightenment among all social and professional strata.  
In its most traditional sense, the case study before and after the publication of 
Moritz’s Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde is considered to be mainly “clinical 
storytelling” that “relies on a chronology of bodily events, [in which] the patient 
subjectively experiences altered conditions—a sequence of disruptions to physiological 
functioning—and tells this experience to the clinician. The clinician then renders this 
account into narrative sequences.”48 Narrating the course of a disease from the 
physician’s point of view had been the main perspective to view a disease. The first 
                                                 
47For further reading on the development of the case study from the antiquity until today, see: Julia 
Epstein, Altered Conditions. Disease, Medicine, and Storytelling (New York and London: Routledge, 
1995). 
 
48Epstein 25. 
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steps away from the traditional case study are taken in Johann August Unzer’s 
“medicinische Wochenschrift” [“a medical weekly”] Der Arzt (1759-64), which was the 
first widely read psychological journal in the eighteenth century. It included not only 
short treatises written by renowned scientists and physicians such as Albrecht von 
Haller, but also a number of case studies of psychological and physiological diseases, as 
well as medical curiosities submitted by lay writers. However, many of the allegedly lay 
case studies are satires written and conceived by Unzer himself in order to ridicule the 
rampant hypochondria at that time and express a pungent judgment instead of furthering 
progress.49 Thus, it is not until Moritz’s bestselling Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde 
that the traditional case study and medical narrative experience an earnest reinvention in 
terms of both content and form. Unlike its contemporaries, Moritz’s Magazin includes 
lay studies and observations as well as contributions made by scientists and physicians 
such as Marcus Herz, and both types of the case study are to be taken equally at face 
value.50 The frame and rules of the case study as a genre become more fluid and flexible. 
As many contributions show, lay writers neither pay attention to the same details as 
physicians habitually do, nor are they strictly focused on physiological explanations. 
Sometimes they do not look for an explanation at all, but rather document what they take 
to be an inexplicable phenomenon or a freak of nature that they feel has to be shared 
                                                 
49Mathias Reiber, Anatomie eines Bestsellers—Johann August Unzers Wochenschrift »Der Arzt« 
(Göttingen: Wallstein, 1999). 
 
50See for example, Adam Melchior Weikard’s psychological journal Der philosophische Arzt (1775-77), 
Christian Reil’s Rhapsodieen über die Anwendung der psychischen Kurmethode auf Geisteszerrüttungen 
(1803), Marcus Herz’s Versuch über den Schwindel (1791), or Johann Gotthilf Schubert’s Altes und 
Neues aus dem Gebiete der innern Seelenkunde (1851) are all brilliant examples for formally traditional 
medical storytelling. The physician has complete agency, the patient is reduced merely to a literal body 
of evidence and an intriguing object of interest, at best. 
 
 
 40
with others. Physiological rules are often disregarded, and for many contributors the 
depths of the human mind are those secrets to which science should devote itself 
primarily. Rather than trying to explain the cause of fever fits, a vast number of 
contributions show that what was most interesting in instances of fever fits, or any other 
physiological disease, were the altered psychological conditions that occurred during a 
disease. Though it may seem like a profanation of scientific laws and even the 
Enlightenment project, Moritz aim is to renegotiate the general approach to the main 
scientific discipline such as medicine and psychology. Moritz’s radical intervention into 
the mind-body discourse is an attempt to dismantle the restrictive ways in which his 
contemporaries think and write about medicine and psychology. Including non-scientific 
contributors helps Moritz to loosen traditional boundaries, which for him often manifest 
as prejudices that rule our thinking patterns. 
Imagination and fantasy become the main factor in exploring not only 
psychological phenomena, but also physiological ones, and the content of dreams 
becomes as valuable in the medical detective work as blood work, for instance.51 The 
realms that are accessible in dreams offer insights that are invaluable for both the 
patient’s recovery as well as the progress of science. In this sense, Herz’s treatment of 
Moritz in the early 1780s is indeed symptomatic. The new kind of case study documents 
numerous reports of dreams and fantasies being helpful instruments in the pursuits of 
                                                 
51There are a number of case studies that document a seemingly miraculous healing at a point when 
physicians had lost all hope and the cure came to the patient in a dream. These cases can be found in all 
major psychological journals, such as the aforementioned Der Arzt, Altes und Neues aus dem Gebiet der 
Seelenkunde, or Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde. One such example, reported by Marcus Herz, will 
be discussed at a later point in this chapter.  
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science revolving around the soul and its functions.52 Imaginative worlds become thus an 
integral part of Moritz’s vision of the progress of the Enlightenment and the lack of 
scientific explanations in lay contributions is, for Moritz, a powerful tool to reconsider 
all that we know. The case studies prove that imagination should neither be contained 
nor feared, and that though it frequently transgresses the boundaries of reason or even 
physical law—a fact that, as Karl Philipp Moritz’s own case of illness depicts—it may 
be put to use in a positive and productive way.  It is a trait the imagination shares with 
the genre of case study, as the case study too transgresses boundaries, and which will be 
the centerpiece of this chapter. Moritz’s take on redeeming the imagination places him 
outside the two dominant threads at that time: Haller’s pursuit of Physiologisierung, but 
also Wolff’s dominance of the spirit. Moritz philosophy clearly shows that imagination 
is more than nerves and fibers. At the same time, he refrains from leaning towards 
spiritualization. Moritz’s vision consciously includes the body and the mind because the 
mind (with its unconscious parts) is there to help solve problems in the physical reality 
of the here and now.    
 Recent scholarship on Moritz’s Magazin has shifted its attention from a 
Foucauldian reading of the case study as an instrument of policing and disciplining 
oneself as well as others towards a consideration of the case study’s influence on the rise 
                                                 
52See for example Henri F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious. The History and Evolution of 
Dynamic Psychiatry (New York: Harper Collins, 1970), 130: In his work, Ellenberger invokes many 
cases from the 18th and 19th century that graphically portray the force of the medicalization of the 
imagination. The following quote is a clear example for the importance of dreams, be it experienced in 
natural sleeps, or, as in this case, in sleeps induce through animal magnetism.“During her sleep, Estelle 
prescribed her won treatment and diet. Soon after the first sessions, a comforting angel appeared to her in 
her magnetic sleep whom she named Angelina and with whom she engaged in lively conversations.“ 
Noteworthy is also the fact that the fifth volume of Moritz’s Magazin alone contains 10 contributions 
dealing with dreams and their direct and indirect influences on the waking life. For example, "Ein 
Traum“ (219-32), "Eine Traumahndung“ (248-9), or "Ein schwer zu erklärender Traum“ (207-11) all 
document the increasing influence and seriousness of this discourse. All articles mentioned in: Karl 
Philipp Moritz: Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde, Petra und Uwe Nettelbeck (ed.), (Nördlingen: Franz 
Greno Verlag, 1986). 
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of the novel in Germany around 1800. Andreas Gailus, for instance, draws a strong 
connection between the novel and the case study. In his article “A Case of Individuality: 
Karl Philipp Moritz and the Magazine for Empirical Psychology,” Gailus regards the 
psychological novel as an almost logical extension and consequence of the case study.53 
He further identifies the case study as a “blend” of discourses on “ethics and biopolitics, 
literature and science” and as a consequence of Moritz’s ambition to “find a mode of 
writing that does justice to the idiosyncrasies and detours of the individual's life, find a 
language that is commensurate with the singularity of the self.”54 Georges-Arthur 
Goldschmidt55 and Hartmut Raguse56 trace the close ties between the contents portrayed 
in the case studies of the Magazin, Moritz’s 1785 psychological novel Anton Reiser, and 
Freud’s psychoanalysis. Both scholars lay out the similarities between Moritz’s and 
Freud’s major concepts, such as the unconscious, but also acknowledge that Freud was 
entirely ignorant of Moritz’s achievements in categorizing, recording, and narrating 
psychological ailments. Exploring Karl Philipp Moritz’s early oeuvre, Alexander 
Košenina’s Karl Philipp Moritz--Literarische Experimente auf dem Weg zum 
psychologischen Roman (2006) draws a parallel between Moritz’s early interest in 
criminal case studies and the psychological case study demonstrated in Anton Reiser and 
                                                 
53Andreas Gailus, “A Case of Individuality: Karl Philipp Moritz and the Magazine for Empirical 
Psychology,” New German Critique, 79 (2000): 67-105. 
 
54Gailus 69-70. According to Gailus, Moritz’s psychological novel Anton Reiser (1785-90) visualizes best 
his attempts to bind the “basic threads” of one’s life into a continuous act of “narrative (self) reflection.” 
 
55Georges-Arthur Goldschmidt, “Selbstwahrnehmung ohne Nachfolge” in Christof Wingertszahn (ed.), 
»Das Dort ist nun Hier geworden« Karl Philipp Moritz heute (Wehrhahn Verlag, Hannover, 2010) 27-40. 
 
56Hartmut Raguse, “Karl Philipp Moritz—ein Vorgänger der Psychoanalyse?“ in Christof Wingertszahn 
(ed.), »Das Dort ist nun Hier geworden« Karl Philipp Moritz heute (Wehrhahn Verlag, Hannover, 2010) 
41-60. 
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the Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde.57 The common ground of most scholarship on 
Moritz’s achievements is that--be it through reading of legal case studies in the Pitaval, 
collecting psychological phenomena for case studies in his own Magazin, or writing his 
autobiographical novel Anton Reiser--Moritz’s devotion to a deeper understanding of 
human psychology manifests itself in all stages of his creative work and is thus the 
driving force behind all of his projects.58  
 In this chapter I show that in the same way as Moritz is driven by his creativity 
and imagination, he expects everyone else to join his cause. Making use of one’s 
imaginative faculties is crucial to any individual and the only way to meet the standards 
is by reevaluating the imagination in order to be able to truly advance the scientific 
progress of the Enlightenment. In order to prove that for Moritz a thriving and creative 
imagination lay at the core of the Enlightenment project, I forego the two prevalent 
approaches to imagination around 1800: the Foucauldian as well as the psychoanalytic 
reading. Instead, I show that the narrative Moritz unfolds is one of an unleashed and yet 
productive imagination and that the human soul’s darkest secrets bear knowledge that is 
essential for successful progress. Further, I contend that the formal redefinition of the 
traditional case study creates a new literary genre. This new literary genre playfully 
combines scientific observation with structures and forms usually found in fictional 
                                                 
57Alexander Košenina: Karl Philipp Moritz. Literarische Experimente auf dem Weg zum psychologischen 
Roman (Lessing-Akademie; Wallstein, Wolfenbüttel; Göttingen, 2006). 
 
58The socalled Pitaval was a popular publication of criminal cases describing not only the legal situation 
of a particular case, but also psychological processes of the criminal mind. The first Pitaval goes back to 
François Gayot de Pitaval’s collection of legal case studies that consisted of 20 volumes (1734-43). 
Friedrich Schiller was the editor of a comprised version of the Pitaval (1792-95). Among many other 
languages it was also translated into German. Its broad popularity sparked numerous offshoots, such as 
Paul Johann Anselm von Feuerbach’s Merkwürdige Rechtsfälle (1808-11) or Julius Eduard Hitzig´s Der 
neue Pitaval (1842-90).  
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texts. These characteristics include, for example, communicating the content in a 
narrative prose or presenting patients not as symptoms but characters, all of which 
encourage an interpretation of the text as though it was a literary one. By fictionalizing 
medicine and psychology, Moritz establishes a space in which the creative imagination 
is given its own raison d’être, thus challenging traditional thinking patterns. Therefore, 
in this chapter, I consider both the content and the formal aspects of the eighteenth-
century case study. The “highly eclectic and loose structure” of the Magazin is 
analogous to the structure of the case study itself.59 It may be tempting to say that the 
apparent lack of formal structure throughout all of the case studies is an attempt to 
imitate the authenticity of the reported experiences. Yet such a claim suggests also that 
by loosening an old and traditional genre as the case study, the only goal Moritz strived 
to achieve was bestowing an air of scientific trustworthiness. As I prove with my work, 
Moritz’s choice of genre and medium was a strategic and deliberate decision. In this 
sense, opening up the structure of the case study allows for a high degree of freedom and 
space for each and every individual and his story. By abandoning strict formal rules 
Moritz transfers the responsibility for the way in which the patient's story is told to the 
patient himself. The bestowed agency is an additional step towards the true fulfillment 
of Moritz’s goal to unearth the mysteries science still may hold, which, as I will prove in 
this chapter, was the ultimate goal pursued through imaginative powers as shown in the 
selected case studies.  
 
 
                                                 
59Gailus 78. 
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Imagination—A Vexed Debate Among the Editors of the Magazin 
 The concepts central to this chapter—imaginative powers and the case study as 
one of its media of expression—were constitutive elements in many discussions in 
eighteenth-century Germany. Imagination, for instance, permeated such different 
discourses as aesthetics, medicine, ontology, and psychology. At the same time the case 
study compelled all citizens who sought enlightenment to explore the depths of their 
own psyche.60 In their efforts to showcase the necessity of bringing philosophy and 
medicine together, psychological journals steadily gained readership. True to the motto, 
“Aber der Philosoph müste Arzt, und der Arzt Philosoph sein; und folglich eine neue Art 
von Kreaturen entstehen,” [“the philosopher should be a physician, and the physician a 
philosopher; and consequently a new kind of beings should come into existence”] the 
doctor-to-be Johann August Unzer established a “moralische Wochenschrift,” a moral 
weekly, called Der Arzt, a psychological journal that surveyed mind-body problems.61 
As Mathias Reiber notes in his monograph Anatomie eines Bestsellers, Unzer’s journal 
was a conglomeration of contributions by authors such as Albrecht von Haller, Friedrich 
Canitz, Heinrich Brockes, or Christian Ludwig Hagedorn.62 These contributions are 
“formal nicht aufgegliedert; gesonderte Abschnitte, Sparten und Spalten, regelnde 
Überschriften fehlen; typographische Hervorhebungen kommen nur selten zum Einsatz” 
[“formally not structured; separate paragraphs, section, columns, and organizing 
                                                 
60Košenina 57. 
 
61Cited in Matthias Reiber, Anatomie eines Bestsellers—Johann August Unzers Wochenschrift »Der 
Arzt«, (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1999). 
 
62Reiber 98.  
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headlines are missing; typographical accentuations are used only rarely”].63 The lack of 
methodology reminds us of the “eclectic and loose structure” Andreas Gailus discerns in 
Moritz’s Magazin published later in the eighteenth century.64 The titles of the 
contributions in both publications point to an analogous eclecticism, highly valued in the 
eighteenth-century Popularphilosophie [popular philosophy]. The articles in Unzer’s 
journal range from “Von den Catarrhen, Husten und Schnupfen” (III) [“Of Catarrhs, 
Coughing, and Head Colds“], “Von den Kleidermoden” (I) [“Of Fashion Trends”], to 
“Wirkungen der Vorhersehungen und Ahndungen in dem menschlichen Körper” (IV) 
[“Impacts of Clairvoyance and Intutitions on the Human Body’].65 Moritz’s Magazin 
delivers a comparable diversity of topics. Apart from the infamous “Ein unglücklicher 
Hang zum Theater” (III) [“An Unfortunate Propensity for Theater”], the Magazin’s 
index lists articles such as “Volksaberglauben” (VI) [“Folk Superstition”], “Ein 
Kindermörder aus Lebensüberdruß” (II) [“Child Murderer out of Taedium Vitae”], or 
“Vermischte Gedanken über Denkkraft und Sprache” (V) [“Various Thoughts on Mental 
Capacity and Language”].66 The parallels between these two journals with regard to their 
eclectic topic choice as well as a loose structure cannot be denied.67 The objective to 
further science and knowledge in the discipline of psychology is also an element both 
journals share. In addition, Unzer as well as Moritz do something quite unheard of at 
                                                 
63Reiber 98. 
 
64Gailus 78. 
 
65All references from Johann August Unzer, Der Arzt. Eine medicinische Wochenschrift ([n.d.]: G.C.  
Wittwe, 1759-64). 
 
66All references from Gnothi Sauton, oder, Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde als ein Lesebuch für  
Gelehrte und Ungelehrte. Ed. Karl Friedrich Pockels (Lindau: Antiqua-Verlag, 1978). 
 
67Admittedly, the Magazin has several subdivision of its Seelenkunde such as Seelendiätetik or 
Seelenheilkunde, yet they are broad and flexible when it comes to the content and structure. 
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that time: the contributors and readers of their journals are meant to include laymen in 
addition to the experts. According to Reiber, Unzer required an 
“Allgemeinverständlichkeit” [“popularity”].68 Consequently, “gelehrte Sprache” 
[“academic language”] has to make way for a language that is marked by “kultivierter 
Natürlichkeit” [“sophisticated naturalness”] as well as one that was free of “barocker 
Schwulst” [“baroque pompousness”] and “bloß logisch und grammatisch korrekten 
Sprechweise eines Kathederphilosophen” [“merely logically and grammatically correct 
mode of speaking of a conservative philosopher”].69 This attitude changed the discourse 
sustainably and helped blaze the trail for Moritz’s Magazin.  
  Combining lay and expert opinion turned out to be fruitful, yet it did not make 
the debate revolving around the imagination any smoother. Along with rising sales 
numbers of the Magazin, the interest in this debate also grew, and different approaches 
to the issue of imagination came into being. This topic was as popular as it was 
contentious. The debate on imagination produced almost as many standpoints as there 
were scholars and the Magazin was not exempt from that. Despite its generally positive 
attitudes towards the discourse, the Magazin did not propagate an exclusively positive 
notion of the imagination. In fact, a number of contributions made it their objective to 
refute reports on divinations and premonitions. Furthermore, a look at the two main 
editors of the Magazin, Moritz himself and Carl Friedrich Pockels, reveals that the 
approaches and goals of these two scholars could not be more different. Volume VI 
delivers two examples:  In “Beurtheilung einiger Fälle von vermeinten Ahndungen” as 
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well as in “Psychologische Bemerkungen über Träume und Nachtwandler,” an author 
calling himself P. evaluates cases of divination and visionary dreams only to conclude 
that:  
Leute, denen die Aufklärung des menschlichen Verstandes am Herzen liegt, und 
was sollte uns allen mehr am Herzen liegen! sollten daher Beispiele von 
vermeinten Meinungen nicht in öffentlichen Blättern, ohne genaue 
psychologische Untersuchungen jener Fälle, bekannt machen. (MZE VI. 2. 71) 
 
[People who are invested in throwing light into the human mind—and what 
should be more important to us!—should refrain from publishing examples of 
alleged opinions without a previous thorough psychological scrutiny of these 
cases in popular periodicals.] 
 
In a different article, the same author notices “welch eine erstaunliche Gewalt eine 
erhizte und erschrobene Phantasie über uns, aber vornehmlich über schwärmerische 
Weiber, bekommen kann, [“what an astonishing power a heated and eccentric fantasy 
can have over us, but especially over enthusiastic women”] for it is the female 
imagination that “nach dem Zeugnis aller Psychologen und aller Zeiten, der größten 
Ausschweifungen fähig [ist]” [according to all psychologists and all times is capable of 
the greatest excesses“].70 In other words, our active imagination is a force not to be 
trusted. Its connotation with steamy fancies, passion, and desire does not deserve a place 
in print culture because, P. insinuates, these reports are nothing more than overheated 
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old wives tales. Taking for granted that the author called P. is Pockels himself, one 
cannot but wonder why despite the obviously critical attitude towards a buoyant fantasy 
the Magazin published numerous articles describing visions and prophecies in a very 
positive way without rebutting or disputing. Interestingly, Pockels was the sole editor of 
the fifth volume, which was published during Moritz’s journey through Italy and has 
become famous for its treatises on dreams and visions.  Moritz’s harsh critique of 
Pockel’s attempts to dismantle the case studies dealing with divination or clairvoyance 
offers an explanation. Moritz dismisses Pockels’s statements as moralizing and thus 
neither scientific nor on par with the Magazin’s objectives and offers criticism on level 
of both content and form. According to Moritz, it is not the Magazin’s goal to instruct 
and moralize, but rather to simply present and illustrate. The question is not why 
something occurs, Moritz goes on to say, but rather to describe how it happens.71 The 
interpretation and conclusion is left to the reader, not the writer. For Moritz, the 
production and consumption of fictionalized psycho-medicine have to be guaranteed in 
the newly shaped case study as this is the main means to have both the reader and the 
writer put their imagination to proper use. 
 Though Moritz’s determination not to scrutinize the causalities of the case studies 
in question led to a falling out between him and Pockels, the following analysis of three 
case studies will ask a set of questions that will help foreground the changes Moritz 
made with regard to the content as well as the form of the case study. Why do such a 
great number of case studies deal with phenomena that are so hard to reconcile with 
traditional science? In the Age of Reason, Pockels was certainly not the only scholar to 
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suspect a certain intellectual and emotional lability behind reports narrating people’s 
visions of the afterlife, their general ability to foresee the future, or intuitions healing 
long-term patients. And yet, during Pockels’s editorial work and thereafter, such reports 
kept flooding the pages of the Magazin. Furthermore, why did lay people and experts 
alike devote so much attention to topics that nowadays strike us as an esoteric, new age 
interests rather than the subject matter of psychology proper? More importantly, 
however, the following analysis will ask why Pockels’s attempts to unmask these reports 
as frauds violated the objectives Moritz set for his Magazin and explore what this means 
for Moritz’s understanding of the imagination. As I claim, imaginative faculties are the 
key element in Moritz’s attempts to bypass all misjudgment and prejudice in order to 
advance progress. In this sense, in an analysis of a selection of case studies, I shall 
address these questions in order to demonstrate that Moritz’s strong reaction to 
Pockels’s statements goes hand in hand with his devotion to complete elucidation of 
even the most obscure psychological processes.72  
 
Tapping the Unconscious – Three Examples 
Even though the importance of creative imagination is the common ground the 
three following case studies share, all of them unfold their narrative from a distinctive 
perspective. This section of the chapter briefly sketches out each of the three case 
studies before engaging in an analysis of the importance of the creative imagination. 
Thus, the project provides a view as encompassing as possible on the renegotiations of 
the concept of the creative imagination that took place in Moritz’s Magazin.  
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In a letter to a friend and fellow physician, a certain Herr Doktor J… aus 
Königsberg, Marcus Herz tells of a nearly fatal disease he himself suffered from, in the 
course of which his fantasy kept him “in einer ganz andren Welt, in einem ganz andren 
Zusammenhange der Dinge” [“in an entirely different world, in an entirely different 
context’].73 In addition to high fever, frenzy, and insomnia alternating with nightmarish, 
feverish dreams, Herz’s fantasy also summons up his friends and acquaintances. They 
walk up and down the room, and in his vision Herz follows them only to find himself  
 
in grossen erleuchteten Zimmern zwischen den Wänden, wo [er] die tiefsten und 
verborgensten Familiengeheimnisse, die in der Oberwelt jeder Mensch in der 
innersten Kammer seines Herzens vergraben hält, erfuhr (MZE I.2.133). 
 
[in a big illuminated room between the walls, where [he] learned about the most 
hidden and veiled family secrets, which everyone in the world of the living keeps 
buried in the innermost chamber of his heart.] 
 
Herz tells his wife about his findings immediately after the experience in such a coherent 
and logical manner that she cannot but take it for a true story that her husband must have 
known all along. Hand in hand with these revelations and dreams go prescriptions for 
certain treatments Herz himself makes, which the people around him—and in hindsight 
Herz himself—take for a mere frenzy, a rage caused by his high fever. Once recuperated, 
Herz cannot remember why he had himself drunk vermouth all day long. However 
outrageous he later deems his unconscious orders and prescriptions, one such fantasy 
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triggered his ultimate convalescence. Following his urge to have a “Kutsch und Pferde” 
[“coach and horses”] take him from Friedrichstrasse, where he believes to abide, to his 
“Lesestube” [“reading parlor”] Herz’s family organizes the required move from his 
Arbeitszimmer [“study”], where he had been kept since the beginning of his disease, to 
his reading parlor, where Herz expects to stay calm and recover soon. After being 
brought to his reading room, Herz falls “zum größten Erstaunen aller” [“to everybody’s 
greatest astonishment”] in a “sanfte[n], ruhige[n] Schlaf” [“gentle, calm slumber”].74 At 
his awakening, Herz notices that “weg war meine Krankheit, da mein völliges 
Bewußtseyn.” [“gone was his sickness, present was his whole consciousness”]. 
Narrating these events in the letter to his friend, Herz reflects that “es war Methode in 
meiner Tollheit” [“there was a method in his madness”], just as he hopes that his friend 
as a physician “einigen Nutzen daraus schöpfen [kann]” [“can benefit from that”].75 Herz 
further concludes that the severity of the disease he suffered hit the laws of his soul right 
at their core, thus enabling the soul to see and understand things  
 
die dem flüchtigen Auge zwar unkenntlich scheinen, den forschenden 
bewaffneten aber in ihrer völligen Deutlichkeit sich darstellen. ... In der 
ausschweifendsten Raserei der Fieberhitze, in dem höchsten Grad der 
Trunkenheit, giebt es so wenig bei den Seelenwirkungen etwas regelloses als in 
der Neutonischen Seele (MZE I.2.134.). 
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[Which seem unrecognizable to the superficial eye, but reveal themselves most 
graphically to exploring and equipped one. … In the excessive frenzy of the 
feverish heat, in the highest degree of inebriety, there is just as little randomness 
as there is the Newtonian soul.] 
 
In other words, roughly a century before Freud’s discovery of the unconscious, Herz 
appears to intuit its existence. At the same time, Herz acknowledges the fact that tapping 
the unconscious is essential in order to gain a clearer consciousness. Thus, he challenges 
his contemporaries’ efforts to understand psychology in terms of Physiologisierung. 
This example shows that spiritual forces, such as the imagination, were deemed 
necessary for a patient to heal.   
The second case study is an anonymous contribution published in the first book 
of the fifth volume. In this case study, with the title “A Peculiar Dream” (“Ein 
sonderbarer Traum”), the anonymous author retells a tripartite lucid dream that a certain 
Baron von Seckendorff—a historical person—had in 1785. In this dream, Baron von 
Seckendorff encounters a completely inconspicuous man. This man offers the Baron to 
dream a dream of his choice with regard to his past and future life. The Baron chooses to 
dream about his past, and his imaginary journey begins with the Baron himself at the age 
of three. He witnesses his fellow students and teachers, but soon afterward he finds 
himself in bed with a bygone love of his. At her feet a curtain is lifted and he sees a 
place that is crowded with transfigured (verklärt) and blissful people.76 He wakes up 
only to fall asleep again soon after. In the second dream, he meets the same man again. 
And again, he asks the Baron if he wanted to dream about any other of his friends and 
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acquaintances. As the Baron affirms this wish, he sees a number of friends dead and 
alive, happy and unhappy. He wakes up and goes to sleep again. In the third part of his 
dream, the Baron reflects on the previous two parts and ultimately composes a poem on 
the positive effects of the imagination. In his poem, von Seckendorff praises what the 
imagination can do for people, namely: infuse them with energy, alleviate our fate, 
inspire and enlighten us, and most importantly, clarify things we do not understand. In 
the last lines of his poem, Seckendorff implores his imagination not to abandon him and 
promises to follow “her” (“ihr”) at day and night as well as in death (“wachen, 
träumend”/”Auch im Tode folg ich dir”). Seckendorff’s enthusiasm for the faculties of 
creative imagination support the fact that despite Haller’s overshadowing presence in 
eighteenth-century psychology, materialization was not for all scholars a feasible path. 
The content of this case study portrays graphically how the case study changed under 
Moritz’s influence.   
The third case study represents numerous other contributions of the same or 
similar kind published in nearly every single one of the Magazin’s issues and hotly 
debated in numerous ensuing letters and amendments submitted by readers and editors 
of the Magazin alike. The question whether dreams can foretell the future appears to lie 
at the core of the abilities ascribed to the creative imagination and is supported through 
many pieces of “evidence” by some, while vigorously contested by others. Herr Dr. D. 
Knape is the author of a case study of the affirmative type, published in the first volume 
of the Magazin with the title “Hat die Seele ein Vermögen, künftige Dinge vorher zu 
sehen?” [“Is the Soul Capable of Foreseeing Future Things”].77 What prompts the 
                                                 
77MZE I.1.54-64. 
 
 55
contributor to tell his story is the fact we do not know “ob es nicht, bisher noch 
unbekannte und ungenutzte Seelenfähigkeiten geben mag; die eben dadurch ihre 
allgemeine Wirksamkeit verloren haben, weil sie zu wenig gebraucht worden sind” 
[“whether there are or aren’t psychic faculties still unknown to us, which have lost their 
general impact because they were used too rarely”].78 As his contribution shows, paying 
attention to his soul’s unknown and untapped skills definitely paid off for him as the 
dream he narrates foreshadows a lottery win. In this dream, the routine and events of 
that lucky day are conveyed to Knape in the same manner as the winning lottery 
numbers that indeed end up being drawn three days later. There is no discrepancy 
between the events in his dream and those Knape experiences on his winning day. 
Speaking to those readers of the Magazin who he expects will be inclined to understand 
this episode as a singular lucky event, Knape delivers two further similar cases he 
himself experienced. Having told all three stories, Knape concludes that he is 
sufficiently convinced “daß es nicht selten Träume giebt, an deren Entstehung und 
Daseyn der Körper, als Körper, keinen Theil hat, und zu diesen gehören, ..., die drei 
angeführten Beispiele” [“that oftentimes there dreams whose creation and existence do 
not originate in the body per se, and the three mentioned examples are such dreams”].79 
Knape’s statement once again stresses on the one hand the incomprehensible force that 
the creative imagination represents, and the urge to explore this force on the other.   
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Creative Imagination—Moritz’s Universal Remedy? 
Physiological healing and the disclosure of future events here as well as in the 
hereafter were a phenomenon frequently discussed in eighteenth-century psychological 
magazines. Given the fact that these topics were discussed in a journal devoted to 
fathom the depths of science, they may indeed appear somewhat esoteric, almost 
irrational. For today’s scholarship, reports such as the three selected case studies most 
likely would have been considered too vague, unreliable, insupportable—in short, not 
scientific enough. Yet in the context of scientific discourse at that time, and especially in 
the framework of Moritz’s Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde, these case studies are 
embedded in a profound rationale that is based on a set of scientific laws and rules valid 
at that time, at a time when, as we learn from Michel Foucault, the institutionalization of 
medicine is in full bloom and science is meant to further the progress of humankind.80 
By choosing the three case studies for publication in his Magazin, Moritz evidently 
underlines his ambitions to renegotiate the traditional case study on the level of its 
content and form, and created thus, as I argue, a new literary genre. This new genre 
draws on the unlimited depths of the unconscious mediated by the creative imagination 
and functions for Moritz as a safeguard securing the perpetual dialogue with science and 
progress. In light of Seckendorff’s dream and his ensuing poem, the path to 
Enlightenment appears to be paved with creative imagination. In other words, we are to 
pay attention to the side in us that is opposed to reason and clarity. We are to embark 
onto the journey that leads us into a world that consists of illusion (“Täuschung”), 
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deception (“Blendwerk”), and magic images (“Zauberbilder”).81 Moritz’s Magazin 
repeatedly publishes case studies which all document a certain inadequacy of the 
dominant model of medicine and science. These case studies call for a reevaluation of 
the objectives not only for the scientific discourse in the late eighteenth century, but 
more importantly for the goals of the Enlightenment era. The critique that psychological 
and medical case studies at that time voice cannot be denied. That is not only due to the 
content of the case studies, but also to the sheer number of such publications. In the 
following paragraphs I first lay out the rationale behind Moritz’s notion of the creative 
imagination and its purpose. I then show how this recalibrated understanding of the 
imagination pertains to the changes of the Enlightenment project, that I discerned as a 
constitutive elements of Moritz’s cause.    
In all three selected case studies dreams and the creative imagination go hand in 
hand. In fact, it may occur tempting to explain this correlation in terms of a sort of 
mental cinema that screens the most incredible contents every time we fall asleep. Be it 
as a scientific, psychoanalytic phenomenon or as an esoteric, spiritual experience, they 
are the result and proof of our creativity and they play a decisive role in Moritz’s 
reevaluation. The soul plays a double role in this paradigm as both the seat of our 
imaginative faculties and as the mediator between the world within and the world 
without. The soul is the only one to operate in both worlds, the internal and the external. 
It is the perfect mediator, a translator so to speak, that taps the cache of knowledge 
stored in the unconscious parts of our mind. In dreams the soul can visualize and 
manifest relevant information. What Marcus Herz’s case study portrays is also discussed 
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in Salomon Maimon’s 1792 article “Über den Plan des Magazins zur 
Erfahrungsseelenkunde,” Maimon states that  
 
Die Therapie in der Seelenarzeneikunde ist auch von der Körperarzeneikunde 
sehr verschieden. In dieser kömmt man der Krankheit durch äußere Mittel zu 
Hülfe, deren Wirkung nach allgemeinen Gesetzen der Erfahrung bekannt ist. ... In 
der Seelenarzeneikunde hingegen können wir uns keiner äußern Mittel bedienen, 
sondern, so wie die Ursache der Krankheit in der Seele selbst, so müssen auch die 
Mittel dawider in ihr selbst gesucht werden (MZE IX.1.17).  
 
[Medical treatment in the psychological pharmacology is very different from that 
in the physiological pharmacology. In the latter one seeks to alleviate the 
symptoms through external means, whose impact is widely known according to 
the general laws of experience. … In the former however, there are no external 
means to apply, but rather, just as the cause for the disease [lies] in the soul per 
se, so too, the therapeutics have to be sought in the very nature of the 
psychological disease.] 
 
Herz’s soul does exactly this as it seeks an individualized, tailor-made remedy for his 
disastrous disease. Though the ways of seeking healing as well as the ultimate remedy 
may strike the bystanders as incomprehensible, the case studies claim that it is through 
our active imagination that the human soul can communicate solutions and answers to 
our questions and problems. It is not until Herz’s fantasy is put into action that his 
disease comes to an end. Seckendorff is given a chance to come to terms with his past as 
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well as prepare for the future in the hereafter, and improve the quality of his remaining 
time here. Knape’s soul takes him even a step further and, though in a dream, reveals his 
upcoming fortune in a detailed one-to-one account of the events.  All selected case 
studies thus document a paradox; the soul’s imaginative faculties are the clearest during 
our dreams and reveries. These faculties, though, carry this clarity into the 
consciousness when we are awake and thus complete our knowledge in order to have a 
most thorough understanding of and solution to our situation.  
The laws of the imagination mapped out in Moritz’s Magazin define dreaming as 
essential to the process of coming to terms with any sort of emergency situation. In the 
moments of his initially feverish dreams Herz says he felt as though “in meinem Gehirn 
… sich eine Erleuchtung von vielen tausend Lampen [befand]” [“in brain experienced an 
illumination of many thousands of lamps”].82 On one level, the allusion to many 
thousands lamps is a clear indicator of the fever heat his body experienced at that time. 
Yet this statement also relates to the sort of clarity that, according to the case studies, 
cannot be experienced only in sleep or unconsciousness. After all, he uses the term 
Erleuchtung.83 While for the bystanders the patients’ (and dreamers’) fantasies are 
incomprehensible, during the dreams the dreamers understand and follow the dream’s 
internal logic. The suppression of the outside world is decisive for a successful 
conclusion of the episode. All three examples occurred in dreams, and if we are to 
accord credibility to numerous essays and treatises on the importance of dreams and 
imagination, this is no coincidence. The conclusion that Knape draws from his story is 
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 60
“daß es nicht selten Träume giebt, an deren Entstehung und Daseyn der Körper als 
Körper keinen Theil hat” [“that note rarely there are dreams, whose coming into being is 
not induced by the body per se”].84 What he suggests is the existence of a higher 
spiritual force that holds a greater understanding of the human being than that we 
ourselves could ever have. Evidently, the realms that were solely accessible through 
dreams were a field that was waiting to be explored by science. Dreaming, consequently, 
is one possible mode of getting in touch with this force.  
Though the majority of contributors do not go as far as Knape, their contributions 
nonetheless are extremely important to understanding the imagination paradigm and its 
revision around 1800 as they all foreground how important unconscious knowledge is 
for the progress of the Enlightenment and beyond. In all ten volumes of Moritz’s 
Magazin numerous contributions discuss the role and significance of dreams within the 
discourse on the imagination. Despite their eclectic nature, the observations illustrated in 
the revisions of the Magazin by all three editors Karl Phillip Moritz, Karl Friedrich 
Pockels, and Salomon Maimon make a valuable contribution to this discourse. The 
connection between dreams and imagination is arguably an obvious one. Yet many case 
studies disclose the reasons why dreams are to be favored over daydreams, visions, or 
reveries, in other words basically all other states in which we are not entirely conscious. 
Maimon, for example, observes that though “[d]er Traum ... ein Mittelzustand zwischen 
Schlafen und Wachen [ist], worin der Körper die durch den Schlaf verlohrne Spannung 
wieder zu erlangen, und empfindungsfähig zu seyn anfängt” [“the dream [was] an 
intermediary condition between sleeping and waking, in which the body begins to regain 
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the lost tension it lost in sleep and its capacity of feeling again”], it is this capacity to 
feel that plays the extraordinary role in the model of the imagination the Magazin 
implies. 85 The sort of feeling, however, that we experience while dreaming differs 
considerably from all other kinds of feeling in all other states of consciousness.  
Maimon observes that “[d]ie Association ... im Traume und vorzüglich im 
Nachtwandeln nicht nur stärker [ist], sondern auch vollständiger als im wachenden 
Zustande” [“the association was not only stronger in states of dream and somnambulism 
in particular, but also more complete than in the waking state”].86 What Maimon means 
by Association is reasoning, extrapolating, and especially, the ability of filling the gaps, 
“die Reihen füllen,“ with bits and pieces of knowledge that are inaccessible while 
conscious and awake.87  Consequently, Maimon implies that, in analogy to the 
previously described case studies, it is during unconsciousness that we can obtain the 
greatest possible access to, and clarity of, the world around us. In a way, the 
consciousness that we gain in states of unconsciousness by far supersedes our 
consciousness in waking states. Maimon leaves his intriguing statements as mere 
observations. Looking for a conclusive body of evidence for his theses or a profound 
rationale leading up to his postulations unfortunately remains largely a futile endeavor. 
Although the significance of feeling in dreams is very pronounced, it remains 
unexplained, which given the form and goals of the Magazin, does not pose a problem. 
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On the contrary, it leaves the interpretation to the reader and provides thus an 
opportunity for an independent dealing with the claims made.   
Moritz’s and Pockels’ amendments in volumes VI and V respectively can come 
to the rescue and shed some light on this matter. In his attempt to elucidate episodes of 
divination logically, Pockels delivers a possible explanation why reasoning indeed is 
stronger when dreaming or sleepwalking.88 Pockels begins his revisions with the 
following statement, 
 
Nicht nur unwissende und gemeine Leute, welche nie über die Natur nachgedacht 
haben, und jedes sonderbare Phänomen derselben höhern Wesen ausser uns zu zu 
schreiben sich geneigt fühlen; sondern selbst Leute von Kopf und Geschmack, 
Philosophen von Profession, -- die doch billig an einem Ahndungsvermögen 
zweifelns müßten, ..., lassen sich den Glauben daran nicht nehmen. (MZE V.1.7) 
 
[Not only ignorant and common people, those who never thought about nature, 
and are inclined to assign every peculiar phenomenon to a power higher than us, 
but also even intelligent and smart people, philosophers by profession,--those 
who ought to doubt premonitions,…, do not abandon their belief in it [higher 
power].] 
In this way Pockels sets out to disprove all of the contributions made to this topic in the 
Magazin that he edits. For Pockels’ episodes such as divination and spiritually induced 
healing, say more about those who believe in such occurrences than the rationale of 
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these occurrences themselves. In other words, according to Pockels, there are no 
supernatural forces at work, but rather superstition and lack of reason.89 In a treatise 
titled “Psychologische Bemerkungen über Träume und Nachtwandler,” Pockels once 
more emphasizes why dreams and visions are no adequate sources for the promotion of 
scientific progress in any discipline.90 He criticizes that 
 
[d]ie Seele während des Traumes nicht in jedem Moment die Kraft behält, über 
die Causalverbindung der Begriffe nachzudenken, und ein jedes Prädicat in seine 
rechte Stelle zu setzen, ferner daß sie aus einer offenbaren im Traum erfolgten 
Schwäche ... der Erinnerungskraft Vergangenes, Gegenwärtiges und Zukünftiges 
miteinander vermischt. (MZE VI.3.236) 
 
[the soul does not retain its capability to contemplate the causal connections 
between the concepts, and to assign each attribute its right place, not to mention 
that, due to a weakness resulting from dreaming, the soul conflates the past, the 
present, and the future.] 
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90MZE VI.3.232-41. Talking about a young melancholic mother who allegedly foresaw her own untimely 
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from her surrounding at that time, Pockels continues, this woman was likely to have assumed her 
subsequent death in childbirth, an idea that Pockels sees as constitutive of her entire premonition. In his 
second analysis of another presentiment of death, this time that of a young man, who, while standing at 
his brother’s grave, suddenly knows he is going to die within few weeks’ time.90 The explanation linkss 
this occurrence to the young man’s personal death wish due to his brother’s untimely death and his 
subsequent preoccupation with this topic. All of Pockels’s alleged arguments against a scientific 
provability of seemingly supernatural events stress the impact of external circumstances on human 
fantasy. According to Pockels, once the major concern of the “patient“ is identified it becomes obvious 
that it was not a glimpse into their inevitable future that their soul allowed them to have, but rather a 
combination of the external circumstances and their own wish. 
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Accordingly, the exquisite ability to complete the gaps highlighted earlier by Maimon, is 
here merely a travesty of reality. The soul and the imagination do not discern causalities 
that permeate quotidian life because these faculties cannot “über den Zusammenhang 
Ihrer Ideen und ihrer Folgen auf einander…nachdenken.“91 While dreaming we are in 
the state of an  
auffallende Gleichgültigkeit … gegen die uns sonst liebsten moralischen 
Principien. Mangel an Scham, wilde Affecten, Verachtung religiöser 
Gegenstände, Blasphemien, und andre abscheuliche Gedanken und 
Empfindungen, die uns im Wachen nicht beunruhigen, bemerken auch die 
vortrefflichsten Menschen an sich, wenn sie träumen. (MZE VI.3.238) 
 
[even the most noble of character among us, notice in their dreams a striking 
indifference  … towards those moral principles that we love otherwise [as well 
as] a  lack of shame, wild affects, scorn for religious subjects, blasphemies, and 
other despicable feelings, which do not pertain to us when awake.] 
 
In other words, in dreams the human imagination thinks in entirely new and different 
categories. In dreams and visions, devoid of any sort of logic, value, or structure, our 
imagination generates worlds and suggests answers that lack any relation to our reality. 
It is our willingness to believe in such things as supernatural, coming from a higher, 
perhaps divine, source.   
What Pockels identifies as a problem in human understanding of allegedly 
supernatural phenomena and an obstacle in the path of science, Maimon and Moritz 
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regard as a benefit. Vindicating their standpoint, all three scholars, foreground the 
importance of external influences. In addition to Maimon’s treatise on the ability to fill 
the gaps of knowledge by the means of dreams, Moritz takes a clear and harsh stand 
against Pockels’ interpretation of this matter, even though their approaches in this 
respect could not be more divergent. Moritz complains that “[d]er zu schnelle Ausruf,…: 
das läßt sich ja ganz natürlich erklären! ist immer schon verdächtig, weil der Erklärer 
seiner Sache zu gewiß ist, und fest zu glauben scheint, daß seinem alleserfoschenden 
schnellen Blick kein wichtiger Umstand entgehen könne” [“the exclamation made too 
quickly,…: This can be explained naturally! has always been suspicious, because the one 
that explains is too certain of his knowledge, and seems to firmly believe that his all 
permeating fast gaze can grasp everything”].92 From Moritz’s point of view, Pockels fell 
prey to exactly the external influences he criticized in his own essays and revisions. 
Societal and personal norms and values which form a person’s understanding and 
perception of the surrounding world are a crucial element in this debate. Moritz further 
continues, “Was geht den Psychologen, als Psychologen irgend ein einreißender Glaube 
an? wozu will er irgend einen einreißenden Glauben beschämen?” [“why is a crumbling 
belief the business of the psychologist as a psychologist? Why does he want to shame 
any such crumbling belief?”].93 Following Moritz’s line of argument, in order to pursue 
true scientific progress the scholar under all circumstances must abandon all acquired 
thought structures and categories because in contrast to Pockels’s conviction instead of 
logic and rationality they generate a biased perception. Therefore, cases as Knape’s, 
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Herz’s, and Seckendorff’s do not serve as scapegoats to pinpoint regression into 
superstition. Rather, they are to be taken at face value as they help us think in and of 
different structures. Though Moritz’s statements were neither written nor published in an 
attempt to defend active—or creative— imagination, they provide elucidate why the 
concept of active imagination played such a significant role in his philosophy and 
science. Hiding behind unconscious prejudices and fossilized thought patterns results—
like superstition—in superficial conclusions and beliefs. Moritz sees this as a threat to 
his quest for truth and Enlightenment and the only way to resolve it is by indulging in a 
quest for truth “um ihrer selbst willen” [“for its own sake”], by making creative 
imagination an invaluable asset.94  
Finding the truth for its own sake, as Moritz puts it, poses a challenge to most 
scholars even though, or perhaps because, it demands from them the greatest possible 
devotion to one of Enlightenment’s most important values: impartiality in the strictest 
sense of the word. What at first does not sound all too difficult--for scholars like Pockels 
most likely did not think of themselves as anything but Enlightenment philosophers--
turns out to be a goal that can only be reached by the means of a complete 
reconsideration of the ways and methods used up to this point. Ultimately, Moritz’s 
criticism suggests an inversion of the methods employed thus far and the general 
understanding of them. If extrapolation and elimination are fallible due to stubborn and 
oftentimes unconscious bias established by society, then what is left for Moritz is 
turning to alternative ways of advancing progress.  
The case studies by Herz, Knape, and Seckendorff all illustrate that entering into 
the worlds of dreams can provide the necessary impartiality needed for true scientific 
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progress, though the chosen path may appear astonishing and incomprehensible at first. 
Herz’s case illustrates Moritz’s demand in a graphic way: his family and physician 
followed for once the dictates of his imagination and he recovers miraculously. 
Seckendorff enters the world of his dreams as though it was the most natural and rational 
thing, and he is rewarded with a glimpse into the whereabouts of his beloved and a 
reassurance that there is life after death, and as far as Moritz’s approach is concerned, 
there is no reason to question Seckendorff’s account. Knape sees clearly the lucky 
lottery numbers that bestow the lottery win upon him and being convinced of the 
truthfulness of his divinations he follows his nightly visions earnestly whenever they 
occur. As Moritz mentioned, it is not important whether one is inclined to take these 
episodes at face value. Yet it is important how they occur and what they do for the 
people involved.  In most cases, dreams bring about a turn of the ride for the better. 
Listening to the whispering of the soul pays off as it may not only lead us to the answers 
we seek, but also to a greater understanding of how our world operates. 
Moritz’s New Genre—The Case Study As An Imaginative Safeguard 
The question arises whether these case studies call for a comeback of a mystified 
and enchanted past or even a return to a folkloristic naturopathy. The question must be 
answered in the negative. At first glance, Moritz’s position in this debate seemingly 
abandons scientific medicine for the sake of a creative imagination that heals all of our 
woes and thus undermines the idea of scientific progress. Yet Moritz’s chosen approach 
proves that, for him, the scientific project at that time had not gone far enough. His 
critique addresses two facts: first, the debates on progress only included the intellectual 
elite, and second, even this intellectual elite was not immune to bias and fossilized 
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thinking patterns. For after the “invention” of the organ of the imagination medical 
science hoped itself to be close to finally understanding the mysteries revolving around 
the human soul, of which the imagination is a constitutive part. Moritz’s paradigm 
contradicts the process of Physiologisierung represented by Haller, for example. 
Evidently, science will not be able to comprehend anything in its fullest extent as long as 
it focuses on the materialist aspects of the body. In his essay “Science and the Discovery 
of the Imagination in Enlightened England,” George S. Rousseau contends that medical 
science “was tearing God from his seat and creating a new kind of deity.”95 Rousseau 
calls this deity “a Godhead of the machine” and I describe it as the desire to make the 
greatest mysteries physically, mathematically, in the end rationally explicable. These 
objectives would have been also in agreement with those Moritz stated in the preface to 
the first volume of his Magazin. And yet, the corpus of documents that Moritz published 
appears to be at complete odds with the laws of science, for it is the most mysterious 
part of the human being, the human imagination with its seat in the human soul, that 
takes us down the path physical science apparently never could.96 For how can taking 
phenomena such as divination and clairvoyance at face value advance the progress of 
science? Embracing such phenomena must have appeared regressive for some scholars at 
that time. For Moritz, however, turning scientific attention towards precisely these 
phenomena is the only way that can bring light, Enlightenment, to all citizens in 
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Germany in the most complete and fulfilling way. For it is not unless we have explored 
the most mysterious of our organs, the soul along with its mouthpiece, the imagination, 
that we can truly know and understand ourselves and become entirely self-responsible 
and mature. As all the examples laid out in this chapter show, according to Moritz’s 
rationale, the suppression of as many external influences as possible is key to the clarity 
of mind that is desirable in furthering progress because these external influences are an 
obstacle to an unbiased perception. Moritz comes to understand societal norms and 
values, thinking patterns, and personal opinions as an undesirable filter that does not 
allow for an unprejudiced apprehension of the world around us. His collection of case 
studies as well as his own observations in the revisions documents what James Engell 
outlines in his monograph The Creative Imagination: “The whole question of knowledge 
and values had moved from outside the self to inside the self.” 97 Indeed, knowing 
oneself carries for Moritz sufficient significance to make it the title of his Magazin. Yet 
in contrast to the numerous literary scholars who regard Moritz’s motto Know Thyself as 
a synonym for merely policing and disciplining one’s own thoughts, creating thus a 
Foucauldian “individual as a describable, analysable object,”98 I contend that reflection 
and observation of oneself and the neighbors in a conscious state of mind was not what 
Moritz solely had in mind: such an analysis employs biased and outdated methods of 
perceiving and thinking. In order to achieve his proclaimed goal to fathom out the depths 
of science, Moritz had to break new ground. In the case of medicine and psychology this 
                                                 
97James Engell, The Creative Imagination. From Enlightenment to Romanticism (Cambridge, Mass. :  
Harvard University Press, 1981) 98. 
 
98Foucault in Gailus 69. 
 
 
 70
new ground is the sub- and unconscious realms that the human minds shelters and that 
are meant to be expressed by the means of his newly recreated case study. Putting them 
to use hold for Moritz evidently more benefits than disadvantages and risks. To be sure, 
exploring these realms posed not an easy task in the understanding of imagination in the 
last decades of the eighteenth century. Its reliance on a dark, unknown, and dangerous 
force alarmed many scholars who did not grow weary of warning the general public of 
“Grillenhaftigkeit” [“eccentricity”] and “Schwärmerei” [“enthusiasm”] two of the most 
common side effects of a buoyant imagination.99 Against the background of the 
eighteenth-century mainstream, Moritz’s cause to redeem creative imagination in order 
to employ the unconscious for advancing Enlightenment progress stands out all the more 
as a radical step.  
In his “Science and the Discovery of the Imagination in Enlightened England,” 
Rousseau argues in favor of a revolt among the poets of the Romanticism that took place 
 
due to unfulfilled promises … [and] the inability of science to formulate laws of 
organic relationship between the imagination (healthy or diseased) and the animal 
spirits; that body of physical laws which, if they had been satisfactorily 
formulated, may have permitted man to be free once again – free in health and 
free in madness, free as the spirit had been in the Renaissance. (99) 
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“Gemüthsgeschichte Christian Philipp Schönfelds, eines spanischen Webers in Berlin,” or “Aus einem 
Tagebuche,” both published in the first book of the first volume in Moritz´s Magazin.  
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No doubt, liberating the imagination was constitutive of the Romantic project. However, 
as I believe, the revolt that Rousseau affiliates with the poets of the Romantic era had 
already taken place in Moritz’s Magazin’s in the late eighteenth century in the 
framework of the Enlightenment. Though not subversive enough to call it revolutionary, 
Moritz’s attempts to renegotiate the understanding of imagination, and thus 
successively, the general ideas of science, medicine, psychology, and ultimately 
epistemology, were no less radical. Moritz’s revisiting of the creative imagination was 
also far more than simply “the desire for compromise” between the two main currents, 
the process of materialization and that of spiritualization, which Catherine Minter 
diagnoses in the discourse on imagination in eighteenth-century Germany.100 Moritz’s 
cause can perhaps be best described as soft and benevolent in its execution, yet radical in 
its rationale.  Advancing progress was certainly a crucial motivation behind Moritz’s 
cause. Yet he was not satisfied with traditional thought patterns which he criticized 
repeatedly as “superficial.”101 For Moritz, superficial meant judging by obvious 
structures contained within the framework of socially manipulated norms, values, and 
categories. However, Moritz was aware that judging by these structures was also almost 
inevitable when conscious and awake. What Moritz strove to convey was the general 
acceptance of the soul as a part our self that is at least as significant and necessary as the 
capacities of the ratio used in a conscious state of mind. Moritz’s take on this debate 
contradicts the materialist strand of discourse on imagination. In order to promote his 
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own approach to it, Moritz had to use the case study as an essential instrument to 
achieve his goals.   
 Many discrepancies between the traditional case study and Moritz’s 
reconceptualization of it are obvious. Probably the most patent difference is that in 
Moritz’s eighteenth-century psychological case study it is not strictly the physician who 
delivers an enumeration of physical symptoms. Instead, the expert is substituted by a 
layperson who narrates a history of an illness s/he themselves suffered from, or who 
reports from hearsay. Naturally, a layperson includes different facts into his or her 
narrative. Furthermore, though the case study is by far not comparable with a novel, it is 
still narrated in prose, rather than charts, tables, or bullet points, as was sometimes the 
case in traditional case studies. The narrativization of illness places the case study for 
many literary scholars into the no man’s land between a novel and a report. Though it 
was meant to be a scientific report to be taken at face value, its content and style many 
times exceeded the standards of the scientific community in the eighteenth century and 
facilitated an inclusion of lay people into the debate on mind-body-issues. It may be 
tempting to interpret Moritz’s motivations as economic strategies to simply promote the 
popularity and sales numbers of his journal. I suggest, however, that by making the case 
studies accessible especially to laymen, Moritz helped prevent the existence of a new 
deity because this new deity, science, no matter how rational it claims to be, comes 
along with the burden of a new set of mysteries surrounding it. Instead of indoctrinating 
laypersons with scientific treatises, Moritz’s encourages not only lay persons to read his 
journal, but also to put pen to paper. Seeing contributions authored by lay people had 
very likely encouraged many a reader to submit his own observations. The significance 
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of this incentive is not only in inspiring Moritz’s readers to make more observations and 
more field work, but also to engage them in the process of narrating an illness or 
medical phenomenon in the framework of the case study. It is the case study that 
generates on the one hand an innovative playground for narrating illness, while it also 
provides a containment of the concepts and observations described. In between these 
boundaries the writing individual can unfold his or her fantasy without being restricted 
by particularities of other genres. Furthermore, despite its narrativization of disease, it 
urges its authors to analyze and reconsider what they write, thus keeping the balance 
between the realms of conscious- and unconsciousness. The possibility to share one’s 
experiences and observations without belonging of the intellectual elite brought not only 
more reports and data to light, but also encouraged more people to write and put their 
own fantasy to use, which in Moritz’s concept is a precious asset that should not be 
suppressed, but put to productive use, and make them aware of their own imaginative 
skills. 
 Giving a voice to non-scientists and entitling them to explore and advance 
science and medicine through imagination turns out to be one of Moritz’s most 
significant and most radical causes. The propagation and dissemination of progress 
cannot be restricted to a small number of experts and remain mysterious and opaque to 
all non-experts because this way the vast majority of people remains unknowing. Non-
experts without the entitlement and possibility to explore their imagination remain 
therefore immature, or “unmündig” to use Kant’s term, when it comes to their own life. 
In other words, the person is not enlightened and the structure of the then prevalent 
model of medicine and psychology that Moritz strove to redefine supported this lack of 
 74
knowledge, personal responsibility and maturity. In this light, bestowing such great 
power to the imagination means bestowing the full responsibility for and full knowledge 
about one’s life to the patient personally. In this manner, Moritz propagation was 
instrumental in the pursuit of an elucidation of issues revolving around the soul, its 
imaginative powers, and its functions. The loose form and content of Moritz’s case study 
that initially may seem to indicate a certain conceptual disorientation turns out to be 
quintessential to Moritz’s project as it guarantees sufficient safe and flexible space to 
experiment with one’s creative imagination.   
 
Conclusion and Outlook   
Looking into the unexplored abyss of our own psyche is certainly a radical step to 
venture in order to further the Enlightenment project. The radical nature of Karl Philipp 
Moritz’s approach, however, reaches far beyond that point. For while many revolts--to 
use Rousseau’s term--may indeed be significant and radical, they only reach a group 
very restricted in number because philosophical revolts usually only encompass the 
intellectual and artistic elite. Moritz’s ideas unfold their true explosive force against the 
background of their dissemination: the case study published in a psychological journal. 
At first sight, a case study does not make the impression of being a particularly 
subversive kind of genre. Neither is a psychological journal traditionally considered a 
revolutionary medium. For many literary scholars, the contributions published in 
psychological journals such as Moritz’s Magazin helped pave way for the psychological 
novel.102 In this chapter I have shown that their true significance lies in the case study’s 
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contribution to a widest possible dissemination of Moritz’s ideas. In addition, it also 
contributes to a most individual and intimate encounter with the force of fantasy and 
creative imagination. Without a doubt, considering the popularity and dissemination of 
the novel in the eighteenth century, it may be tempting to regard the novel, as a genre 
and medium, to be the most suitable platform to unfold imaginative faculties. The novel 
supersedes the case study in scope: the quantity of pages and the quality of literacy are 
only two of the fields of triumph for the novel. And yet, though not discarding the novel 
entirely, Moritz still embraces the case study over the novel as the preferred medium of 
dissemination. Literary scholar Alexander Košenina ties Moritz’s passion for the case 
study to his early interest in legal case studies, as published for instance in the Pitaval, 
which Košenina comes to understand as the spark for Moritz’s long-lasting admiration 
for the case study. I, on the other hand, suggest that approaching the matter from a 
formal point of view can be equally productive as it elicits a more nuanced 
understanding of the function of the case study and Moritz’s entire Magazin.103 As I 
have shown, Moritz’s rationale is mirrored in two ways: his own statements regarding 
the creative imagination, and the selection of articles he chose for publication. Neither 
his own contributions nor those made by others were meant to instruct and indoctrinate 
the readers of the Magazin. Rather, they were meant to showcase the bottomless 
opportunities that exploring our imagination has to offer. The case study was to become 
an essential tool for Moritz’s endeavor, but had to be renegotiated terms of its content 
and form.  
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Observations and reflections on medical progress as they were presented in the 
psychological journals mentioned above were meant to unite laymen and experts alike 
under the umbrella of medical discourse and provide thus a platform that was not only 
accessible, but also attractive to an unparalleled number of readers and contributors. 
Case studies were the preferred medium for the propagation of these ideas. In view of 
the numerous poems and plays that incorporate medicine in one way or another, it may 
be tempting to think of case studies as yet another art form to play with this popular 
topic. However, as I have shown, the choice of the genre was not coincidental. The case 
studies were published in medical and psychological magazines that in the eighteenth 
century were at the peak of their popularity. As the multiple reprints of these magazines 
prove, their popularity grew hand in hand with a constantly growing readership and 
perpetually inspired more readers to not solely passively consume, but to actively 
explore science themselves and become thus independent thinkers. The new, fully 
responsible and fully enlightened patient was to be shaped. At the same time, it is also 
the patient, who is in charge, who is in an equal dialogue with the physician and his 
surroundings. It is the patient, who unconsciously, feels his or her way out of a disease, 
a problem, or a state of ignorance. The only condition that Moritz deems necessary to 
reach the state of full responsibility (“Mündigkeit”) is to unleash what most eighteenth-
century thinkers want to see contained: imagination (“Einbildungskraft”). In this sense, 
the ideas put forth in the numerous case studies whole-heartedly embrace what Kant 
formulated in his 1784 essay “What is Enlightenment?”: “Aufklärung ist der Ausgang 
des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit. Unmündigkeit ist das 
Unvermögen sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen” 
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[“Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage s man's 
inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another.”] As the 
following chapters will show, in addition to Karl Philipp Moritz case study collection, 
novels by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, F.W.J. Schelling, Jean Paul show that case 
studies and novels became the preferred medium because both genres guaranteed the 
widest possible dissemination throughout the general public and a productive utilization 
of the imagination.
  
CHAPTER TWO: 
METAMORPHOSIS OF UNDERSTANDING: JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE’S 
“CONFESSIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL SOUL” AND THE HEALING FORCE OF DAYDREAMING 
 
Introduction: In the Beginning was the … Metaphor  
In the second edition of a conventional contemporary work such as the Gale 
Encyclopedia of Psychology we find the following entry: “Imagination – a complex 
cognitive process of forming a mental scene that includes elements which are not at the 
moment perceived by the senses.”104 Reading on, we learn that this definition includes 
“original” creations, images so to speak that neither reflect nor process the experiences 
made during the day.105 What sounds so unspectacular for today’s reader would have 
been quite a sensation for many a philosopher of eighteenth-century Germany. For the 
majority of these philosophers and scientists--Albrecht von Haller for example--these 
mental images could only be generated on the basis of what had already been perceived 
in waking life. Creating original images that do not have their origins in something 
experienced in life was regarded as problematic. A brief look at Moritz’s novel Anton 
Reiser (1785) exposes the potential dangers of it, in contrast to Moritz’s very own 
Magazin that delivered an unparalleled number of articles supporting the creative 
imagination. In contrast to Anton Reiser, Goethe’s “Die Bekenntnisse einer schönen 
Seele” foregrounds the curative effect that creative imagination can have. To be sure, 
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Goethe does not glorify creativity, but instead he draws a thorough picture of what 
creative imagination can do once we understand its nature. Overt religious fervor on the 
one hand, and hypochondria on the other, are only the most prominent of dangers and 
unwanted side effects of a creative imagination, which usually was synonymous with an 
overactive and overflowing one. If we give Gale’s encyclopedic entry credence, the 
imaginative dangers of the eighteenth century then are nowadays recognized as its 
benefits:  
 
At one time, daydreaming and fantasies were regarded a compensatory activities 
that had the function of “letting off steam,” but recent research has cast doubt on 
that theory. Creative imagination is the basis for achievements in the realms of 
both art and science. … Researchers have found that imagery plays a significant 
role in emotion, motivation, sexual behavior, and many aspects of cognition, 
including learning, language acquisition, memory, problem-solving and 
perception. …Mental images have also been used as a diagnostic tool [in clinical 
work]. (324) 
 
What this excerpt acknowledges is that, in fact, an active imagination can have a 
therapeutic impact on some of the most significant areas of our lives like feeling, 
learning, and coming to terms with what we experience. At the same time, it becomes 
obvious that the idea of benefitting from a creative imagination is a rather late invention 
as even nowadays many cognitive scholars are still working hard on convincing the 
general public. Additionally, it foregrounds how radical and outstanding the 
interventions of Moritz and, as I will now show, Goethe were. In light of this short 
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encyclopedic entry, namely, Goethe’s anonymous protagonist the beautiful soul, who we 
encounter in the sixth book of Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre and whose creative 
imagination is one of her central characteristics, is doomed to being misunderstood by 
her environment. As to be expected, she grows gradually alienated from her family and 
friends. What could be understood as another problem is for the beautiful soul a change 
she is willing and ready to take in order to establish and then maintain her individuality 
and the opportunity to stay faithful to her ideals.  As a matter of fact, these 
developments appear to make the beautiful soul a happier character than many of those 
she is surrounded by.  
 Despite the fact that Moritz’s contribution forestalls Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters 
Lehrjahre by several years, Goethe’s work pioneers with regard to a positive 
revalorization of the creative imagination using the genre of a Bildungsroman. As a 
consequence, instead of focusing on individual case studies that are not interconnected, 
Goethe crafts a densely woven network that uses the creative imagination as one of its 
central threads. In this light, the beautiful soul’s overflowing and creative imagination 
does not make her a unique character. There are a number of examples in Goethe’s 
literary oeuvre in which he contradicts the mainstream interpretation of the advantages 
and disadvantages of the imagination. In fact, Goethe engages a whole battery of 
different aspects and sides of the idea of creativity and imagination in order to draw a 
detailed picture of the kaleidoscopic nature of the imagination. Ottilie in his 
Wahlverwandtschaften (1809) is certainly the most prominent of examples as far as the 
discourse on psychology is concerned. As a gloomily melancholy character, she is prone 
towards magnetism that was so sensationalized at the turn of the nineteenth century, but 
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which in those days was a crucial element of the then-rising psychiatry, for example.106 
Goethe’s stance becomes even clearer after the miraculous healing of a young girl 
showcased in the same novel. Upon touching Ottilie’s dead body the young girl is 
healed, and unless we believe in miracles, it is the young girl’s power of creative 
imagination that facilitates the therapeutic effect of the encounter with Ottilie’s body. In 
Iphigenie auf Tauris (1786), the spectator encounters a similar occurrence. Orest, whose 
troublesome past deprives him of his vital energy, has a fantasy about the underworld 
and its dwellers. It turns out to be an opportunity to reconcile with characters long dead, 
heal his guilty conscience, and rid himself of a gloomy death wish he fostered.  
Displaying the possibility of continued existence bestows a greater significance to the 
soul than to the actual, physical body. Orest’s character shows that seemingly 
supernatural phenomena as visions, dreams, or the hereafter exist regardless of whether 
we believe in their existence or not. His and Ottilie’s cases establish the world of the 
imaginary as a place that offers a manual to self-help in all of the fields that Gale’s 
encyclopedia entry emphasizes. Thus, Goethe makes the creative imagination a force 
that needs to be explored if we are to learn as much as there really is to learn, a force 
reaches thus far beyond the seemingly miraculous healing we saw in the previous 
chapter.  
 For the beautiful soul, experiencing her creative imagination means dwelling in 
the world of the invisible. From an early age on, the beautiful soul had been used to the 
presence of the “invisible,” which she implies to be the world of divine spirits and 
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angelic beings.107 In the long years of religious devotion and seclusion from the 
secularized material world, the psychic shelter that the beautiful soul calls seelischen 
Schutzort, had become a natural space for her to leave and enter at will. Yet this very 
space, which for her is merely a natural extension of the inhabited world, remains 
invisible and incomprehensible for her surroundings. In the case of the beautiful soul the 
nine months of her bed confinement appear to function as a prerequisite to entering this 
refuge. The symbolic force of these nine months is not to be ignored. After her nine-
month incubation, the beautiful soul is a fully transformed person as though she were 
born anew. The imposed immobility generates the necessity to unfold her imagination as 
the imaginary world is the only one where she can move on with her life. At first sight, 
the beautiful soul’s psychic shelter may strike one as a religious locus amoenus which 
offers an opportunity to replenish one’s soul in new religious joy and divine love. 
Ultimately, the reason why she seeks out her psychic shelter is to strengthen the 
sensations she feels when she reconnects with the invisible world. A second glance, 
however, reveals the importance of the creative imagination and the commentary that 
Goethe makes in this regard. As I shall claim, in contrast to the traditional interpretation 
of the beautiful soul as an idiosyncratic neurotic and a negative example for an 
uncontained imagination, the portrayal of how the beautiful soul handles the power of 
the creative imagination suggests a positive revalorization of the imagination not only 
for medical purposes. As I will show in this chapter, the lack of understanding Goethe 
depicts in “The Confessions of a Beautiful Soul” is the same lack of understanding for 
positive aspects of the imagination Goethe traces among his fellow contemporaries.  
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 Literary scholarship has traditionally been prone to understanding the beautiful 
soul as either the embodiment of a desirable independence and emancipation or a 
literarization of mental illness. By pathologizing Goethe’s beautiful soul, those scholars 
who foreground the usefulness of a psychoanalytical reading of her create a narrative of 
a woman whose neurosis prevents her from fulfilling her goals of social happiness and 
sexual fulfillment. For instance, Robert E. Norton interprets the beautiful soul’s inability 
to establish and maintain fulfilling relationships and her “troubled rapport with her own 
body” as a symbol for a “divorce from physical sphere” and a “willful alienation” from 
realms of sexuality and maturity, and thus strictly to be interpreted as markers of the 
beautiful soul’s pathological behavior pattern.108  In her rejection of “maturity and 
sexuality,” to use Norton’s words, the beautiful soul is trapped in loneliness and 
barrenness with regard to her social life as well as her lack of biological procreation. In 
her neurosis, the beautiful soul tries to fill the resulting void with the invention of an 
imaginary world at first, and later a Narcissistic idealization. In her posthumously 
published Theology and Dehumanization (2009), Jill Kowalik contends that the 
spiritualized and thus desexualized beautiful soul bears witness to Goethe’s “depiction 
of the failure of German patriarchy to provide conditions under which little girls might 
resolve their conflicts over gender identity.”109 Kowalik further claims that “Goethe 
reveals that growing up female in the eighteenth century had a pathological side with 
origins in the failure of fathers to understand … the needs … of their young 
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daughters.”110 In the case of the beautiful soul, instead of overcoming this pathological 
situation, she turns to religion to find a surrogate father and remains thus trapped in her 
pathology. Psychoanalytic interpretation of “The Confessions of the Beautiful Soul” 
leads its readers to believe that Goethe’s neurotic heroine is an example for a misguided 
religious fervor and a misunderstanding of spirituality and devotion to God. It is due to 
her pathological thought patterns that she remains unable to make healthy choices and 
use her life productively. The overt religious enthusiasm that she creates enhances the 
beautiful soul’s neurosis and detachment from the world around her.  
 On the opposing side of the spectrum is the narrative that feminist critics such as 
Susanne Zantop or Marianne Hirsch set out to tell. In their interpretations, the beautiful 
soul stands in stark contrast to the psychoanalytical approach. In “Eignes Selbst und 
fremde Formen: Goethes ‘Bekenntnisse einer schönen Seele,‘“ Susanne Zantop traces a 
conscious and willful rebel who voices her opposition against family and society, instead 
of portraying the beautiful soul as a neurotic heroine.111 Instead of pathologizing and 
ultimately victimizing her, Zantop as well as Hirsch both recreate the beautiful soul as a 
rebellious and independent woman, whose detachment equals neither the repression of 
her sexual instincts nor the postponement of her maturity. Instead, it is both a rejection 
of the patriarchal order as well as a positive alternative to Wilhelm’s typically 
“masculine” – that is, active, linear, and obsessively goal-oriented – path towards 
Bildung.”112 In “Spiritual Bildung: The Beautiful Soul as Paradigm,” feminist critic 
                                                 
110Kowalik 162.  
 
111Susanne Zantop, “Eigenes Selbst und Fremde Formen,” Goethe Yearbook 3 (1986) 73-92. 
 
112Norton 254. 
 
 
 85
Marianne Hirsch, for instance, urges to refrain from the traditional reading of Goethe’s 
beautiful soul’s social withdrawal as a “neurotic form of regression [and] a flight from 
adult sexuality.”113 Instead, Hirsch suggests regarding the beautiful soul as an analogy to 
Antigone. The withdrawal of both of the heroines is in analogy to Zantop’s 
interpretation “an active rebellion.”114 Hirsch further elaborates that “we must see the 
heroine’s adoption of the religious life as the only option; an accommodation to society 
would have meant an acceptance of herself as inferior and thus the antithesis of 
Bildung.”115 Zantop argues in the same spirit claiming that the beautiful soul writes her 
confessions “against the uncle, against society, and to the children.”116 Interpreting 
Zantop’s conclusions as an appeal to understand the beautiful soul as a polemic, or 
pamphlet against the straightjacket of prevailing norms and values that eighteenth 
century women have to face, rather than the traditional Pietist confession, which it 
appears to be, may be risky. Yet the fact that so divergent readings of one and the same 
character can emerge foregrounds the exceptionality which permeates the circumstances 
the beautiful soul creates and faces, as well as the choices and decisions she makes.  
 Be it as an (untreated) patient of neurosis or similar pathological patterns, or as a 
(misunderstood) rebel against encrusted standards, the beautiful soul’s narration has 
stirred up the critic’s opinions on her interpretation. Moreover, in light of the great 
discrepancy in approaching the beautiful soul’s case, generating a black or white 
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understanding of her will not do justice to the complexity of her character or the critique 
that I claim Goethe voices here. I suggest that Goethe employs the character of the 
beautiful soul and her entire narrative to mirror the biased and constricted contact with 
our creative and imaginative resources, which we should explore rather than judge and 
dismiss. As I will show, it is neither an attempt to criticize neurosis nor patriarchy, but a 
thorough reflection on what is truly dangerous for intellectual growth: ignorance and 
bias towards the resources at our disposal. This, again, is the lesson we are to learn 
[d]urch die Erfahrungen, welche wir an dieser [regelmäßigen] Metamorphose zu machen 
Gelegenheit haben.”117 These experiences namely,  
 
werden … dasjenige enthüllen können, was uns die regelmäßige [Metamorphose] 
verheimlicht, deutlich sehen, was wir dort nur schließen dürfen; und auf diese 
Weise steht es zu hoffen, daß wir unsere Absicht am sichersten erreichen.  
 
[of this metamorphosis will allow us to discover what is hidden in regular 
metamorphosis, to see clearly what we can only infer in regular 
metamorphosis.]118 
 As my using of this excerpt already suggest, Goethe’s “Der Versuch die 
Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären” will play a twofold role in this chapter. Firstly, 
it will be instrumental in demonstrating to what great extent Goethe utilized literature to 
support the cause of science. Secondly, the parallels between the unfolding of a plant as 
well as the beautiful soul’s journey to her own (re)creation, her own Bildung so to speak, 
                                                 
117Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Der Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen (Weinheim, Acta 
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118All translation of Goethe Metamorphose are taken from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, The 
Metamorphosis of Plants, ed. Gordon L. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009) §7. 
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will be helpful in outlining the revalorization that Goethe undertakes in this work. In this 
chapter I intend to direct the attention on the creative imagination as I believe it is the 
crucial element in the beautiful soul’s complex character and its discovery a turning 
point in her development. Regardless whether we tend to interpret her as a neurotic, or, 
on the other hand, as a liberated feminist prototype, her creative imagination is the 
conduit that facilitates all of these developments. As I shall show in this chapter, her 
creative imagination is beneficial to her physical as well as psychological health—only 
one benefit of many that I claim Goethe attaches to the force of the creative imagination. 
Thus, I shall offer new perspectives on interpreting the beautiful soul by suggesting that 
Goethe’s eponymous heroine be read through the lens of Goethe’s own scientific 
writing. In order to foreground the intervention into the discourses of imagination and 
medicine that Goethe makes, it is more fruitful to focus on Goethe’s own theoretical 
writings.  
 Literary scholars have not failed to notice the strong connection between 
Goethe’s scientific writings, such as “Der Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu 
erklären,” and his creative aesthetic oeuvre. Literary scholar Karl J. Fink points out that 
“the major part of Goethe’s philosophy of science is focused on how phenomena are 
arranged and presented in written form.”119 Fink further notices that in his essay 
Materialien zur Geschichte der Farbenlehre (1810) “Goethe raised questions about the 
role of metaphors in scientific language,” a fact that Fink understands to be the 
consequence of “a gradual loss of faith in the literal language of logical positivism.”120 
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According Fink, in his 1810 Materialien zur Geschichte der Farbenlehre Goethe 
observes “that scientists are usually predisposed to one or the other “way of thinking” 
(Gesinnung),” a fact influenced but also mirrored through the “logocentric basis of 
science.”121 As I have shown in the previous chapter, the predisposition to certain ways 
of thinking and how science should prevent this was also at the core of Moritz’s 
concern. While for Moritz, the said predisposition revealed itself in scientific bias and 
elitism, Goethe objects to the insufficiency of narrating science in a logocentric way. 
Metaphors and images, in this light, could indeed be a way of circumventing linguistic 
inadequacies and not only the author’s but also the reader’s imagination would then 
become the crucial element in comprehending a problem or an idea in its full extent. As 
we will see later in this chapter, this notion gains its full significance if we come back to 
consider the form, content, and the framework of “The Confessions of the Beautiful 
Soul” in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister. Using and encouraging her imagination to become 
and then remain active and creative is the key element for the beautiful soul to further 
her cognition and health. Jocelyn Holland poses the question what it means “for a poet, 
or for literature itself, to be ‘beneficial‘ to science, and why Goethe finds that plant 
metamorphosis can accomplish the task.”122 Holland observes that many of Goethe’s 
contemporaries believed that “a literature informed by the language and tropes of 
science is nevertheless not the same as one which engages in, contributes to, or is in 
some way beneficial to scientific thinking.” In an analysis of Goethe’s 1798 poem “Die 
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Metamorphose der Pflanzen,” Holland outlines how deeply intertwined poetry and 
science can be, and, moreover, how beneficial such a fusion can be for both art and 
science.  
 David Seamon’s collection of essays Goethe’s Way of Science: A Phenomenology 
of Nature delivers a thorough and diversified overview of seminal research on Goethe 
and science.123 The thread connecting the collected essays is the emphasis on the 
radically novel evaluation of science that distinguishes Goethe. The novelty of Goethe’s 
approach is constituted by his sidestepping of traditional, Galilean, scientific 
methodology. Rather than focusing on mathematical precision and categorizing results 
into larger, abstract, theories, Seamon’s collection of essays portrays a Goethe whose 
“procedure is that one remain as open as possible and allow his or her way of seeing to 
be shaped by the phenomena.”124 Stressing the visual nature of science, Frederick 
Amrine suggests that for Goethe “the growth of science resides neither in the 
accumulation of brute facts nor in the reduction of one way of seeing to another. Rather, 
it resides in the controlled development of new ways of seeing as such.” Quoting 
Goethe’s letter to his friend K.L.v. Knebel (1787), Amrine stresses Goethe’s wish to 
visit India “not in order to discover anything new, but rather to view that which has 
already been discovered in [my] own way.”125 Amrine’s observation thus suggests that 
furthering science entailed for Goethe a personal and individual experience of science as 
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it is not the phenomenon or the fact that is new and revolutionary, but rather a new way 
of seeing and interpreting it. Walter Heitler “Goethean Science” assumes a similar 
perspective by identifying “the fundamental importance of Goethe’s scientific 
contribution “in its demonstration that rigorous science is possible both within the realm 
of pure form and the qualitative and that this science is as valid as Galilean.”126 In this 
sense, Goethe’s novel paths sought to negotiate new approaches to science that are based 
on a sensory experience of a phenomenon, and thus bemoan the “rise of an essentially 
secular, materialistic philosophy,” he saw unfit to unveil the truth. Expanding these 
observations, this chapter will show that Goethe not only blazed new trails opposing the 
exclusive focus on rational, linear thought as a means of judgment, but also sought to 
transgress the boundaries of empiricism by searching for senses and ways of perception 
that lie beyond the physical ones. 
 In her essay “Goethe’s ‘Classical’ Science,” Astrida Orle Tantillo examines the 
interrelation between Goethe’s fiction and scientific works, arguing that Goethe’s 
science should be interpreted in a much broader sense.127 In her approach to Goethe’s 
science, Tantillo puts a particular emphasis on Goethe’s preference for pre-Socratic 
thinkers as they analogously stress disorder and creativity. Tantillo further claims that 
“Goethean science is thus not solely or even primarily modeled on the traditional 
understanding of Platonic forms or Aristotelian teleology, but also on the more dynamic 
and unpredictable figure of Proteus, a figure that can change its shape and essence at 
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will.”128 The ideas of malleability that Tantillo traces in Goethe’s work as well as his 
taste for disorder and creativity are in fact crucial for this chapter. Wilhelm Meister 
demonstrates traditional approaches and definitions function solely as a sound basis for a 
playful and perpetual reevaluation of them, delivering thus an opportunity to approach a 
particular thought or objects from an infinite number of perspectives, and adjust its role 
according to one’s needs. Goethe’s preference for disorder stems from his understanding 
of disorder as necessary in order to recreate and redefine old perspectives and 
approaches. The disorder that Goethe cherishes is not a random chaos, but a well of 
constant renewal. Creativity, along with creative imagination, is a crucial element in our 
dealing with the ongoing rearrangement. In the case of Wilhelm Meister it is not only a 
redefinition of scientific paradigms that readers can expect, but also a reevaluation of 
psychology, medicine, religion, and even the medium that serves a canvas as well as a 
vehicle for his idea. Wilhelm Meister clearly shows that Goethe creates an intersection of 
discourses—religion, science, and medicine—but also of a number of literary genres in 
order to put forth a new take on all of these concepts. 
 In my work, I intend to expand Holland’s work by casting this light on Goethe’s 
fiction rather than his poetry. Using the example of “The Confessions of the Beautiful 
Soul,” I hope to prove that in his fiction Goethe intertwines science and literature to a 
far greater extent than his poem “Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen” allows the reader to 
conclude. I suggest that the “Confessions” be read not merely as an attempt to create an 
idol or a negative example, but rather a commentary on the status quo of the methods 
and approaches in the scientific community in Goethe’s time. As the following chapters 
will demonstrate, Heinrich von Kleist’s Käthchen von Heilbronn as well Friedrich 
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Schelling’s Clara, for example, voice a similar kind of dissatisfaction with the dominant 
contemporary scientific methods. Though each of these authors pursues “a different 
route” to express their “disenchantment with orthodox science,” they all agree that 
changes must be made to the same extent as the prevalent approach to science has to be 
renegotiated. By creating such a controversial character as the beautiful soul, Goethe 
depicts the weaknesses he diagnoses among scientists and philosophers alike. The debate 
on the (creative) imagination serves thus as a metaphorical conduit to make his point 
and, by choosing such a popular genre, distribute it among an even broader reading 
public.  
As we have seen in the previous chapter, describing science in images rather than 
in technical terms appears much more productive for the interconnection between 
literature and science. At the same time, as science receives a larger readership and a 
more universally legible interface, it also changes the purpose and possible interpretation 
of literature. This perspective allows us to see Goethe’s heroine, the beautiful soul, in a 
new light and calls thus for a reevaluation of the interrelation of her narrative to medical 
discourses. Rather than diagnosing her mental as well as physical ailments, and moving 
from one symptom to another, we can now comprehend her character and her narrative 
as a fictionalized contribution to the significance of the creative imagination in medical 
discourses on a grander scale. As this chapter will show, the intervention Goethe makes 
exceeds the boundaries of a psychologically sharp observation of female pathologies at 
that time because it emphasizes how beneficial and therapeutic it can be to dare to 
explore one’s creative imagination.  
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  In order to provide a thorough background for my subsequent analysis of the 
beautiful soul’s narrative, I will first map out the meaning and significance of this 
concept among Goethe’s contemporaries as well as those who followed him later in the 
discussions on the Bildungsideal of the beautiful soul. A brief introduction to Goethe’s 
Metamorphose will precede my analysis and close readings which will focus on the 
contribution that the beautiful soul’s confessions make with regard to the role and 
importance of the creative imagination in discourses on psychology and medicine. 
 
Tracing the Beautiful Soul 
 Johann Wolfgang Goethe’s bildungsroman Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre tells the 
story of the eponymous Wilhelm Meister, a son of a bourgeois merchant family who, 
after abandoning the merchant trade, pursues a career with a theater company. The 
numerous and adventurous experiences that Wilhelm makes on the path of his life are all 
constitutive elements of his character building. The variety of them ranges from being a 
sometimes fortunate, sometimes desperate lover, facing death in life-threatening battles 
and injuries, or even the (surprising) joys of fatherhood. After concluding the 
tumultuous stage of his development, Wilhelm, now wiser and more mature than ever, 
returns to his bourgeois roots, the place he comes to recognize as his. At his side is his 
wife Natalie, whom Wilhelm encounters in the final stages of his journey. She comes 
from an aristocratic family and is as outstandingly beautiful and as she is virtuous. 
Standing in the line of generations of beautiful and virtuous women in her family, she is 
educated in harmony with her natural tendency to foreground and encourage her best 
sides. Natalie’s best side is virtue and charity, which makes her according to Friedrich 
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Schiller “vollends zur Figur des harmonischen Lebensideals” [a perfect character of the 
harmonious ideal of life”].129 It is in Natalie’s character in which Schiller finds the 
concept of the beautiful soul embodied to the fullest extent. Goethe, however, allotted it 
to Natalie’s relative, the anonymous beautiful soul, to whom he dedicates the sixth book 
of his Wilhelm Meister.  
 Wilhelm Meister’s sixth book is arguably the most famous among the total of 
eight books of the novel. Its centrality to the novel is emphasized through its deviance 
“from [the novel’s] general scheme in both its form and its substance.”130 In book six, 
the beautiful soul, whom Goethe introduces as the author of this embedded narration, 
casts a retrospective view on her own development and life. This narration not only 
interrupts the progress of that of Wilhelm Meister, but it also illustrates a counter-
example to Wilhelm’s linearity and teleological progress. The beautiful soul’s own 
narrative is disrupted by two violent hemorrhages and a number of strokes of fate. The 
first of the two hemorrhages strikes the beautiful soul at the young age of eight and 
confines her to the bed for nine months. In analogy to a foetus that is born after nine 
months in the womb, these nine months transform the young beautiful soul entirely to 
the point that she does not mention anything about her life prior to the sickness. During 
this incubation period she unfolds her personality through the reading of scientific as 
well as biblical writings. Her development certainly equals a transformation of her old 
ways and characteristics into new ones which the beautiful soul develops during her 
illness. Her father educates her in natural sciences. At the same time, her mother 
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provides her with biblical readings to ensure the beautiful soul’s spiritual development. 
Encouraged by her mother, the beautiful soul “las die heiligen Bücher mit vielem 
Anteil.”131 With the same amount of “Anteil,” she also listened to the fairy tales told by 
her aunt. As she emphasizes at multiple occasions, this tripartite equilibrium of fantasy, 
spirituality, and science, is of great significance for her.  
 No matter how well balanced her education is, the immobility caused by her 
sickness makes it impossible for the beautiful soul to observe what she has learned 
firsthand. In her confessions, she remarks that in the moment of the first hemorrhage, 
her soul became “ganz Empfindung und Gedächtnis.”132 Both of these concepts were 
typically assigned to the imagination in the eighteenth century. In other words, in order 
to balance her shortcomings, the beautiful soul uses her imagination to create a world 
that accommodates her needs and soothes them best. To a certain degree, the 
“unsichtbare Welt” she creates is an intersection of what she learns from her chaperons. 
Yet it also goes beyond merely reflecting her physical environment. This world is 
spiritual in a twofold manner.133 On the one hand, she experiences religion in a highly 
individualized manner. On the other, she can only access the world through her spirit as 
it exists only in her imagination. There, within, being all “Empfindung und Gedächtnis,” 
she experiences her own self “ohne System” and “ohne fremde Formen” that she 
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believes to be imposed from without.134  It is the silencing of her body that forces the 
beautiful soul into the introspective—an experience she most likely would have missed 
without her sickness.  
 As it widely known, Goethe’s character of the beautiful soul is based on the 
historic figure of Susanna Katharina von Klettenberg. As a friend and relative of 
Goethe’s mother, she took care of the young Goethe during his long-term illness after 
his return from Leipzig. During the time of his recuperation, Goethe became interested 
in the “state of soul.”135 Through numerous conversations Goethe grew “fond of 
Katharina von Klettenberg, and she, in return, becomes something of a spiritual mentor 
to him.”136 The friendship lasted until Klettenberg’s death in 1774. Yet Goethe’s 
fondness and gratitude for spiritual mentoring are not the reasons why Goethe devotes 
an entire chapter to Klettenberg. Rather, incorporating the concept of the beautiful soul 
and bestowing so much centrality on it mirrors the significance of this concept and 
Lebensideal in eighteenth-century Germany, making it thus suitable to reuse it for his 
purposes.137 Any digression and deviation from this ideal would consequently be 
recognized immediately and facilitate that Goethe’s intended message be easier to 
understand for everyone. In this respect, the beautiful soul’s confessions represent a 
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commonly known metaphor that Goethe employs to make a commentary on the state of 
the scientific community and the way its members approach phenomena that are deviant 
from the norm. By setting the beautiful soul into the dialogue with the discourse on the 
imagination, Goethe consciously taps into one of the most prominent and most 
controversial discourses at his time and creates thus a figure that is equally prominent 
and controversial. I suggest that Goethe’s aim is not to set out and spread the gospel of 
the benefits of a creative imagination, nor is it to warn explicitly of creativity. As I 
claim, with the beautiful soul’s narrative he creates a mirror that admonishes his 
contemporaries to acknowledge that healing or sanity, for example, come in different 
ways. What is difficult for one, can be a blessing for the other, and is therefore not to be 
rejected due to arrogance and bias.    
 The beautiful soul’s unsteadiness and the resulting deviancy from the norm make 
it clear that her portrayal is not an attempt to represent “eine Seele, in welcher der 
Gegensatz zwischen Pflicht und Neigung harmonisch ausgeglichen ist.”138 In Wilhelm 
Meister it is his later wife Natalie who represents these qualities, whom Schiller favored 
over the actual beautiful soul. Clearly, Goethe’s and Schiller’s opinions on the definition 
of a beautiful soul diverge, and only upon Schiller’s editorial objections does Goethe 
acknowledge the status of the beautiful soul to Natalie as well, whom Schiller considers 
a model for this concept. Goethe and Schiller are not the only ones to disagree over this 
concept. In his Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
proclaims the concept of the beautiful soul to be doomed to fail on its own premise.139 
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The beautiful soul’s paradigm fails because by narrating her story she proves that she 
does need the world from which she fancies herself to be independent. Her inwardness, 
which on the surface means a rejection of and a withdrawal from material life along with 
its values and norms, finds an outward expression and verbalization of its own existence. 
In other words, in order to exist, she requires the approval and legitimacy of her own 
existence from an audience, which symbolizes the rejected material world. In and of 
itself, Hegel claims, beautiful souls cannot exist without stringently failing. In his 
unmistakable manner, Friedrich Nietzsche joins Hegel. In Zur Genealogie der Moral 
(1887), Nietzsche says: 
 
Unter ihnen fehlt auch jene ekelhafteste Spezies des Eitlen nicht, die verlognen 
Mißgeburten, die darauf aus sind, »schöne Seelen« darzustellen, und etwa ihre 
verhunzte Sinnlichkeit, in Verse und andere Windeln gewickelt, als »Reinheit des 
Herzens« aud den Markt bringen: die Spezies der moralischen Onanisten und 
»Selbstbefriediger«.140  
 
[Nor is there lacking among them that most disgusting species of the vain, the 
mendacious failure whose aim is to appear as “beautiful souls” and who bring to 
market their deformed sensuality, wrapped up in verses and other swaddling 
clothes, as “purity of heart”: the species of moral masturbators and “self-
gratifiers.’]141 
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Even though one may disclaim Nietzsche’s statement as exaggerated, extreme, and 
acerbic, he nonetheless puts his finger on the beautiful soul’s biggest wound: the 
challenges posed by the sinful external world, the high and even unrealistic ideals of the 
human and their own self, and the double standards that are likely to result from the 
discrepancy among the circumstances, aspirations, and actual outcome.  The beautiful 
soul’s aspiration and hope is to fulfill the ideal of an inwardly and thus outwardly 
beautiful, virtuously perfected Christian human being. Yet ironically, the inwardness 
that Pietist beautiful soul seeks automatically seems to entail the outwardness that she 
claims to shun. In analogy to Hegel’s criticism, the beautiful soul fails because she needs 
legitimacy from without. Nietzsche alleges that those who claim to be such a beautiful 
soul are vain (eitel) and dishonest (verlogen). In other words, in order to exist as a 
beautiful soul one necessitates an audience which, in this case, is to function as a mirror 
reflecting the self that the beautiful soul wants to see.    
 Reconciling her rebuttal of linearity and seemingly natural teleology, with the 
sense of happiness and fulfillment that she feels and mentions at multiple occasions 
causes one of the biggest challenges for literary critics. In contrast to the prevalent 
approaches to the beautiful soul’s narrative, however, I would like to shift the spotlight 
onto the beautiful soul’s world of fantasy and daydreaming, which I intend to treat as a 
narrative that in many ways parallels the case studies published in Moritz’s Magazin. 
Just as many a contributor to the Magazin, the beautiful soul narrates her life in a diary-
like form.142 The content of her narrative is likewise comparable as it delivers not only a 
                                                 
142Excerpts from diaries, and contributions alluding to this mode of writing, were popular and thus a 
constitutive element in Moritz’s Magazin. See for instance the anonymous contribution “Aus dem 
Tagebuche,” as well as “Selbstgeständnisse des Herrn Basedow von seinem Charakter.” All articles taken 
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reflection on the beautiful soul’s main life events, but also zones in on her physical and 
psychological ailments. It is not hard to imagine the descriptions of her two hemorrhages 
as well as her dreams and visions of the invisible world published as case studies in 
Moritz’s Magazin. In the light of the psychological discourses at that time, the beautiful 
soul does not so much tell a tale of rebellion and opposition, nor should her narcissistic 
trait be foregrounded as the feature she is best known for. In the following paragraphs I 
will show that if read through the lens of Goethe’s own scientific writings, the beautiful 
soul’s narrative is one that outlines the importance and salubrious nature of an active 
imagination. In order to prove my claim I will first discuss those fragments of Goethe’s 
scientific oeuvre that are beneficial to my claim, and subsequently move right into the 
close analysis of “The Confessions of the Beautiful Soul.” 
 
The Beautiful Soul as a Monstrous Plant?—Goethe’s “Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen” 
 
 
 In his 1790 essay “Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen,” Goethe distinguishes three 
different ways in which a metamorphosis can take place: “regelmäßig, unregelmäßig, 
und zufällig” [“regular, irregular, and accidental”].143 While the accidental 
metamorphosis is not deemed worthy of further discussion due to its monstrosity and its 
                                                                                                                                                       
from: Karl Philipp Moritz: Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde, vol.1, eds. Petra und Uwe Nettelbeck 
(Nördlingen: Franz Greno Verlag, 1986) 36-38 as well as 114-17 respectively.  
 
143Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Der Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen (Weinheim, Acta 
Humaniora, 1984) §5. From now on abbreviated as Metamorphose. 
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limits, Goethe elaborates greatly on the two other kinds of metamorphosis.144 Goethe’s 
description of the regular metamorphosis reads as follows: 
 
Die regelmäßige Metamorphose, können wir auch die fortschreitende nennen: 
denn sie ist es, welche sich von den ersten Samenblättern bis zur letzten 
Ausbildung der Frucht immer stufenweise wirksame bemerken lässt, und durch 
Umwandlung einer Gestalt in die anderen, gleichsam auf einer geistigen Leiter, 
zu jenem Gipfel der Natur, der Fortpflanzung durch zwei Geschlechter 
hinaufsteigt. … (Metamorphose §6) 
 
[Regular metamorphosis may also be called progressive metamorphosis: it can be 
seen to work step by step from the first seed leaves to the last formation of the 
fruit. By changing one ofrm into antoher, it ascends—as on a spiritual ladder—to 
the pinnacle of nature: propagation through two genders.] 
 
This brief excerpt foregrounds a development that is remarkably smooth and even. It 
shows an ideal whose highest goal it is to strive for and ultimately achieve what Goethe 
calls the peak of nature, or procreation. From the earliest stages of the plant’s creation, 
the plant’s every fiber strives naturally, almost blindly, for procreation. Though Goethe 
indeed talks about plants, side glances at human nature are hard to ignore. Let us 
consider, for instance, what we would get to see if we imagined the personification of a 
regularly developed plant. Most likely, we would see a person with no rough edges, with 
                                                 
144
“Dagegen werden wir von der dritten Metamorphose, welche zufällig, von außen, besonders durch 
Inseckten gewirkt wird, unsere Aufmerksamkeit wegwenden, weil sie uns von dem einfachen Wege, 
welchem wir zu folgen haben, ableiten und unsern Zweck verrücken könnte. Vielleicht findet sich an 
einem andern Orte Gelegenheit, von diesen monströsen, und doch in gewisse Grenzen eingeschränkten 
Auswüchsen zu sprechen.” (§8)  
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no disruptions of any kind,  a person, whose abilities unfold equally well and smoothly, 
and whose whole development moves steadily towards biological procreation. It is the 
continuity of a biological heritage which makes the person perfect. Among Wilhelm 
Meister’s characters certainly Therese and Natalie come to mind, especially since 
Natalie was Schiller’s choice for representing the beautiful soul. Both value the 
regularity with regard to education as well as an education that forms the innate skills a 
person inherits. In their conversations with Wilhelm Meister both protagonists relate 
multiple times how their education was designed to unfold their natural skills and 
interest. In her detailed narrative of her life, Therese, for instance, remarks that a life as 
a “Hausfrau” was something that most women naturally excel at. Therese’s inner 
harmony comes into being through “[a]lle immer wiederkehrenden unentbehrlichen 
Bedürfnisse,” and she emphasizes, “[w]elche regelmäßige Tätigkeit wird erfordert, um 
diese immer wiederkehrende Ordnung [eines Haushaltes] in einer unverrückten, 
lebendigen Folge durchzuführen!”145 As this short excerpt shows, Therese’s personality 
is regular to the core. She seeks out what is regular, and her main task is to bring order 
and regularity to places where it is absent. As we learn from her narrative, the task “[bei] 
einer Dame in der Nachbarschaft, die große Güter besaß … ihrer Haushaltung 
vorzustehn” had been, again, a natural next step that had unfold before Therese in the 
course of her life.146 There was nothing extraordinary that Therese had to perform or do 
in order to receive the position that she considers to be the most important and also most 
natural in a woman’s life. Therese is highly critical of women who complain, “man sei 
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ungerecht gegen unser Geschlecht, hieß es, die Männer wollten alle höhere Kultur für 
sich behalten, man wolle uns zu keinen Wissenschaften zulassen, man verlange, daß wir 
nur Tändelpuppen und Haushälterinnen sein sollten.”147 With admiration she 
appropriates Lothario’s statement that “das Regiment des Haushalts” was the highest 
possible position a woman was capable of assuming and the most important one as well. 
The lack of criticism in Therese’s attitudes manifests her love, but also her need, for 
regularity and order. Her obedient appropriation of Lothario’s opinion does not occur 
out of a blind love for Lothario, but rather out of admiration for order and regularity that 
clearly identifies her as an embodiment of the regular type of plant Goethe describes in 
his Metamorphose.  
Unlike Therese, the beautiful soul does not strike her readers as an evenly 
developed character. Her story is one of disruption, irregularity, and lacunae, and 
resembles the description of the irregular metamorphosis, which reads as follows: 
 
Die unregelmäßige Metamorphose könnten wir auch die rückschreitende nennen. 
Denn wie in jenem Fall, die Natur vorwärts zu dem großen Zwecke hineilt, tritt 
sie hier um eine oder einige Stufen rückwärts. Wie sie dort mit 
unwiderstehlichem Trieb und kräftiger Anstrengung die Blumen bildet, und zu 
den Werken der Liebe rüstet; so erschlafft sie hier gleichsam, und lässt 
unentschlossen ihr Geschöpf in einem unentscheidenen, weichen, unsern Augen 
oft gefälligen, aber innerlich unkräftigen und unwirksamen Zustande. Durch die 
Erfahrungen, welche wir an dieser Metamorphose zu machen Gelegenheit haben, 
werden wir dasjenige enthüllen können was uns die regelmäßige verheimlicht, 
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deutlich sehen, was wir dort nur schliessen dürfen; und auf diese Weise steht es 
zu hoffen, dass wir unsere Absicht am sichersten erreichen. (Metamorphose §7) 
 
[Irregular metamorphosis might also be called retrogressive metamorphosis. IN 
the previous case nature pressed forward to her great goal, but here it takes one or 
more steps backward. There, with irresistible force and tremendous effort, nature 
formed the flowers and equipped them for works of love; here it seems to grow 
slack, irresolutely leaving its creation in an indeterminate, malleable state often 
pleasing to the eye but lacking in inner force and effect. Our observations of this 
metamorphosis will allow us to discover what is hidden in regular 
metamorphosis. Thus we hope to attain our goal in the most certain way.] 
 
In contrast to Therese’s regular development, the beautiful soul’s path is minted by 
many extremes, which indeed may be regarded as throwbacks in her pursuit of linearity. 
Her violent hemorrhages, her decision not to marry any of her suitors and remain 
childless, and finally her self-imposed solitude represent the sudden changes of course in 
her striving for the greater goal of procreation. Yet as Goethe also suggests, there is 
something that we can learn from this model. It is something that we cannot learn from a 
regular metamorphosis because it conceals it from us. Interestingly, Goethe uses the 
term “verheimlicht,” which gears toward something which not even the regular 
metamorphosis is free of, that is, something that appears to be inherent in most 
creations, yet not only consciously so. The “unkräftige” and “unwirksame” condition 
that Goethe describes in the seventh paragraph of his Metamorphose is exactly what 
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literary scholarship traced in Goethe’s character of the beautiful soul. Unlike the regular 
development, this creation, be it botanic or human, does not strive for procreation 
because it is too weak and unsteady in order to be able to reproduce. Such an assumption 
prompts two important questions. The first question is, what is it that which, according 
to Goethe, the regular plant conceals from us and which that we should know? The 
second question revolves around the mystery of why of all things it is the character 
whose development is violently disrupted by blows of fate as well as own decisions who 
becomes the beautiful soul in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister. The following paragraphs 
attempt to find an answer to both of the questions suggesting that we all have facilities, 
for example the creative imagination, that are obscure to us, but that we need to be 
aware of in order to put into beneficial practice. That way, a continuation, though not a 
linear one, is guaranteed. 
 
Goethe’s Approach to the Imagination—A Look around the Novel 
 In his search for a means to make the process of unfolding, be it in a plant or a 
human being, universally understandable, Goethe not only chooses various literary and 
scientific genres, but also taps into an array of different ideas. In her essay “Goethe’s 
‘Classical’ Science,” Astrida Orle Tantillo explores the connection between Goethe’s 
science and its indebtedness to classical, for instance Platonic or Aristotelian, paradigms 
of science and thinking.148 Though her essay strongly focuses on the interrelationship 
between Goethe’s science and classical Greek philosophy, Tantillo also traces a number 
of features in Goethe’s scientific paradigm that are valid not only in the framework of 
                                                 
148Astrida Orle Tantillo, “Goethe’s “Classical” Science,” in The Literature of Weimar Classicism, ed. 
Simon Richter, (New York: Camden House, 2005). 
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classicism, but also assume a general importance in Goethe’s scientific project. Tantillo 
lays out that  
 
it is quite clear that [Goethe] actively sought traditional, classical models 
throughout his works, whether scientific or literary. His Italienische Reise is all 
about his attempts to rediscover and re-invent classicism for the modern age. … 
Goethe did not limit his classical models to those defined by Winckelmann… . 
Rather, Goethe also embraced those classical models that displayed chaos, 
passion, disruption, and disorder. (327) 
 
Goethe’s determination to rediscover and reevaluate traditional models of thinking had 
for one furthered his own understanding of science. Yet, in analogy to the excerpts from 
Goethe’s Metamorphose, for example, Tantillo’s analysis implies that Goethe’s 
paradigms exceed their primary field of focus, in this case that of botany. This perpetual 
renegotiation of traditional models becomes traceable in his Wilhelm Meister. In this 
light, Goethe’s approach towards his use of scientific paradigms is bound to strike the 
readers with a playful redefinition of traditions.  In the case of Wilhelm Meister it is not 
only a redefinition of scientific paradigms that readers can expect, but also a 
reevaluation of psychology, medicine, religion, and even the medium that serves a 
canvas as well as a vehicle for his idea. Wilhelm Meister clearly shows that from 
Goethe’s perspective all these ideas—psychology, medicine, and religion—intersect and 
create thus something new. Through this intersection of discourses traditional paradigms 
reemerge in a new light and lead to new recognitions.    
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 As far as creative imagination is concerned, Wilhelm Meister illuminates the 
imagination from a number of different angles. The imagination finds its most obvious 
expression in Wilhelm’s love for and participation in theater plays, in his younger years, 
and later theater productions. On his way towards his fulfillment in the final stages of 
Goethe’s bildungsroman, Wilhelm’s passion for theater does not always serve him well. 
Within the theater group he experiences his most joyous moments, but also his most 
devastating ones. At the end of this novel, at the zenith of his personal happiness with 
Natalie, Wilhelm’s urge to express his creativity and imagination seem long forgotten. 
Wilhelm’s tale, however, is not one meant to dismiss a creative imagination as a 
symptom of youthful unsteadiness. Rather, as a look at the characters around Wilhelm 
Meister show, Goethe’s dialogue with the discourse on imagination is not a matter of 
black and white, or good or bad.  The character of the harpist, as for instance Hellmuth 
Ammerlahn claims in his article “Produktive und destruktive Einbildungskraft: Goethes 
Tasso, Harfner und Wilhelm Meister,” is the representation of potential dangerous 
aspects of the force of imagination, which in the case of the harpist end in madness and 
despair.149 The destructive force of the harpist’s imagination lies for Ammerlahn, and I 
support his claim, in the fact that he uses his imagination solely as canvas for the 
“psychoanalytischen Projektionen” [“psychoanalytic projections”] of his troublesome 
past that Ammerlahn´s describes as a “zu Vereinseitigung führendes Model” [“model 
leading to onesidedness”].150 In other words, using one’s imagination for the sole 
purpose of reenacting one’s past is at least a misuse if not an abuse of the imaginative 
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forces that lie within us. To the contrary, Wilhelm Meister’s very own process of 
exploring and expressing his imagination is a successful example for coming to terms 
with the “produktive Einbildungskraft” [“productive imagination”] that Ammerlahn 
interprets as being endangered by the destructive forces that the harpist’s imagination 
unfolds.151  Ammerlahn further concludes his argument by emphasizing that “ein 
gründliches Studium des Romans zeigt, daß Goethe allen wichtigeren Romanfiguren den 
Bereichen von Wilhelms schöpferischem Erleben sowie kritischen Erkennen zugeordnet 
hat” [“a thorough examination of this novel shows that Goethe assigned each of the main 
characters to one of Wilhelm’s aspects of creative experience as well as critical 
reasoning”].152 Wilhelm Meister’s happiness is fulfilled “durch das Zusammenkommen 
der verwandtschaftlichen Viererfamilie von Friedrich, der schönen Gräfin, Lothario und 
Natalie” [“through the coming together of the relational family of four consisting of 
Friedrich, the beautiful Duchess, Lothario, and Natalie”].153 It is the unification of 
various different modes of perception—embodied by these characters—that facilitates 
Wilhelm the creative experience and critical perception, which Ammerlahn lays out in 
his argument, and which evidently is instrumental for attaining happiness and 
fulfillment—a fact which will become crucial in my interpretation of the “Bekenntnisse 
einer schönen Seele” later in this chapter.  
 In exploring Goethe’s urge to revisit and renegotiate traditional scientific 
paradigms that Tantillo identifies in her essay, Ursula Mahlendorf’s theories on the 
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origins of creativity can be helpful and productive.154 Goethe’s great affinity to the 
epistemology of classical Greece on the one hand, and his need to reevaluate these 
philosophies on the other, reach beyond his scientific models only. In analogy to his 
botanical observations, Goethe’s take on imagination reveals elements that indeed are 
obviously rooted in Platonic concepts whose popularity peaked in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century. Yet ultimately, Goethe’s take on the nature and function of 
imagination step away from merely mimetic representations. Portraying the different 
Greek traditions in thinking about creativity, Mahlendorf comes to classify theories of 
and research on creativity into three subcategories.155  In the pessimistic tradition the 
creativity is of divine origin, and the hero is marked by gods, yet fails to use his gift of a 
creative imagination to his advantage. As Mahlendorf points out it is  
 
Today’s psychoanalytic studies of the artist’s pathology, and the presently 
unfashionable psychiatric pathography are based on this tradition. … Over the 
past two centuries creative diseases have had their fashions and theories. 
Consumption, syphilis, epilepsy have had their day, and so have drug addiction, 
alcoholism, schizophrenia, manic depression, and various deformities and 
inferiorities. (11)  
 
Scholarship eagerly classifies the beautiful soul as a representative of this category.  Her 
voluntary withdrawal from the outside world and the simultaneous turn towards 
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imaginary figures and places has led literary scholarship to understand her as 
showcasing the negative effects of a creative imagination.  
 In contrast to the pessimistic tradition, the optimistic group “views creative 
activity as therapeutic. In the problems of life, all symbolic activity, and especially all 
imaginative, creative activity, makes flexible approaches and salutary resolution 
possible.”156 I suggest that there is sufficient evidence to interpret the beautiful soul as a 
character that also showcases positive and productive ways of using creative 
imagination. I will show that in analogy to his approach to science, for example, Goethe 
dissolves typical classifications in the main discourse like science or imagination to 
foreground that by analogy nothing around us follows such rules strictly. The emphasis 
he lays on the individual person is also valid for an individual case. Through several of 
the characters in Wilhelm Meister, Goethe clearly shows the importance and necessity of 
a very prolific imaginary creativity. In the same manner that Moritz redefined the case 
study known since antiquity, Goethe does the same with the orientation of theories on art 
and creativity. He dissolves strict boundaries that had to be followed and shows that the 
fluidity between categories formerly separated by these boundaries brings science and 
thought a lot further than an obedient following the rules. Strict regulations and blind 
obedience is not useful.  
 
 
The Beautiful Soul—More than Meets the Eye? 
 
 “Mit dem Anfange des achten Jahres bekam ich einen Blutsturz”—this is the 
oldest memory that the beautiful soul writes down in her narrative. The vehemence of 
such an incision into the life of the little girl comes with a power that overshadows 
                                                 
156Mahlendorf 13.  
 111
everything to date. In fact, the blast with which the outbreak of the hemorrhage 
overcomes her displaces everything about the beautiful soul from before her disease into 
absolute oblivion. Her life up to this point does not seem to have existed at all in the 
consciousness of the beautiful soul, a fact that portrays this experience as a 
metamorphosis with a subsequent rebirth. The imposed seclusion and immobility place 
the beautiful soul before a bifurcation of her path: she can either give in to the disease 
and fade away as a result of the perpetual “heftigsten Husten und abmattenden Fieber” 
[“sharp spells of coughing and debilitating fever”] or, she can substitute the lacking 
external world with one that she herself created.157 The beautiful soul quickly embraces 
her imaginary faculties and almost naturally unfolds them, ultimately maintaining thus a 
positive outlook on her desolate situation. Unlike in the case studies analyzed in the 
previous chapter of this dissertation, the beautiful soul does not dream about a particular 
remedy that would help her cure her ailing body. What she receives from her vivid 
imagination is the ability not only to endure her disease, but to make it a time of thriving 
for her personality. In her confessions, she writes that  
 
während des neunmonatlichen Krankenlagers, das ich mit Geduld aushielt, ward, 
so wie mich dünkt, der Grund zu meiner ganzen Denkart gelegt, indem meinem 
Geiste die ersten Hülfsmittel gereicht wurden, sich nach seiner eigenen Art zu 
entwickeln.158  
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[During the nine months of convalescence which I bore patiently, the foundations 
of my present way of thinking were laid – or so it seems to me now. For during 
that time my mind received various impulses that helped  in the shaping of a 
specific character.] 
 
In this statement we see that indeed for her spirit the necessary help comes through the 
backdoor of the imagination. The biblical stories her mother tells her, the fairy tales she 
hears from her aunt, as well as natural scientific artifacts her father shows her only gain 
their educational significance insofar as they inspire the beautiful soul’s imagination 
with which she uncovers the facets of her spirit. Whatever the beautiful soul is 
confronted with, be it her frail health on the negative end of the spectrum, or her 
continuing her educational program on the other, her creative imagination and the 
created imaginary world are the constitutive element of the success of the undertaking. It 
is her unbiased manner in encountering and exploring her imagination that encourages 
the beautiful soul to keep going as well as is possible in her desolate situation. This, as I 
claim, is the lesson Goethe intended for his readers to learn from the irregular 
metamorphosis for, as her example shows, creativity and imagination guarantee a 
continuity that her physical body denies her. Thus, the beautiful soul learns how to tap 
those faculties in us that lie dormant and unrecognized and that only a disruption in the 
linearity of progress can bring to light.  
Her eagerness to learn with all means at hand enables the beautiful soul to merge 
these two worlds together and thus change, or even sharpen, her perceptive and 
analytical skills. Her course of action resembles what Freud later observed in childish 
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play.  In his 1907 essay “Der Dichter und das Phantasieren,” Freud observes that 
“[j]edes spielende Kind benimmt sich wie ein Dichter, indem es sich seine eigene Welt 
erschafft, oder, richtiger gesagt, die Dinger seiner Welt in eine neue, ihm gefällige  
Ordnung versetzt” [“every playing child acts like a creative writer, in that it creates a 
world of his own, or, rather  rearranges the things in a new way which pleases him”].159 
Freud further denotes this childish play instinct as a clearly demarcated behavior, one 
that the child easily discerns as play and not reality, for “[d]er Gegensatz zu Spiel ist 
nicht Ernst, sondern Wirklichkeit” [“the opposite of play is not what is serious, but what 
is real”].160 Goethe’s beautiful soul goes even a step further than Freud’s assumption. At 
this very young age and with overflowing curiosity and creativity, she manages to 
reconcile her imaginary world and real life, without losing the ability to distinguish them 
from each other. The endeavors she undertakes in the realm of her imagination, namely, 
do not remain without consequences for the reality she faces. Thus, indeed these two 
realms remain separated, yet in a dialogue with one another, and that is why I advocate a 
revalorization of her creative imagination in a positive way. Using her imagination, the 
beautiful soul gets access to elements that her confinement in bed denies her, but ones 
that she requires in order to secure her further development. These elements represent 
friendship, learning, and the feeling of not being deviant in any sort of way, and the 
beautiful soul intuitively remedies her desolate salutary situation by uniting both of the 
worlds she encounters.  
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 The lack of friendships, learning possibilities, as well as the feeling of 
acceptance and belonging manifest themselves in many different ways. For instance, she 
relates that she spends hours at a time, in which “[sie sich] mit dem unsichtbaren Wesen 
unterhielt” [(she) intinmately communed with the Invisible Being”] and she even 
dictates parts of these conversations to her mother. Many scholars, Kowalik for instance, 
interpret this invisible being as the beautiful soul’s attempt to keep the Oedipal 
structures of her world intact, and substitute her own father, who does not spend enough 
time with his eight-year-old daughter, with the ultimate, almighty father figure—God.161 
Though the beautiful soul’s imagination makes use of religious pictures and motifs, I 
would like to contradict Kowalik in her interpretation. The beautiful soul’s creative 
imagination generates an admittedly spiritual world, yet, as I suggest, not in order to 
maintain a close love relationship to her (imagined) father. Apart from the invisible 
being, dem Unsichtbaren, the beautiful soul also imagines, for example, a “reizenden, 
kleinen Engel, … in weißem Gewand und goldenen Flügeln” [“delightful little angel, in 
white garments and with golden wings”].162 Inspired by the fairy tales, she also imagines 
a number of princes, beautiful princesses, and beautiful dresses that that the eight-year-
old would be wearing to a ball, were she ever to attend one. The beautiful soul’s 
imagination is thus driven by her desire not to restore a missing father-figure, but to 
recreate whatever her frail health denies her in real life. With her creative imagination, 
the beautiful soul generates landscapes and beings that give her what she needs to keep 
going and keep developing.   
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The reasons for her eagerness to learn from the imaginary beings, as well as her 
overall enthusiasm for everything revolving around the imaginary world, lies in the fact 
that whatever she encounters in the invisible world is as legitimate as her experiences in 
the real world. Although for her surroundings, the beautiful soul’s encounters with the 
invisible world are a mere fantasy, a game as Freud calls it, for her it becomes a place 
that is equally legitimate as reality. Her excursions into the world of imagination are the 
only possibility to experience anything first hand. Being confined to the bed, the 
beautiful soul has no opportunity to slip out from her parents’ attention and seek out 
something, or somebody, she herself deems desirable. It is in the world of her 
imagination that she has the chance to do something, to experience something, to have 
something that resembles a normal life. The biblical, scientific, and fantastic tales 
narrated by her parents and her aunt dominate the external life. In the real and during her 
disease, the beautiful soul lives in a world of words rather than deeds and experiences. 
They are only available in the world of imagination, and she interchanges these two 
worlds deliberately in order to maintain a certain balance between words and actions, as 
well as between stasis and dynamic motion. This, consequently, has a beneficial 
influence on her mental and physical health, which becomes even clearer when we take 
into consideration her adolescent years, which the beautiful soul spends in good health 
and in company of real (as opposed to imaginary) friends. Once healthy, her time and 
education is filled with real, worldly activities, and therefore she neglects, almost 
forgets, the world she imagined during her sickness. In hindsight, she describes this 
period of her life as “die leersten Jahre meines Lebens” [“the emptiest years of my 
life”].163 “Tagelang von nichts zu reden,” she further complains, “keinen gesunden 
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Gedanken zu haben, nur zu schwärmen, das war meine Sache” [“For days on end I had 
nothing to talk about, nothing salutary to think about, nothing to do but go along with 
crowd”].164 Here, the beautiful soul clearly alludes to the force of imagination, yet used 
for vanity, not to achieve actual enlightening contents. Schwärmen, to enthuse, has been 
substituted for the serious and meaningful exchanges the beautiful soul exercised in her 
childhood.     
Learning a lesson from the emptiness of her adolescent years, in all following 
dark hours of her life, be it caused by another hemorrhage or both of her parents falling 
ill, the beautiful soul makes sure to stay in touch with the spiritual world she accesses 
through her imagination. As an adult, she reflects on the significance and validity of her 
imaginary experiences and comes to the following conclusion: 
 
Nun konnte ich mich prüfen, ob auf dem Wege, den ich eingeschlagen, Wahrheit 
oder Phantasie sei, ob ich vielleicht nur nach andern gedacht, oder ob der 
Gegenstand meines Glaubens eine Realität habe, und zu meiner größten 
Unterstützung fand ich immer das letztere. (398) 
 
[I was now able to examine myself to see whether the path chosen was one of 
truth or of fancy, whether I had only been imitating others, whether the object of 
my faith as a reality or not; to my great consolation I always found that it was.]  
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Although the belief that she finds confirmed in these harsh times is a spiritual one, it is 
important to keep in mind that it is not religion per se that saves her, but rather her 
imagination that allows for a direct and highly individualized experience. It is not the 
solemn priest that comforts her, but imaginary creations that can infuse her with 
something she intuitively knows that she needs. Ultimately, her imagining of angelic 
friends rescues her from physical as well as emotional oppression. The “fremde Formen” 
[“external forms and systems”] that the beautiful soul finds so liberating to cast off and 
that Susanne Zantop interprets as the suffocating constraints of eighteenth-century 
patriarchal society, appear to me as the forms of her physical body.165 Her physical 
reality, which for the beautiful soul is repeatedly stricken by severe diseases as well as a 
number of minor ailments, affects evidently her emotional state as well. Her physical 
constraints operate here in a way that is similar to that of the social constraint 
maintained by the society around her. According to Zantop’s reading, the beautiful soul 
flees into what superficially appears to be aloofness and solitude, yet, Zantop interprets 
this as a powerful and willful independence and a sign of rebellion against the 
parochialism of the eighteenth-century social norms. I suggest, however, that the 
undoubtedly constraining “fremde Formen” are not of a social nature, but ones 
represented by her body as well as thinking patterns that have become a habit and that 
prevent her, and everyone else, to truly explore her self and live in harmony with 
physical and spiritual needs, which ultimately is the only path to physical health and 
sanity. In other words, by turning her back on great parts of the material world, and 
turning towards the world of her imagination, the beautiful soul steps out of the forms of 
thinking that stigmatize her as an aloof, pathologic hermit. Instead of submitting to those 
                                                 
165See Susanne Zantop, “Eigenes Selbst und Fremde Formen,” Goethe Yearbook 3 (1986). 
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“forms” that literally make her sick, the beautiful soul embraces her imaginations and 
finds thus a way of staying healthy and sane. Making use of her creative imagination is 
an essential device in this process.  
 Deactivating her physical body not only rids the beautiful soul of potential 
physical ailments, but also keeps those biological processes at bay that may tint her 
perception. In the process of exploring her imagination, the beautiful soul feels the 
connection to her soul, which she believes to be her true self, and by doing so she is able 
to come to term with the past and anticipate the future. In her confessions she writes: 
 
Es war, als wenn meine Seele ohne Gesellschaft des Körpers dächte; sie sah den 
Körper selbst als ein ihr fremdes Wesen an, wie man etwa ein Kleid ansieht. Sie 
stellte sich mit einer außerordentlichen Lebhaftigkeit die vergangenen Zeiten und 
Begebenheiten vor und fühlte daraus, was folgen werde. Alle diese Zeiten sind 
dahin; was folgt, wird auch dahingehen, der Körper wird wie ein Kleid zerreißen, 
aber Ich, das wohlbekannte Ich, Ich bin. (427) 
 
[It was as if my soul were thinking without my body, looking on the body as 
something apart from itself, like some garment or other. My soul vividly recalled 
past times and events and sensed hat was to come. These times were all gone by, 
and what was to come would also pass; the body will be rent like a garment, but 
I, the well-known I, I am.] 
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According to her statements, the physical body is nothing but a space of the interaction 
between external influences and biological processes, which altogether tint and shape 
the beautiful soul’s thinking and feeling. For the beautiful soul these interactions are an 
obstacle in recognizing her full potential. To be more specific, these intersections cause 
prejudice and bias in her thinking and perceptions, that, as a consequence, distract the 
beautiful soul from the recognition, or intuition of what is right. This is decisive for her 
capability to continue. By removing that veil, the beautiful soul sees herself capable of 
mastering any situation she may encounter because she knows that whenever she is in 
need of support and help all she needs to do is to enter the world of her imagination to 
thus get in touch with something that provides her with what she needs the most at a 
particular moment. During the harsh times of her parents’ illness, the beautiful soul’s 
imagination generated moral and emotional support. In the nine months of her battling 
the hemorrhage it provided her with friendship, acceptance, and a deeper understanding 
of her situation, which ultimately helped her fully recover from her disease. In fact, her 
recovery worked so well that the beautiful soul translated this imaginary cooperation 
into all areas of her life, for example her education and personal relationships. The 
connection between a creative imagination and well-being is very pronounced in her 
confessions. Even though many of her readers may not be willing to choose such a 
lifestyle, approving of it or disapproving it remains a matter of preference and taste. For 
the beautiful soul, the person she had chosen to become, the person she had spent years 
to shape through her creative imagination, is one that works for her. Her decision to pay 
such close attention to the dictates of her imagination did not create a linear teleology, 
but certainly one that helped the beautiful soul to achieve those goals in life she deemed 
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worthy. From her point of view, she “is always moving forward and never backward”—
as sign of the notion of fulfillment and productivity.166 The times in which she neglects 
her imaginary world for the sake of the material world are those of unhappiness and 
loneliness, while the times in which she eagerly explores the world her imagination 
creates are described as happy and fulfilled. The idea of merging the physical existence 
with the imaginary one is crucial for both mastering the material life and using one’s 
imagination in a productive manner. In other words, a creative imagination is a key 
element in her pursuit of growth in expansion. At the same time, this take on the purpose 
of a creative imagination resembles that suggested by Moritz. Here, the scientific 
snobbism and elitism criticized in Moritz works is substituted by external influences that 
effect our perception and our understanding of ourselves and the world around us.  
 In light of the “Bekenntnisse einer schönen Seele,” the benefits that a creative 
imagination may have on a person’s physical and psychological development and well-
being balance the negative effects that an ill-used imagination can have.167 Embracing a 
way of life which necessarily includes the use of a creative imagination means 
embarking on a journey that is less foreseeable, yet at the same time, less terrifying as 
well. Following the dictates of her imagination, the beautiful soul steps out of the linear 
trajectory that leads directly up to the main goal of the regular metamorphosis, the 
physical reproduction. Tying it back to the pessimistic and optimistic traditions of 
viewing creativity, it becomes evident that literary scholarship traditionally interprets 
                                                 
166WM 432, also emphasized in Robert Tobin, Doctor’s Orders. Goethe and Enlightenment Thought 
(Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 2001) 73. 
 
167See for instance the beautiful soul’s adolescence. She describes these years of her life as empty and 
lonely as she was preoccupied with exclusively worldly issues and used her imagination solely for 
Schwärmerei, i.e. a non-creative activity. 
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the beautiful from the pessimistic position. Her pathology is regarded as her main 
feature and Goethe main purpose of literarizing the beautiful soul’s confessions. She has 
a reputation of being trapped in an Oedipal relationship with the world, or a socio-
emotional aloofness, and she is unable to leave any of them behind because she is a 
model for a Narcissistic nature.  This, again, traditionally leads scholars to the 
conclusion that with the depiction of the beautiful soul Goethe wanted to create a 
negative example for the consequences of an unbalanced way of life, in brief an irregular 
development of a plant. As a consequence, both patterns the regular as well as the 
irregular, have to be traceable in her narrative. Interpreting the beautiful soul as either an 
exclusively positive example of self-liberation and independence or as an exclusively 
negative example of social and emotional eccentricity does not do justice to the beautiful 
soul’s portrayal and the lesson Goethe may have hoped that his audience take away from 
this reading.  
 Creating a character that is either exclusively a role model or a deterrent, and 
seemingly nothing in between, deprives the readers of a teachable moment that an 
irregular metamorphosis provides. The irregularity the beautiful soul voluntarily seeks 
out is an implementation of what Goethe observes in his Metamorphose. The drives and 
goals of a regular development are laid out in plain sight in many of the (female) 
characters surrounding the beautiful soul. The nine-month rupture in her life represents 
in the life of the beautiful soul a step aside from the regularity and linearity in the course 
of her life. What is revealed during the time of her illness is the undeniable power of her 
imagination. In her narrative, the imagination is decisive for her recovery. As already 
mentioned, instead of frustration and resignation, the beautiful soul’s imagination 
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creates acceptance, support, and optimism for her future. Lacking these components 
would certainly have complicated her recovery. At the same time, without the invasion 
of the irregularity, the beautiful soul would not have made this experience. For as her 
adolescent years show, the beautiful soul resumes the linearity of her life before the 
hemorrhage and detaches herself thus from the creative and therapeutic force of her 
imagination. She receives an encompassing education, she finally is given the 
opportunity to socialize with her peers, and finally she makes her first amorous 
experiences. Her later engagement is an evident proof of her linear striving towards 
marriage and procreation, what Goethe phrased as a “Gipfel der Natur, der 
Fortpflanzung durch zwey Geschlechter” [“the of nature: propagation through two 
genders”].168 Yet, in all these stages and situations of her life, she remains unproductive 
in both senses the biological as well as the intellectual one. The case of the beautiful 
soul shows that pursuing the linearity in one’s life may leave to a biological 
reproduction, but it certainly does not always lead to intellectual development. Rather, 
there is a plentitude of things that one can learn during irregular disruptions. In this 
light, there can be no strict black and white reading of her persona either. Her years of 
adolescence, which altogether can be regarded as quite linear, are those in which the 
beautiful is socially most accepted. Yet at the same time, these are also the years which 
are dull and filled with ennui and, ultimately, a standstill. 
 
 
 
                                                 
168Metamorphose §6.  
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Conclusion and Outlook 
 The relation between her social success and her intellectual and spiritual growth 
is distorted because the superficiality of her social life prevents her from exploring and 
comprehending the world through the kaleidoscope of her imagination. In other words, 
while she approaches the goal of the peak of the linear development, the beautiful soul 
regresses with regard to her personality and intellect. The superficiality of her thoughts 
and concerns not only has an impact on her social life, but also on everything else, 
including creativity and imagination. With these two components, however, there can be 
no true progress. Therefore, it is obvious what an ambivalent character the beautiful soul 
is, and interpreting her as either a pioneer of female agency and independence, or, as an 
eccentric, neurotic hermit and religious zealot, does not do justice to the complexity of 
her character. Whichever way she may be interpreted, one thing becomes clear: by the 
means of her creative imagination the beautiful soul manages over and over again to 
maintain her emotional stability and vital energy to face all of the low points during the 
times of her severe diseases. In that light, I suggest that her eventual aloofness and 
abandoning of the material world be read not as an expression of shrewd neurotic, but 
rather as a survival, or protective, instinct. What protects her, helps her survive and find 
a place in this world is the power of her imagination. For the beautiful soul it is a 
“Schutzort,” a refuge, in which her soul finds protection. What it really is, is ultimately 
almost impossible to determine. However, it is obvious that her imagination functions as 
a conduit for the sort of healing she really needs. In contrast to the case studies in the 
previous chapter, her imagination does not alleviate a high fever. Nor does it reveal her 
the future she is about to face. What it does for her, is keep her sane and enable her 
 124
emotionally to face whatever life brings. Her ability to cope with her physical ailments 
is successful in an unparalleled manner. In analogy to Moritz’s case studies, the creative 
imagination inspires her to pursue her life in the way that works best for her. In that 
sense, tapping the creative imagination enables the beautiful soul, as it did in Moritz’s 
case studies, to develop further. The ruptures that at first appear to be disruptions of her 
path of life turn out to be the most fruitful and productive periods of her life. In contrast, 
her linear and smooth years do not bring anything but dull ennui. The ruptures facilitate 
the beautiful encounters with her creative imagination, which works as a therapeutic 
because as Mahlendorf observes “in the problems of life, all symbolic activity, and 
especially all imaginative, creative activity, makes flexible approaches and salutary 
resolution possible.”169  
 Goethe’s passion for science is intertwined with Mahlendorf’s invoking of 
“flexible approaches” because in his pursuit of scientific innovation it is not new facts 
and new discoveries Goethe is after. Innovation does not lie in the exterior world, but on 
the contrary, it always lies in the eye of the beholder. The forces facilitating perpetual 
innovation are deeply rooted within the faculties of creativity and imagination. The 
creative imagination that Goethe invokes in the beautiful soul’s daydreaming is therefore 
the driving force not only for those who seek “salutary resolutions,” but also for those 
who seek to propel science in general. Intertwining literature and science links several 
goals: it reaches a wider public and triggers in and of itself the fantasy and imagination 
of the reader during the reading process. Thus, by reading readers are confronted with 
known facts and circumstances, yet in a new and different light. Further, the medium of 
the novel stresses for one its educational aspect. For example, readers will read about 
                                                 
169Mahlendorf 13.  
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something and compare it with their own experiences, enriching thus, hopefully, their 
outlook on things. At the same time, using the novel to further science encourages an 
individualized approach to the issue presented in the novel and creates thus opportunities 
to arrive at unorthodox solutions. Furthermore, intertwining science and the novel makes 
each reader a participant in the discourses presented in a particular novel.  
 As Frederick Amrine points out, in Goethe’s scientific paradigm it is the scientist 
that has to willingly seek out the metamorphosis. The ongoing change in existing 
paradigms of and approaches to science can only take place within the scientist. All 
there is to know already exists, yet has not been recognized yet. To reach the point of 
recognition, the scientist must remain open towards and appreciative of the unexpected. 
Tantillo’s interpretation of Goethe as an admirer of the chaotic and disorderly is indeed 
valid because, as I have shown, it stresses Goethe’s stringent belief in the fallibility of 
not only the traditional but in fact all paradigms. For with the time, new perspectives 
come, and with them new results that construct a new truth and a new reality. The 
passion of disorder underlines thus Goethe’s need to rearrange old ideas in order to gain 
a picture. As this chapter demonstrates, the pursuit of new results pushes Goethe’s 
scientist beyond conventional boundaries. In analogy to the Galilean approach that had 
served its time, the perception of the data, i.e. the world around us, through purely 
physical senses does not reach far enough. Creative imagination becomes thus a 
legitimate instrument in gaining and analyzing data as it is not only available to anyone, 
but also without any boundaries. As radical as this stand may seem, the following 
chapter will reveal that it is by far not Goethe alone to advocate this position. Heinrich 
von Kleist, as I will demonstrate, not only shares the belief in the importance and 
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usefulness of creative imagination, but also goes ever further than Goethe. Kleist’s 
works clearly show that embarking on the path laid out by the creative imagination is the 
only way to combine the perceived data into a coherent narrative. 
  
CHAPTER THREE: 
THE PAINTING OF VIRTUE
 AND HAPPINESS—THE ROLE OF THE IMAGINATION IN HEINRICH VON KLEIST’S PRINZ 
FRIEDRICH VON HOMBURG UND DAS KÄTHCHEN VON HEILBRONN 
 
 
Introduction: All There Is To Know 
 
 Julietta, Heinrich von Kleist’s infamous Marquise von O…, experiences it first 
hand: there is knowledge trapped in our unconscious. Die Marquise von O… (1808), like 
no other, epitomizes a fainting spell like no other. Within the blink of an eye, or literally 
within the length of a dash, the Marquise’s life changes entirely. The few moments of 
unconsciousness of her body cost her peace of mind because as she soon intuits, she 
conceived a child during these instants. Frantic, on the verge of losing not only her 
sanity, but also her parental home, the Marquise desperately attempts to reconstruct the 
progression of events. Her memory, however, remains adamant. Not one bit of memory 
resurfaces from the depths of her mind. All she seeks to know and all there is to know 
seems to be forever sealed in the black box of her mind. The dash represents the 
Marquise’s unconscious that in German translates into both the physical 
Bewusstlosigkeit [“consciouslessness”] as well as the psychological das Unbewusste 
[“the unconscious”]. While the first refers to a seemingly lifeless body deprived of its 
perceptual facilities, the latter pertains to the psychological lack of awareness. Thus, 
Kleist’s most famous dash reifies what seems to be one of his main concerns: the forces 
of our (un)conscious guard unexplored sources of knowledge and must therefore be 
explored. Consciously gaining access to the knowledge held in the unconscious is in 
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Kleist’s case not easy, at times it in fact appears almost impossible. And yet Kleist 
revisits this motif in almost all of his works. In Kleist’s literary oeuvre only “Das 
Bettelweib von Locarno” and Der zerbrochene Krug do without a depiction of a fainting 
spell. As most of his characters show, if there is a chance to tap these resources it occurs 
while the body is unconscious or in a transitional state because these states facilitate an 
improved perception of the spirit. Fainting, as I will show, is indeed one of the main 
facilitators of this experience, yet by far not the only one. The key ingredient is an 
altered state of mind, as for example in dreams, daydreams, or visions. The bodily 
processes have to be muted for the soul or spirit to be able to refocus on the other, 
darker, unexplored side of the self.170 Be it in dreams or syncopal visions, the 
impressions of daily life and conscious perception fade out, while the creative 
imagination creates images that contribute to an improvement of health, sanity, and 
general understanding of the human nature. In this chapter, I intend to shed a different 
light on this mind-body-issue in Kleist’s works. In a juxtaposition of the plays Das 
Käthchen von Heilbronn (1807-08) and Prinz Friedrich von Homburg (1811), this 
chapter will foreground the role the creative imagination in combination with fainting 
spells plays in the dialogue between the mind and the body. The main focus will lie on 
the faculties of the creative imagination that, as I claim, Kleist considers the key element 
for (re)gaining mental health and physical well-being.  
                                                 
170Kleist is vague and inconsistent in his terminology. At times, he uses the term spirit, while later he 
prefers the term spirit, meaning the same concept or phenomenon.  
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One of the most remarkable portrayals of Kleist’s approach to the mind-body 
discourse at that time is Sylvester in Die Familie Schroffenstein.171 When accused of 
murdering his nephew, Sylvester loses his consciousness as a wordless answer to the 
accusations. After recovering from his short fainting spell, he realizes that in each such 
spell the spirit returns to his Urquell, its original wellspring. Leaving his physical body 
behind, Sylvester’s conscious spirit sets out to explore realms which seemingly lie 
beyond realms categorized by physical laws. A second glance reveals that Sylvester’s 
spirit acts almost autonomously. In a brief reflection on his fainting spell, Sylvester 
refers to the Geist, his own spirit, in the third person. On the one hand, the distance he 
creates bestows autonomy on the Geist and foregrounds Sylvester’s dependence on his 
spirit. On the other hand, it grants independent agency to Sylvester’s spirit and suggests 
that his spirit acts on its own resolution. In the moment of fainting, Sylvester’s spirit 
flees his body. Driven out of Sylvester’s body by fear and confusion, his spirit seeks 
refuge in its Urquell. Even though the Urquell is not further described, it alludes to the 
concept of a locus amoenus, a place of safety and tranquility. It is a place that feels like 
home, but it is also a place that offers the spirit a customized solution for its distress or 
ailment. In the moment of fainting, while his body unconsciously on the floor, the 
Urquell functions for Sylvester’s spirit as a shelter. It leaves the body to seek those 
answers that it cannot obtain through the five physical senses. Rather, it consciously 
seeks remedy at the Urquell, attesting thus to a very conscious, open, and above all, a 
radically new way of coping with syncope. In this regard, syncope, which originally 
                                                 
171Heinrich von Kleist, Die Familie Schroffenstein in Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, ed. Helmut Sembdner, 
vol. 1 (München: dtv, 2001) 1.2.896-900. All further reference to this drama will be indicated by the 
abbreviation FS. 
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means a cut or a gap, does not seem like an appropriate term for Sylvester’s case—
interlude appears to be more suitable.172  
Fainting is not the only means to readjust the dialogue between the mind and the 
body. Dreams, for instance, constitute another such possibility. Dreamers receive other 
worldly guests, or pay visits to other dreamers while dreaming themselves. Readers learn 
their content in a number of different ways: through stage directions, explicit accounts 
through the dreamers themselves or their confidants, and, as is the case in Prinz 
Friedrich von Homburg as well as Käthchen von Heilbronn, through somniloquy. In 
these examples, those affected report directly from the world they experience in this 
very moment. What dreams and syncopal visions have in common is an altered state of 
mind that mutes the white noise of the everyday life. It is the moment that other senses 
come into play, ones that Kleist failed to term, but still portrayed in many possible ways. 
The bottom line is that all these instances of fainting and dreaming illustrate faculties of 
the human mind that are unknown and unexplored in most cases due to the fact that they 
remain unconscious. To be sure, Kleist’s representations of these nameless unconscious 
forces allude to similar ideas that Freud would later gather under the term the 
unconscious. However, Kleist’s understanding of it is far too vague and kaleidoscopic in 
its nature to be put on one level with the Freudian unconscious. Moreover, what Freud 
attempted to uncover in long meetings with his patients, Kleist suggests be solved with 
the help of the creative imagination, which, as I will show, functions in his works as a 
mediator between the unconscious and the conscious faculties of the mind.   
                                                 
172Catherine Clément, Syncope (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) 1. 
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Research on altered states of consciousness plays a marginal role in Kleist 
scholarship. One example is Margarete Berger’s 2008 article “Zu den 
Ohnmachtsszenarien Kleistscher Protagonisten.”173 Berger interprets fainting as an 
expression of a narcissistic reaction to altering circumstances. The protagonists repress 
the progressing shifts in their surroundings due to their narcissistic blindness. At a 
certain point of time, however, the sum of repressed changes reaches a quantum, which 
cannot be denied anymore and subsequently leads to fainting.  In my chapter, I oppose 
this reading by arguing that it is not the most fruitful method to approach fainting 
scenarios the way they are deployed by Kleist. Clearly, the actual moment of fainting is 
strictly related to a significant loss of agency and the protagonists’ fear of losing their 
agency, to be ohne Macht, which alludes to Ohnmacht [consciouslessness], and this can 
easily be read and justified through the lens of Freud’s concept of fear of castration. 
After all, according to contemporary definitions of fainting, fear, anxiety and pain are 
very likely to prompt it.174 But a closer look reveals that in Kleist we deal with more 
than psychological processes such as the aforementioned fearful or anxious reaction. 
Rather, we encounter literary and dramatic attempts to foreground the force of creative 
imagination as a central element to finding the golden middle Kleist thematizes in most 
of his works. As this chapter will demonstrate in the following analysis, creative 
imagination allows each protagonist to develop a surrounding according to his or her 
individual needs. For example in Sylvester’s case, it is his Geist that flees his body and 
                                                 
173Margarete Berger "Zu den Ohnmachtszenarien Kleistscher Protagonisten," Freiburger 
Literaturpsychologische Gespräche 27 (2008): 249-278.  
 
174Synkope—Wissenswertes zum Thema Ohnmacht, CNMedizintechnik AG, 2004, Web, 05/22/2012 
http://www.synkope.at/wbs.php  
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runs to God, while the spirit of the prince of Homburg explores visionary dream 
landscapes that are strongly reminiscent of the Elysian Fields. The spirit does not flee 
the body in order to repress or forget.  Rather, it abandons “its” body in order to enter 
another realm. This realm, as I claim, is a product of the creative imagination and gives 
the protagonist the chance to experience an alternative and improved version of 
perception, one that is neither blurred nor tinted by physiological processes within the 
body. Thus, I show that Kleist partakes actively in the debates on medicine, psychology, 
and philosophy. In a similar manner to Moritz and Goethe, he makes an intervention that 
opposes the mainstream understanding of the value of a creative imagination.   
Helmut Schneider’s article “Standing and Falling in Heinrich von Kleist” is a 
study of corporeal gestures that claims that “the impressive register of body and 
expressions frustrates […] any attempt to decode it unambiguously.”175 Accordingly, 
Schneider’s reading of Kleist concludes that the effect of bodily involvement is “less 
one of sheer descriptiveness or psychological depth, but rather a kind of mise-en-scène, 
a singular combination of corporeal concreteness with choreographic stylization, of 
spatial depth with theatrical pattern.”176 Schneider believes that the function of a falling 
body is to stress a particular moment in the structure of a play or narration, rather than to 
communicate its own message in a dialogue with the world outside the body. The idea of 
a continual dialogue between the mind and body and the outside world is, however, an 
essential part of this thesis. As this chapter demonstrates, the significance of fainting far 
exceeds its structural role. As I shall claim, fainting should be regarded as an 
                                                 
175Helmut J. Schneider, “Standing and Falling in Heinrich von Kleist,” MLN 115.3 (2000): 502-518. 
 
176Schneider 502. 
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intersection of possibilities as to how to cope with a problematic or even traumatic 
experience. It is a crucial instance in this mind-body dialogue as it can lead to an 
improvement or expansion of the existing horizons of the fainting protagonists, thus 
unlocking an infinite pool of knowledge, help, and advice. In this chapter I will 
foreground the theater as a visual medium that Kleist deliberately makes use of in order 
to overcome the insufficiency of language that overshadows the attempts to convey 
science, medicine, and philosophy in an exact, truthful, and yet aesthetically attractive 
way.177 By choosing theater as the preferred medium, Kleist valorizes images over words 
to unfold and distribute his cause. Visualizing the mind-body issue helps Kleist fills the 
gaps that words miss to fill. 
An integral part of this work is the overarching idea that Kleist’s disproportional 
use of fainting scenarios, dream accounts, as well as a sporadic (con)fusion of reality 
and dreams, points to a renegotiation of their origin and their purpose within the 
discourse on imagination. In addition to the benefits of nightly and daily dreaming 
discussed in the first two chapters of this dissertation, Kleist’s Das Käthchen von 
Heilbronn and Prinz Friedrich von Homburg add new a component to the discourse on 
the creative imagination: understanding all these altered states of consciousness as a 
gradual process towards a better and customized solution rather than a sudden reaction 
to an individual trauma. I argue that in his works Kleist skillfully deploys the traditional 
understanding of unconsciousness as an evidently gendered way of reacting to hurt 
                                                 
177See for instance Carl J. Fink, Goethe’s History of Science, (Cambridge University Press, 1991) as well 
as Jocelyn Holland, German Romanticism and Science. The Procreative Poetics of Goethe, Novalis, and 
Ritter (New York: Routledge, 2009). Both scholars investigate Goethe’s struggle with the insufficiency 
of language to narrativize science.  
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feelings and dismay.178 In its stead, by playing with the two notions of the unconscious 
and unconsciousness, Kleist portrays an integral part of our psychology that lies dormant 
in everyone. I will show that Kleist’s call for its exploration as well as integration into 
the quotidian is not a fancy whim, but a necessity to maintain mental health. In an 
examination of both eponymous characters of Prinz Friedrich von Homburg as well as 
Käthchen von Heilbronn, I will show that accepting and then using the unexplored and 
frequently feared forces of the imagination constitute in Kleist’s oeuvre the only way to 
a balanced self and a completed painting of virtue. The ways in which the individual 
characters make use of it depends on their individual background and mind set. 
In analogy to the authors already discussed in the previous chapters of this 
dissertation, Salomon Maimon for instance, Kleist advanced the idea that the further the 
individual is detached from his or her conscious state of mind, the better it is for the 
emergence of the creative imagination. Understanding the consciousness-
unconsciousness dichotomy in almost geographical terms, for example in Maimon’s idea 
to move further away from the conscious state, is not entirely uncommon. As the first 
chapter demonstrates, regarding the process of moving further away from the conscious 
mind was inherent to many psychological phenomena and is productive in visualizing 
the process of getting to the bottom of something—the initial goal for exploring and 
                                                 
178See Catherine Clément, Syncope (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) 1: For 
generations fainting “has usually […] been allotted to woman: it is she who sinks down, dress spreading 
out like a flower, fainting, before a public, that hurries forward.” Fainting is clearly gendered and  a 
fainting female protagonist is accepted and almost expected in literature around 1800. For instance, in her 
1771 bestseller, Das Fräulein von Sternheim, Sophie von La Roche depicts a scenario of female fainting. 
The eponymous female protagonist faints when her virtue and reputation are in danger. Sophie von 
Sternheim’s fainting does not necessitate an explanation. It is an appropriate way to express her dismay 
and being upset, and the public understands it as such. As a member of the weaker sex, the female 
protagonist is more likely to be overwhelmed by her emotions and less likely to regain control over her 
affects and therefore, female fainting does not transgress nearly as many conventions as male fainting 
does. 
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conquering the unconscious realms of the human mind.  For example, according to 
eighteenth-century dictionary entries, medicine of those days distinguished between two 
stages of unconsciousness: the first stage being “Ohnmacht ersten Grades” [“first degree 
fainting”], the second that of “starcke Ohnmacht” [strong fainting”], and lastly 
“Synkope.”179 In addition, Ohnmacht was either “eigenleidig” or it was “mitleidig,” two 
concepts which referred to an autochthonous fainting, or to fainting as a symptom of a 
physical disease.180 As the previous chapters of my dissertation have shown, the creative 
forces of our imagination are considered to be only accessible through dreams or 
daydreams. In this light, this chapter examines Kleist’s reevaluation of traditional 
fainting scenarios as a means to invade even deeper, further into the human mind. In this 
respect, my thesis adds a crucial historical dimension to current research. I analyze those 
moments in Kleist’s work which depict a domination of the spiritual over the physical, 
for example in fainting spells, sleep, and all transition states, as a literary figure and a 
vehicle that mobilizes creative forces of the imagination which have a positive effect on 
the protagonist’s further development. 
This chapter also emphasizes the medium that Kleist chose for the instantiation of 
syncope and imagination: the stage play. In this regard, I argue that by incorporating 
most of the portrayed fainting spells into his theater plays Kleist finds a way of 
portraying what did not have a name until almost a century later: the unconscious. 
Though Moritz’s case studies and Goethe’s “The Confessions of the Beautiful Soul” all 
                                                 
179Roland Galle, “Szenarien der Ohnmacht im Jahrhundert der Aufklärung in Leib-Zeichen: 
Körperbilder, Rhetorik und Anthropologie Im 18. Jahrhundert, ed. Rudolf Behrens and Roland Galle 
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1993) 110. With regard to different versions of Ohnmacht see 
also “Ohnmacht,” Zedler. 992-1004. 
 
180Galle 110. 
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foreshadow what Freud develops and names, in The Unconscious for example, it is 
Kleist who acknowledges, or perhaps yields to the inadequacy of words to represent the 
motifs of mind-body issues at the turn of the nineteenth century. As I argue, it is no 
coincidence that an overwhelming majority of Kleist’s examples of syncope are 
embedded in stage plays, and take the protagonist (as well as the spectator) into places 
that lie beyond the conscious, physical world.181 The absence of words that accompanies 
the fainting body in Kleist’s play is programmatic for his take on this issue: our senses 
are just as inadequate for grasping the greater meaning as are words. The influence of 
the body on perception equals in Kleist’s plays a disturbance that has to be eliminated in 
an equally radical way: fainting. Free from bio-chemical processes that for Kleist taint 
our perception, the spirit finally gets the chance to get away from the surge of 
impression and see the situations for what they are. In a way, in staging fainting, I claim, 
Kleist found a productive way to represent the golden middle.  
Before engaging in an analysis of Kleist’s Das Käthchen von Heilbronn and 
Prinz Friedrich von Homburg, this chapter will first highlight the two main themes that 
weave through all of Kleist’s works: the search for what he describes as “auf der 
Mittelstraße zu wandern” and the search for the source of knowledge.182 As the 
discussion of these two topics will show, Kleist’s conflictual coming to terms with these 
forces is what necessitates discovering new paths that lead to a clearer understanding the 
dialogue between the individuals and the world around them. The examination of the 
                                                 
181See for instance the fainting spells in Die Marquise von O…, Das Erdbeben in Chili, and Michael 
Kohlhaas. None of these fainting spells involve an excursion into the world of the characters 
imagination, while Die Familie Schroffenstein, Das Käthchen von Heilbronn, or Der Prinz von Homburg 
elaborately visualize a space evidently created and accessed by the imagination. 
 
182Heinrich von Kleist, “Kunst- und Weltbetrachtung. Aufsatz, den sichern Weg des Glücks zu finden und 
ungestört—auch unter den größten Drangsalen des Lebens—ihn zu geniessen!” in Sämtliche Werke und 
Briefe, ed. Helmut Sembdner, vol. 2 (München: dtv, 2001) 308. All further reference are abbreviated KW.  
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two plays will foreground the connection between the ubiquitous fainting and the 
discourse on medicine, psychology, and creative imagination. This analysis will 
ultimately lead to my claims that it is only through conflating extremes that Kleist finds 
a way of reaching the golden middle that facilitates a perception that reaches far beyond 
physical boundaries and abilities. In order to remain in touch with this source of insight, 
I will further show, fainting, Kleist’s main port of entry into the world of that higher 
perception, must necessarily be induced, prolonged, and used at will. Thus, fainting 
cannot be understood merely as reaction to an external stimulus, but also a self-
controlled means to gain a thorough insight.  
 
“… grade nur auf der Mittelstrasse zu wandern…” 
 During his short yet productive life, Heinrich von Kleist took up the musings on 
how to achieve the greatest possible balance, which he referred to as virtue, probably 
more often than most of his contemporaries. At times directly, sometimes only 
implicitly, the pursuit of the said balance emerges in most of Kleist’s plays, novellas, 
letters, and essays. In a letter to his friend Rühle [von Lilienstern], Kleist writes:  
 
Wir sehen die Großen dieser Erde im Besitze der Güter dieser Welt. Sie leben in 
Herrlichkeit und Überfluß, die Schätze der Kunst und der Natur scheinen sich um 
sie und für sie zu versammeln... aber der Unmut trübt ihre Blicke, der Schmerz 
bleicht ihre Wangen, der Kummer spricht aus allen ihren Zügen. Dagegen sehen 
wir einen armen Tagelöhner, der im Schweiße seines Angesichts sein Brot 
erwirbt; Mangel und Armut umgeben ihn, sein ganzes Leben scheint ein ewiges 
Sorgen und Schaffen und Darben. Aber Zufriedenheit blickt aus seinen Augen, 
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die Freude lächelt auf seinem Antlitz, Frohsinn und Vergessenheit umschweben 
die ganze Gestalt. (KW 301) 
 
[We see the greats of this earth in possession of this world's wealth. They live in 
glory and abundance, the treasures of art and nature seemingly gather around 
them and solely for them...but resentment clouds their gaze, pain pales their 
cheeks, worry speaks from their features. In contrast, we a see a poor day 
laborer who earns his living by the sweat of his brows: dearth and poverty 
accompany him, his whole life appears to be eternally dominated by sorrow, 
working, and lack. Nonetheless contentment shines from his eyes, happiness 
emanates from his face, cheerfulness and abandon shroud his whole form.] 
 
This excerpt spells out what many of Kleist’s pieces of work instantiate: earthly wealth 
and riches, by many believed to create happiness and blessedness, are nothing but a mere 
semblance without any roots in the reality. The rich and wealthy, who according to the 
commonplace belief should feel blessed, happy and fortunate, reveal neither of these 
traces. Their facial features reveal what their sartorial elegance, for instance, tries to 
hide: sorrow, pain, and discontent. On the other side are those believed to be less 
fortunate. They are poor in material goods, and yet, in Kleist’s opinion, they are those 
whose countenance reveals genuine happiness and joy. To find a way to bridge the 
extremes, to strike that balance, of this chiasm is as worthy of pursuing as it is close to 
impossible to fulfill. Achieving happiness and fulfillment is in Kleist’s works an issue 
built on seemingly irreconcilable extremes. In analogy to the gap between the unhappy 
rich and happy poor, the gaps dividing the material and the spiritual, human and animal, 
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as well as conscious and unconscious remain equally irreconcilable and glaring. In the 
same letter, Kleist admits nonchalantly that the painting depicting full felicity would 
forever remain a conundrum due to the lack of the “bedeutungsvolle[n] Wort der 
Auflösung” [“significant word of  release”].183  Lacunae are a central theme in his works 
and, as this chapter will demonstrate, it is furthermore what Kleist so eagerly represents 
through all sorts of syncopal states. Prinz Friedrich’s somnambulism, Käthchen’s 
dreams, Schroffenstein’s fainting spells—all these phenomena orbit around it as though 
it were a celestial body. As I will show, it is not for the lack of a better word, but for the 
lack of a word at all that Kleist turns toward the theater play as a medium and syncope 
as the vehicle for making his point—a problem we I have already discussed in the 
previous chapter on Goethe’s “Bekenntnisse einer schönen Seele.” 
 The impossibility to verbalize that what lies beneath the surface and constitutes 
the lacunae paves the way for a large problem for Kleist: epistemology. If we have 
access to only a certain share of all that there is to know, how reliable are the facts and 
premises on which we build our lives and societies? A look at the narrators and 
protagonists that Kleist created in his literature reveals unmistakably that, strictly 
speaking, there is no way for the reader to trust them. Most of them experience ruptures 
of consciousness and thus their narrative is fragmentary, as for example the 
aforementioned Marquise von O… . Others, Friedrich, the prince of Homburg as we will 
see, rely on their dreams and visions as the source of their knowledge, and are frequently 
unable to disentangle the content of the physical reality and that of their dreams. In the 
case of Käthchen and her beloved Graf von Strahl Kleist even goes as far as to have 
                                                 
183KW 304. “… aber, Lieber, ein Gemälde würde das immer nicht werden, ein Rätsel würde es Ihnen, wie 
mir, bleiben, dem immer das bedeutungsvolle Wort der Auflösung fehlt.” 
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them meet in a lucid dream that they both share. Accepting and trusting the truthfulness 
of that dream ultimately leads to their reunification and marriage. The unreliability of 
the sources that feed what we (believe to) know has the consequence that nothing is 
what it seems. The prince of Homburg is the most graphic case among Kleist’s 
characters. As a protagonist, the prince’s most dominant features are his vivid dreaming, 
somnambulism, and somniloquy. They all fragment the prince’s modes of perception and 
make it almost impossible for him to tell the boundaries between reality and dreams as 
he fails in reconciling these different modes. The gaps existing between these fragments 
belong to his profile to the same extent as do the actual fragments bearing pieces of his 
personality. In other words, Kleist’s discussion of the ever uncompleted “Gemälde” 
[“painting”] from the opening paragraphs finds its representation in characters such as 
the Prinz von Homburg. Strictly speaking, we can never be sure whether what we see is 
in fact the true, or, to push it step further, whether there even is something like truth for 
Kleist. As I will demonstrate shortly, it is the insufficiency of the five senses that 
thwarts this endeavor. As a consequence, by emphasizing this inadequacy Kleist actively 
criticizes the systems of science along medicine and psychology, but also our 
epistemological principles. While scholarship traditionally understands this to be an 
expression of Kleist’s socalled Kant-crisis and his “deeply rooted philosophical” and 
later “social sceptisism,” I intend to approach this debate through the lens of the genre 
he chooses to stage the inadequacies of the sensual perception.184 
 In his works, Kleist anxiously foregrounds a multiplicity of narratives that is 
deeply rooted in his belief that our five perceptual senses are not enough to perceive the 
                                                 
184Seán Allen, The Stories of Heinrich von Kleist. Fictions of Security (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 
2001) 4.  
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whole picture.  The fact that Kleist’s protagonists can unfold or reconstruct only 
fragments of their narrative is one aspect of this observation. The other is the fact that 
each of the characters in question develops a unique set of instruments that facilitates his 
or her interaction with the realm in between the superficially graspable fragments.  In a 
way, the intersection between the superficial narrative that other protagonists as well as 
readers and spectators can follow, and the narrative that unfolds in the depths of the 
unconscious, appears to be Kleist’s response to the insufficiency of the epistemological 
systems he is acquainted with. Numerous times throughout his entire literary oeuvre, 
Kleist’s characters make statements such as “so begriffen es diese fünf Sinne … nicht” 
[“these five senses were not to comprehend it…”].185 In the same way that Kleist 
struggled with the inadequacy of words to express what he had in mind, he also has 
difficulty in coming to terms with the dominant epistemological systems of empiricism 
and rationalism. As I will show, this troublesome dialogue is essential in order to 
understand the role and function of the altered states of consciousness that flood Kleist’s 
works. Each fainting spell, for example, puts the said shortcoming in the spotlight. A 
number of these fainting spells occur when the perceived is too overwhelming and the 
five senses fail in processing the external stimuli.186 Repeatedly, Kleist demonstrates that 
there is not only more to human nature than the physiological senses could possibly 
grasp, but moreover that those physiological processes that facilitate perception in the 
first place can also blur the picture that we try to attain. Syncope does for Kleist’s works 
what dreaming did in Moritz’s case studies: it dims the white noise caused by 
                                                 
185Theobald in Das Käthchen von Heilbronn I.1.111.  
 
186See for example the eponymous Marquise von O…, the elector in Michael Kohlhaas, Jeronimo in Das 
Erdbeben in Chili, or Alkmene in Amphitryon.   
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physiological processes which interfere with the sotto voce of the unconscious. Once the 
physiological processes are dimmed, the unconscious becomes all the clearer, and the 
fragments can be woven into a whole.   
 With each instance of a fainting spell with an ensuing dream, Kleist actively 
seeks to rebut the claims made by empiricism as he underlines the existence of an 
alternative reality. In order to perceive this reality we need reach beyond the five 
physical senses and allow our (creative) imagination to provide us with images of that 
reality. At the same time, it is well known that his attempts to approach rationalism 
turned out even more futile.187 This failed attempt translates in Kleist’s works into the 
chaos and unpredictability of events caused by ruptures. Chaos always looms right 
beneath the surface, regardless of how composed it may seem at first sight. For example, 
Jeronimo, Josephe, and their son Juan (Das Erdbeben in Chili) are murdered during a 
Catholic mass in a place that initially seemed to all of them like the almost paradisiacal 
idyll that looks “als ob es das Tal von Eden gewesen wäre” [“as if it was the valley of 
Eden”].188 The atrocious circumstances of this excessively violent crime can be neither 
predicted nor understood at any time. The eruption of violence in this novella evidently 
shows that for Kleist reason was not the driving force, nor was it an instrument capable 
of comprehending all types of situations and pieces of information we may be 
confronted with. To sum it up, whatever physical means are available to perceive, 
process, and comprehend, they will always remain insufficient for grasping the entire 
                                                 
187See Kleist’s “Kant-Krise,” for example: Tim Mehigan, “Kleist, Kant und die Aufklärung,” in Tim 
Mehigan (ed.), Heinrich von Kleist und die Aufklärung (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2000).  
 
188Heinrich von Kleist, “Das Erdbeben in Chili,” in Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, ed. Helmut Sembdner, 
vol. 2 (München: dtv, 2001) 149.  
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picture. As I claim, acknowledging the need non-physiological modes of perception is 
for Kleist the first step towards a possibility of filling the disruptions with meaningful 
content and leading thus dominant epistemological systems into a new, productive, 
dimension.  
 
Insert [your need here]—Prinz Friedrich von Homburg and the Creative Imagination  
 
 
Kleist’s final play, Prinz Friedrich von Homburg, is seemingly set up to tell the 
story of the prince of Homburg, an actual historic figure, and his battle at Fehrbellin. Yet 
even though the title may imply a dramatic reproduction of the prince’s biography 
during the time of the battle, Kleist abandons factual loyalty and creates instead a 
gloomy, Romantic hero who wanders the thresholds of the realms of reality and fantasy. 
Although the battle provides the central narrative structure of the play and serves as the 
decisive moment in the prince’s fate, it is not the focus of the entire work. Rather, it is 
the prince’s mysterious somnambulism, reverie, vision-like dreams, and frequent 
fainting that make him a unique character among his contemporaries. Like many other of 
Kleist’s characters the prince is at war. As a character he is regarded as ambivalent, and 
effusive, but most of all he is in despair because he is struggling against the authority of 
which he is part.189 As a prince he is an official member of the electoral court with 
representative as well as executive functions and powers. He represents and executes the 
laws, which he himself violates and thus evokes the great tragedy that almost costs him 
his life. Yet this is not what makes him so exceedingly unique. Apart from his 
superficial struggle with laws and authorities, the prince fights a battle with his 
                                                 
189Mathieu Carrière, Für eine Literatur des Krieges, Kleist (Frankfurt am Main: Roter Stern, 1981) 39. 
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consciousness that, paradoxically, is wide awake during his fits of sleepwalking, and 
opaque when he is conscious and awake. It distinguishes the prince from other 
characters in so far as it means that, in analogy of Kleist’s painting of the virtue, parts of 
the prince’s personality are always unconscious. While sleepwalking the prince has the 
most vivid and active dreams that border on divinations. Yet while conscious and awake, 
the prince is lost, confused, and disoriented as to what is true and real, and what is right 
or wrong.  
The foundation of his feelings and perception is based on the two extremes of 
waking and dreaming. This binary constitutes equal parts of the prince’s consciousness 
and reality creating thus the framework in which he attempts to negotiate his identity as 
a public persona, a private man, a spirited warrior, and a romantic lover. In the course of 
the play, Friedrich’s struggle to unite all of his personae on one level of consciousness is 
at the verge of failing multiple times, and he is in danger of remaining only a collection 
of fragments and pieces without a connecting thread to fill the gaps between these 
fragments. The gaps between the fragments are constitutive of his personality to the 
same extent as are his conscious moments. In other words, he consists of fragments 
which he fails to bridge. Living between these fragments and simultaneously in all of 
them not only challenges his perception and reasoning; it alienates the prince from his 
social surroundings. More strikingly however, Friedrich is many times at a loss of 
understanding himself. His creative imagination, which as the end of the play shows is 
meant to have a positive effect on him, poses for Friedrich one of the largest problems. 
All this can be observed in the initial scene in which Graf Hohenzollern and the elector 
with his wife and daughter find Friedrich sitting under an oak, absorbed in a fantasy and 
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entirely oblivious to the external world. Witnessing Friedrich in this state of mind 
irritates the elector’s family: 
Der Kurfürst. Der junge Mann ist krank, so wahr ich lebe.  
Prinzessin Natalie. Er braucht des Arztes—!  
Die Kurfürstin. Man sollt ihm helfen, dünkt mich, Nicht den Moment verbringen, 
   sein zu spotten!  
Hohenzollern (indem er die Fackel wieder weggibt). Er ist gesund, ihr   
  mitleidsvollen Frauen, Bei Gott, ich bins nicht mehr! … Es ist nichts  
  weiter, glaubt mir auf mein Wort, Als eine bloße Unart seines Geistes.  
  (I.1.31-39) 
 
[Elector. The young man’s ill. I’m quite convined. 
Princess Natalie. He needs a doctor--!  
Electress.                     We should help him, so 
 It seems to me, not spend our time in making 
 fun of him! 
Hohenzollern (handing back the torch). 
                How kind you ladies are,  
but he’s in good health by God 
my own’s no better!... Oh you may take my word  
for it, it’s nothing more than a fit of mere distractedness.]190 
                                                 
190All Prinz Friedrich von Homburg translations by Martin Greenberg taken from Heinrich von Kleist, 
“Prince Frederic of Homburg,” Five Plays, ed. Martin Greenberg (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 1988). 
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The sight of Friedrich lost and confused prompts the need to call a physician, classifying 
the prince thus as somebody who needs medical help and is unable to call for help 
himself, not to mention help himself. The electress’s remark not to waste time on 
ridicule and mockery insinuates in addition that the sight has them believe Friedrich is 
mentally ill, not physically. This incidental statement, however, showcases Friedrich’s 
entire tragedy: his sleepwalking and sleeptalking have brought him the reputation of 
being not entirely sane and accountable for his deeds. The situation unwinds when the 
Duke of Hohenzollern explains that it is not illness, but rather his spirit’s bad habit.  
 Both Kleist as the author and Hohenzollern as the character fail to specify what 
this bad habit of Friedrich’s spirit may be. Gudrun Debriacher calls it a “Verfallenheit in 
die Welt der Träume” [“an addiction to the world of dreams”] and interprets it as a 
misdemeanor.191 In contrast to Hohenzollern, who blames the spirit and implies thus that 
it is an entity with its own will and agency, Debriacher concludes that Friedrich’s 
somnambulism serves here as mitigating circumstances for his disobedience towards the 
state. While Debriacher sees them as an excuse for the prince’s disobedience, I contend 
that each dream and fainting episode is an attempt to bridge the ruptures between his 
public and his private self with a coherent narrative. To master this daunting task, 
Friedrich intuitively resorts to the unconscious, in Kleist’s sense, to establish a balance. 
I shall argue that his failure to trust whatever he learns in these episodes stems solely 
from Friedrich’s unwillingness to accept these images as an alternative, but legitimate 
dimension. In this respect, Friedrich differs from his literary counter-part Käthchen from 
                                                 
191Debriacher 103. 
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Heilbronn, which follows the dictates of her imagination without hesitation. Though she 
causes a similar amount of alienation, Käthchen never is emotionally torn as we witness 
in Friedrich’s case.  Unlike Friedrich, Käthchen understands, also intuitively, that 
without the integration of the unconscious forces the aforementioned painting of the 
world will stringently remain incomplete. While Debriacher interprets this behavior as a 
transgression of the existing legal and social norms, I see as a chance to negotiate an 
explanation or a remedy for Friedrich’s situation by the means of his creative 
imagination. Friedrich’s resorts to the images conjured up by his creative imagination 
because the conventional means, his physical senses and his ratio, fail him in this task.  
A similar tenor dominates Helmut Schneider’s article on “Standing and Falling in 
Heinrich von Kleist.” Schneider interprets Friedrich’s fainting and somnambulism as a 
metaphorical fall and the prince’s struggle with and later acceptance of the death 
sentence as an appreciation of “the self as part of a higher order, that of the state.”192  
The concept of a “higher order of the state” is one that figures prominently in 
Schneider’s research. The struggles to adhere to this higher order visualize Friedrich’s 
contradictory nature: on the one hand, he indeed tries to comply with this order, yet on 
the other his deviant behavior sabotages this endeavor. In contrast to Schneider, I 
position Friedrich’s struggle within the discourses on psychology rather than politics and 
law. Friedrich does not struggle with himself in order to abide by the hierarchy of the 
state, but rather in order to establish a balanced dialogue with both sides of the human 
mind: the conscious and the unconscious. The peak of the imposed hierarchy is in my 
interpretation not the state, but a one-sided glorification of the conscious side of the 
                                                 
192Schneider 502–18. 
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human mind along with the perception through the five physical senses only. In other 
words, it is not the rigidity of the state that Friedrich sabotages, but the containment of 
the human mind into strictly physiological categories that the glorification of empiricism 
and rationality attempts. Each of his accounts of fainting, dreaming, sleepwalking, and 
sleeptalking is thus not a reaction, but an action taken to realize Friedrich’s need to 
connect with the unconscious, animalistic side, which is equally drawn to and afraid of. 
In analogy to the two previous chapters, altered states of consciousness here symbolize 
the decision to flee the corporeal, physical world and seek refuge, explanations, and 
advice that can only be provided by Friedrich’s creative imagination. It is only there that 
Friedrich can flee the mockery and failure, and finally indulge in fame and glory as “das 
größte der Güter der Erde” [“the greatest of the commodities in the world”].193  The 
ultimate materialization of this dream, however, can only become available to Friedrich 
once he realizes that his dreams and visions were comforting premonitions that he 
should have trusted to begin with.   
 
Friedrich, Arthur, and a Double Identity 
A close look at the way Kleist introduces his last hero reveals a man who can 
hardly be taken seriously by his aristocratic and militaristic surroundings at court. Even 
before the action in Kleist’s play begins, the image of the prince of Homburg is defined 
in seemingly negative, almost lunatic terms. In the middle of the night Friedrich “sitzt 
mit bloßem Haupt und offner Brust, halb wachend halb schlafend, unter einer Eiche und 
windet sich einen Kranz [“bareheaded and with his shirt open at his throat, nodding 
                                                 
193Heinrich von Kleist, letter to Ulrike von Kleist, 26 October 1803. 
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half asleep, is seated underneath an oak tree twining a wreath”].194 That he is bareheaded 
and unbuttoned, as he is described in the stage directions, clearly violates the courtly 
sartorial protocol. The fact that the scene takes place during the night does not dismiss 
the prince from his duties as a public figure representing the court at all times and by all 
means. Moreover, he not only transgresses the dress code, but he also deviates from the 
norm in his state of consciousness as well as that of his behavior. In the improper 
garment, with his consciousness captured somewhere between waking sleeping, he sits 
under an oak, dreams, and weaves a wreath. The decay and destruction of the 
seventeenth century, in which Kleist chose to set his last play, dissolve in almost 
enchanted heathen scenes. The oak, the wreath, and the disheveled garment create an 
atmosphere of an unspoiled and innocent primal communion between the protagonist 
and his dream world. In the light of a mind-body symbolism, the bare chest as well as 
the bare head, suggests an allusion to an open heart and an open mind, unobstructed by 
any royal, i.e. worldly emblems. In this scene, Kleist invokes an intimate look into 
Friedrich’s most vulnerable, unprotected aspects of his personality, which, as will 
become evident later, is not possible without his immersion into his dreams.    
The attempt to awake him from his dreams causes Friedrich to faint and lose his 
consciousness entirely. The sound of his given name Arthur being called from the 
physical world hits the prince like a bullet. This fainting spell is only the first in array of 
falls that become Friedrich’s trademark, even among Kleist’s protagonists. Friedrich’s 
recurrent sinking to the floor, falling, or stumbling is a key element in Kleist’s attempt 
to visualize the dominant forces that come into bearing in the interaction between 
                                                 
194PH 1.1. 
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Friedrich’s mind and body, as well as his conscious and unconscious side.  According to 
Helmut Schneider,  
for the eighteenth century […] standing upright, rising to one’s feet in order to 
confront the world and face one’s fellow human, distinguished man from animal 
and symbolized his moral autonomy. Correspondingly, falling […] designated the 
failure to live up to this distinct position and served as a reminder of human 
frailty.195  
What this passage suggests is that the loss of the upright position of his body equals a 
loss of his ability to assume responsibility and agency. The lack of bodily uprightness is 
symptomatic for a lack of uprightness of his character. Instead, by losing his stability 
Friedrich is dehumanized and stripped of the ability to think in moral and rational 
categories. Departing from this negative reading of the act of falling, I argue that in 
Kleist’s oeuvre identifying a protagonist with an animal does not imply a debasement of 
that protagonist, but alludes to a (re)connection with the animalistic aspect of the human 
mind. In other words, it constitutes a turn, or a return, to the instincts and intuitions that 
are, and must be, contained by the conscious and rational mind. Considering the fact that 
each time Friedrich, and as we will later see Käthchen, docks into these instinctual 
forces, he experiences a manifestation of images. In the end, these images grant 
Friedrich, and Käthchen, a glimpse into their future delivering simultaneously additional 
facts about their future that neither Käthchen nor Friedrich are able to produce with their 
physiological senses alone. These additional insights aim for a double impact: first, they 
are meant to complete the rather fragmentary painting, to use Kleist’s term, and deliver 
thus a better grasp of Friedrich’s situation and future. Second, they also deliver a simple 
                                                 
195Scheider 504. 
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yet powerful message guaranteeing an entirely positive outcome of things. Friedrich’s 
confusion arises accordingly from his inability to embrace these messages and accept 
them as insights which are as valid as thoughts and conclusions he makes with full 
consciousness.  
 In contrast to his female counterpart Käthchen, Friedrich rejects the mentioned 
unity of the conscious and the unconscious throughout vast parts of the play. In fact, the 
ultimate understanding that these visions manifested the future reality all along, does not 
occur to Friedrich until the final scene and the help of his friends. Until then, Friedrich 
is only able to strike the balance between both forces when in a battle. Though his 
official name is Friedrich, the protagonist closest to him, call him by his given name, 
Arthur. In its Celtic origin Arthur means the bear. A bear may be an awe-inspiring 
animal, yet it is an animal. During the fateful battle of Fehrbellin the prince is described 
as fighting “dem Bären gleich” [like a bear”].196 He develops stunning and literally awe-
inspiring powers and skills, and he appears to gain the victory due to instinct-driven 
action and tactics. These scenes reveal Friedrich’s strong connection with the 
animalistic, instinct-driven, unconscious not in order to showcase a wild and unstable 
personality that requires taming and containment. On the contrary, these scenes serve as 
examples for the infinite grandeur Friedrich achieves when his conscious and 
unconscious forces unite. The utter confusion Friedrich suffers from, consequently, does 
not originate in the mere existence of his dreams and visions, but rather from his 
perpetual attempts to contain, control, reject it. In the end, it is this rejection that 
paralyzes him.  Friedrich’s inner turmoil and fragmentation is documented in lines such 
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as “Träum ich? Wach ich? Leb ich? Bin ich bei Sinnen?” [“Am I dreaming? Am I 
awake? Am I alive? Am I in my senses?”], and foreground his inability to trust his own 
judgment. This again finds its expression in Friedrich’s fainting, falling, and stumbling, 
altogether signs of instability triggered by the loss of uprightness suggested by 
Schneider.197 In the following paragraphs, I will examine Friedrich’s literary 
counterpart, the eponymous Käthchen von Heilbronn. Käthchen’s approach to the 
conscious-unconscious dialogue surpasses Friedrich in terms of productivity, usefulness, 
and success. By juxtaposing the two diverging ways of coping with the interaction 
between the conscious and the unconscious parts of the human mind, I will prove that 
Kleist’s contribution to the psychological discourse of his time was as radical as that of 
Moritz, and Goethe, and his appeal to explore the unconscious realms of the human 
mind was not only a matter of invigorating the creative imagination, but the only way of 
negotiating a coherent and complete picture in the pursuit of happiness.  
 
Käthchen’s Lucid Dreams 
 
 Käthchen is Heilbronn’s most cherished daughter. Growing up with Theobald the 
gunsmith as a father, Käthchen’s good heart and beauty makes her famous beyond 
Heilbronn’s city walls.198 Due to her virtuous modesty and divine beauty, she is the 
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 Heinrich von Kleist, Das Käthchen von Heilbronn in Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, ed. Helmut 
Sembdner, vol. 1 (München: dtv, 2001) I/I 69-80. All further reference to this drama will be indicated 
parenthetically in the body of the text by the abbreviation KH. “Ein Wesen von zarterer, frommerer und 
lieberer Art müßt ihr euch nicht denken. ... Ging sie mit bürgerlichen Schmuck über die Straße, den 
Strohhut auf, vom gelben Lack erglänzend, das schwarzsamtene Leibchen, das ihre Brust umschloß, mit 
feinen Silberkettlein behängt: so lief es flüsternd von allen Fenstern herab: das ist dsa Käthchen von 
Heilbronn; das Käthchen von Heilbronn, ihr Herren, als ob der Himmel von Schwaben sie erzeugt, und 
von seinem Kuß geschwängert,  die Stadt, die unter ihn liegt, sie geboren hätte.” [“You could not imagine 
a creature of more tender, pious, and loving nature, even though your thought flew on the wings of 
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focus of many dreams, aristocratic and bourgeois alike. As the obedient and loving 
daughter that she naturally is, Käthchen, she is set to marry her betrothed, a man chosen 
by her father, and a decision she seemingly never would have questioned. This setting is 
strikingly reminiscent of Kleist’s painting of fulfilled virtue, beauty, and happiness, and 
sure enough doomed to be shattered into pieces with a vehemence that leaves Käthchen, 
Theobald (her father), and many minor characters speechless and uncomprehending. 
Upon seeing the regional Duke, Graf Strahl, Käthchen shows a different side. She drops 
 
Geschirr und Becher und Imbiß, da sie den Ritter erblickt, ...; und leichenbleich 
mit Händen, wie zur Anbetung verschränkt, den Boden mit Brust und Scheiteln 
küssend, stürzt sie vor ihm nieder, als ob sie ein Blitz nieder geschmettert hätte. 
(KH I.1.160-164.) 
 
[the dishes and goblets and repast, and pale as a corpse, with hands clasped as in 
prayer, her forehead and breast to the floor, she fell down before him, as if a bolt 
of lightning had stricken her down.] 
 
The Graf’s striking impression, mysteriously transforms Käthchen’s from a picture-
perfect daughter to someone “gleich einer Verlorenen, die ihrer fünf Sinne beraubt ist” 
[“like a madwoman, bereft of her five senses”].199 In an attempt to hold on to this 
                                                                                                                                                       
imagination to the dear little angels who peep out with bright eyes from under God’s hands and feet. 
Whenever she crossed the street in her simple finery, wearing her straw hat gleaming with yellow 
lacquer, with neat little silver chains draped over the black velvet bodice that fits her so trimly, a whisper 
would run from window to window: That is Käthchen of Heilbronn. Käthchen of Heilbronn, my lords, as 
if the Heaven of Swabia had begot her, and the city beneath it, fructified by its kiss, had borne her.”] All 
translations for Das Käthchen aus Heilbronn by Frederick E. Pierce and Carl F. Schreiber taken from: 
Fiction and Fantasy, ed. Frederick E. Pierce and Carl F. Schreiber (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1927).  
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sensation and follow the Graf, Käthchen steps out of the window and falls thirty feet to 
the ground. As a result, she is in a coma for weeks. After her first awakening, Käthchen 
“schnürt ihr Bündel” [“tied up her bundle”] and leaves her home to find the Duke.200  
 Seeking help in coming to terms with Käthchen’s mysterious transformation, 
Theobald takes the case to court where he hopes to find clarification over justice for 
Käthchen’s transformation, that he simply calls abduction. Remarkably, for Theobald 
Käthchen’s abduction is of dual nature. On the one hand, he feels that Graf deprived him 
of his daughter. He refuses to believe that Käthchen follows the Duke with accord to her 
own will. On the other hand, Käthchen is transformed to such a great extent that the 
father is unable to recognize his beloved daughter in the person he is confronted with 
after the change. The Vehmic court presiding over Käthchen’s case functions as a place 
in which the desperate father hopes to find an explanation, a chance to comprehend, and 
perhaps undo the recent events rather as a punitive institution that will avenge his loss. 
Together with an examination of the play’s speaking names (Graf Strahl for instance), 
natural symbolism (elder bush), and the function of father-figures, the legal framing of 
the play is one of the most analyzed aspects of this play.201 One of the most recent 
studies on Kleist’s Käthchen von Heilbronn is Kathrin Pahl’s “Forging Feeling: Kleist’s 
Theatrical Theory of Re-Layed Emotionality,” in which Pahl “supports Deleuze and 
Guattari's assessment that Kleist was one of the forerunners of an endeavor we are still 
engaged in today, namely of deconstructing the bourgeois ideology of feeling and 
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 155
instead cultivating (again) the exteriority of feelings.”202 Pahl further elaborates that, for 
Kleist, in order to: 
communicate feelings one must press them out of their interiority: feelings must 
be ex-pressed. At the same time, language must be unable to express feelings 
since the superficiality of languages (the dilemma was initially confined to 
language in the narrow sense, but it quickly spread to all forms of expression, 
like body language, actions, etc.) is deemed to do injustice to the true depth of 
feeling. (667-668) 
Like Pahl I am convinced that the necessity to communicate feelings and the 
simultaneous inability to do so are central to Kleist’s works. In the same sense, I 
embrace her observation that the diagnosed superficiality of language also affects other 
forms of expression. Pahl further identifies Kleist’s attempt of coming to terms with this 
dilemma in his focus on the exteriority and “the idea of desubjectivizing emotionality” 
in order “not only to spot feelings outside the subject, but also to forge them.”203 In 
contrast to Pahl, I think it necessary to divert the focus away from exteriority toward the 
processes triggered and experienced on the inside. Though Pahl’s argument that Kleist’s 
works suggest that emotions be expressed is correct, it disregards that a thorough 
knowledge of the spiritual mechanisms is at least equally significant. Apart from our 
emotions, it is the creative imagination that requires an outlet in order to make the 
picture complete. As the analysis of Kleist’s last play Prinz Friedrich von Homburg has 
revealed, suturing the bits and pieces available to us is deemed one of the most pressing 
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concerns because dealing with fragments at times even enhances the looming chaos. In 
this light, I will now offer an interpretation of Kleist’s Käthchen von Heilbronn and will 
show that the seemingly natural integration of creative imagination is a key element to a 
more successful and meaningful communication.  
 
Living the Dream: Käthchen’s Criminal Records  
 
 Kleist’s Käthchen von Heilbronn begins with a court scene. All of the involved 
protagonist gather before the judges to examine one of the more esoteric crimes of 
German literary history. According to Theobald, the main plaintiff, Graf von Strahl is 
guilty of the kidnapping of Theobald’s daughter Käthchen. But the accused considers 
himself innocent and rather a victim of being stalked by the same Käthchen. Käthchen 
herself seems unable to comprehend the uproar that her behavior had triggered. From her 
perspective she does the most natural thing: she follows a dream she once had. As the 
play reveals midway through the plot, the turmoil is caused by a dream of the Duke 
himself. Yet unlike most other dreams, this dream was a mutual experience. In the New 
Year’s night, the Duke tormented by a ravishing fever is visited by an angel. Together 
with the angel, the Duke comes to see the girl that is destined to becomes his wife and 
be the only one that will ever truly love him. In this dream, he also learns that he will 
able to discern her easily from everybody else because she has a birthmark on the back 
of her neck.204 Once recovered from his fever, the Duke’s dream disappears into 
oblivion. Käthchen, however, remembers this dream when she sees the Duke for the first 
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time in her father’s armory. She recognizes him instantly and from then on follows the 
dream that she takes to be a divine revelation.  
 The clarity of their dreamy encounter is stunning as she remembers every detail 
of that dream.205 To believe that Käthchen is a character who has clarity of mind with 
regard to dream and reality, however, is misleading. Though she is a character standing 
on the threshold between dreams and reality, just like the Duke, Käthchen is also 
frequently unable to tell these two dimensions apart. In fact, the boundaries between 
these two dimensions are many times less then clear. The consequence is not only a 
general confusion, but also a certain obstruction in the verbal communication among the 
protagonist. Käthchen’s interrogation in the initial court scene showcases such 
miscommunication:  
 
Der Graf vom Strahl (kalt). … Wo hab ich sonst im Leben dich getroffen? - Ich 
 hab im Stall zuweilen dich besucht. 
Käthchen. Nein, mein verehrter Herr.  
Der Graf vom Strahl. Nicht? Katharina!  
Käthchen. Du hast mich niemals in dem Stall besucht, Und noch viel wen'ger 
 rührtest du mich an.  
Der Graf vom Strahl. Was? Niemals?  
Käthchen. Nein, mein hoher Herr.  
Der Graf vom Strahl. Kathrina!  
Käthchen (mit Affekt). Niemals, mein hochverehrter Herr, niemals.  
Der Graf vom Strahl. Nun seht, bei meiner Treu, die Lügnerin! 
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Käthchen. Ich will nicht selig sein, ich will verderben, Wenn du mich je—!   
(KH I.2.510-19) 
 
[Count vom Strahl (coldly). … Where have I  
 At any other time encountered you? 
Sometimes in the stable I would visit you. 
 Käthchen. No, honored lord. 
 Count vom Strahl. Not that! Come, Katherine! 
 Käthchen. You never came to me in any stable,  
  And yet more ralre laid a hand on me. 
 Count vom Strahl. What, never?  
 Käthchen. No, great sir.  
 Count vom Strahl.  Ah Katherine! 
 Käthchen (with deep feeling).   Never, my highly honored, lord, no, never! 
 Count vom Strahl. Now, verily, behold the lying jade. 
 Käthchen. May heaven reject me, may my soul be lost,  
  If ever you--! ] 
 
The futile attempt to reconstruct the chain of events that have led Käthchen’s father to 
come to believe in her abduction are symptomatic for most situations in which the 
protagonists try to get to the bottom of something. Striving to reveal the truth, the Duke 
and Käthchen for example, both confuse their dreams with reality. The fact that both in 
deed even share certain dreams does not make the communication any easier. While in 
this example it is Käthchen who seems to be the one who cannot distinguish between 
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imagination and fact, it is actually the Duke who attaches scenes from his dreamy 
encounter with Käthchen to their interaction in real life. Many of the gestures the Duke 
refers to in the course of the interrogation, such as touching Käthchen “bei der Hand” 
[“Käthchen’s hand”] or “beim Kinn,” [“Käthchen’s chin”] refer to interactions that take 
place both in dreams as well as the reality. The lack of clarity is a thread weaving 
through the entire play and is not resolved until Graf Strahl acknowledges that the New 
Year’s dream is not merely a fantastic episode, but the “nackte Wirklichkeit” [“naked 
truth”].206  
 Recognizing the dreams and visions as a constitutive part of the reality is 
essential for the Duke to solve the puzzle that caused him and Käthchen so much 
trouble. At the same time, it is also essential to understand Kleist’s approach to physical 
reality, which for him, as I claim, cannot be fully understood without uncovering the 
depths of the unconscious. Those parts of our consciousness that lie behind the veil of 
the unconscious are equally important to reconstructing and suturing the fragments of 
reality that we are confronted with while fully conscious. The content of the unconscious 
cannot be communicated directly without causing further confusion and consternation. 
Rather, the unconscious translates its pieces of information into images that with the 
help of our creative imagination become our dreams, which again, then become are 
reality. Graf von Strahl spells it out after realizing that Käthchen is the girl he had seen 
in his infamous dream:  
 
Der Graf vom Strahl. 
Was mir ein Traum schien, nackte Wahrheit ists: 
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Im Schloss zu Strahl, todkrank am Nervenfieber, 
Lag ich danieder, und hinweggeführt,  
Von einem Cherubim, besuchte sie 
Mein Geist in ihrer Klause zu Heilbronn! (IV.2.2147-2151) 
 
[Count vom Strahl. What seemed a dream to me was naked truth. 
 With feverish nerves within my castle at Strahl 
I lay, it seemed, a dying man. And yet, 
By one of heaven’s cherubs led, my soul 
Visited her in her Heilbronn abode.] 
 
After a confusion that held its grip until the final scenes of the play, the Duke finally 
remembers and acknowledges the dreamy encounter he had with Käthchen on New 
Year’s Eve. Taken by surprise that he indeed is “doppelt,” meaning that he is a ghost 
and wanders through the night, not only brings the actual event to light, but also 
highlights Kleist’s cause in terms of the unconscious and creative imagination. In the 
quote above, the Duke acknowledges that what he thought to be a fantasy is the truth. 
Though he makes clear that it was only his ghost/spirit to render Käthchen that visit, he 
simultaneously acknowledges his spiritual part as equally legitimate and constitutive of 
his entire self. In fact, his spirit is as real as his physical body. The only difference 
between the spiritual and the physical self is that former all too often falls prey to 
oblivion, negligence, or disbelief. It is not until he becomes aware of his subconscious 
that Käthchen’s case begins to make sense to him. Prior to this discovery, Käthchen’s 
story was a vast disarray of fragments and episodes that failed to merge with one 
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another. In hindsight of this revelation, the Duke finally realizes his chance to grasp the 
entire picture and weave the scattered episodes into one big tale.  
 With regard to their abilities to tap and their awareness of grasping their 
imaginative and subconscious capacities, the two main characters, Käthchen and the 
Duke, stand in a chiasmic relationship to one another. During her trial and in the 
restored account of her enchantment with the Duke, Käthchen strikes as the one lost 
between the reality and fantasy. The dreamy visitation of the Duke and the ensuing 
encounter in their waking life are so tightly knit that is does not even occur to her to 
disregard her intuition that tells her to follow the Duke. Whatever she learned that night 
in her dream is true and there is not one single moment in which she falters, questions, 
or doubts the events and their verisimilitude. Among them two it is Käthchen who 
knows from the start that whatever our imagination mediates. The Duke on the other 
hand dismisses Käthchen as deluded. He acts kindly, at first, but does not take her 
seriously. His feelings for Käthchen remain just as well hidden as the fact that he 
recollects that infamous dream. None of his dreams or feelings is allowed to permeate 
the surface of the composed and rational Duke. Despite the fact that he intuits otherwise, 
in a conversation with his mother he speculates whether Kunigunde could be the girl he 
saw in his dream.207 In this case, the need to think over emphasizes the triumph of his 
rationality over his feelings and the imbalance between the surface and the interior.  
                                                 
207Dreizehnter Auftritt Gräfin Helena. Der Graf vom Strahl.  
Der Graf vom Strahl. So wahr, als ich ein Mann bin, die begehr ich  
Zur Frau!  
Gräfin. Nun, nun, nun, nun! 
Der Graf vom Strahl. Was, Nicht? Du willst, daß ich mir eine wählen soll; Doch die nicht? Diese nicht? 
          Die nicht? Was willst du?  
Gräfin. Ich sagte nicht, daß sie mir ganz mißfällt.  
Der Graf vom Strahl. Ich will auch nicht, daß heut noch Hochzeit sei—Sie ist vom Stamm der alten  
         sächsischen Kaiser.  
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 At first sight, this situation appears to support Pahl’s argument that Kleist urges 
his protagonists and his readers to express their feelings. He has feelings for Käthchen, 
which he is conscious of, however, to put plainly, his head win out over his heart, and he 
disregards his actual feelings and considers getting married to Kunigunde because the 
facts point to her being the girl he dreamt about on New Year’s eve. In this light, 
expressing his feelings could, in fact, alleviate the tension and confusion in this 
situation. Yet the conversation between the Duke and his mother also revolves around 
his feelings. The Duke’s statement “So wahr, als ich ein Mann bin, die begehr ich / Zur 
Frau!” is a clear and outright testimony of his desires, which he is absolutely capable of 
communicating. One might argue that the emotions the Duke expresses in this scene are 
temporary and shallow—after all the reader knows how much he loves Käthchen at that 
point—and therefore not so difficult to express. But the crux in this situation is not 
whether or not the Duke manages to find a way to communicate his emotions. What 
matters is whether he manages to recognize his dream both in terms of its interpretation 
and meaning as well as accept it as the “nackte Wahrheit” as he does in the final scenes 
                                                                                                                                                       
Gräfin. Und der Silvesternachttraum spricht für sie? Nicht? Meinst du nicht?  
Der Graf vom Strahl. Was soll ichs bergen: ja!  
Gräfin. Laß uns die Sach ein wenig überlegen. (Ab.) (KH II.13.1372-1382) 
 
[Count vom Strahl. So true as I’m a man, ‘tis she I want 
 To be my wife. 
Countess. Well, well, well, well! 
Count vom Strahl.   What! No? 
 You wish that I should choose myself a wife,  
 And yet not her, this woman? 
Countess.  Be not impatient, 
 I haven’t said that she displeased me wholly. 
Count vom Strahl.  Not I that I would wed this very day. 
 She comes of blood of ancient Saxon kings. 
Countess. And so your dream of New Year’s eve upholds her,  
 Is that your meaning? 
Count vom Strahl. Why conceal it? Yes. 
Countess. Let’s take some time to think the matter over. (Exeunt.) 
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of the play. The capability of conveying one’s emotion outward is one of the further 
steps. At the beginning stands the process of accepting the images created by the 
imagination as real and an essential part of one self. The threshold between reality and 
fantasy is therefore not to be seen as a limiting border, but a visual aid that facilitates 
navigating through reality and fantasy.  
 
Of Windows and Dreams 
 The significance of understanding the nature and function of thresholds in 
Kleist’s play unfolds in several stages. Strikingly, Käthchen and the Duke meet several 
times while standing on or sitting at a threshold. It is for the Duke and due to their 
mutual dream that Käthchen transgresses the threshold in an attempt to reconcile the 
dream and the reality. The first transgression occurs right after Käthchen and the Duke 
meet in real life for the first time. As we learn from her trial, Käthchen acts like 
mesmerized and in order to follow the Duke, whom she recognizes from her dream, she 
steps out of the window, falls several stories deep, and breaks her back. The rough 
crash-landing does not discourage her from pursuing her calling, nor does the Duke 
show any reaction to the accident. The following time both characters meet at a 
threshold the encounter goes a lot less violent, yet not less significant. Already on their 
way to Strasbourg, the Duke sees Käthchen sitting at the threshold to a stable. In court, 
he testifies: 
 so trete ich eines Tages, da ich sie auf der Stallschwelle finde, zu ihr und frage: 
 was für ein Geschäft sie in Straßburg betreibe? Ei, spricht sie, gestrenger Herr, 
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 und eine Röte, daß ich denke, ihre Schürze wird angehen, flammt über ihr Antlitz 
 empor: “was fragt Ihr doch? Ihr wißts ja!” (KH I.1.289-93) 
 
[then one day I found her at the stable door, I approached her and asked what 
business she was attending to in Strassburg. Ah goodsir, she said, and a blush that 
I thought would kindle her apron flamed up over her face, why do you ask? 
Surely you know!] 
 
Sitting at the threshold to a stable, Käthchen functions as a reminder not to disregard the 
feeling and subconscious elements of the self. The Duke, ignorant to her actual endeavor 
is stunned at Käthchen’s exclamation “was fragt Ihr doch? Ihr wißts ja!,” which 
foregrounds the fact that she is aware of their mutual dream, while he is not.208 Her naïve 
assumption that he remembers the dream to the same extent as she does reveals also the 
actual barrier between them. The aforementioned chiasm comes in this scene particular 
to its bearing. Käthchen, sitting at the threshold with an animal abode behind her, 
mystifies her surroundings with a tremendous goal-directedness, yet at the same time 
strikes many as lost, disoriented, and even mesmerized. With her exclamation Käthchen 
reminds the Duke of their shared dream, and by doing so implicitly sends out a warning 
not to turn away from experiences like this. The Duke’s response to her exclamation 
however, is to send her back to her father and thus avoid the visual confrontation with 
the realm of his dreams and fantasy.  
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 Doors, thresholds, and particularly windows are according to Lutz Koepnick’s 
Framing Attention devices “connect[ing] dissimilar spaces: interior with exterior realms, 
private with public arenas, dim with luminous surroundings.”209 Despite their connecting 
role, Koepnick continues, they frequently remain “mysterious and often monstrous” 
because through them “our senses and thoughts come to inhabit different worlds at 
once.”210 In his considerations of windows as a medium, Koepnick regards the ability to 
transmit perceptual data and connect distinct senders as the most crucial characteristics 
of a window. The fact that despite all facilitated mediation and connections windows 
above all inspire the construction and conveyance of images “of the real according to a 
certain code or program” is not only important to Koepnick’s argument, but also 
traceable in Kleist’s Das Käthchen von Heilbronn.211 Yet in contrast to Koepnick’s 
contention that windows simultaneously connect but also distance us from the 
surrounding, in Kleist’s play the distance and separations windows are said to create, are 
superseded by a zooming in on a particular object. Rather than indulge in a distant 
fantasy, Käthchen’s perception hones in on her dreams turned reality. Lured by the 
glimpse at Graf Strahl she catches from her window, Käthchen completely disregards the 
potential barrier the window, and especially the height it is places at, poses. The wall the 
window is situated in dims the surroundings as if it was solely white noise, and brings 
the man to the fore that she had encountered in her dream. In her dreamy infatuation, 
Käthchen what she sees through the window is the only world existing. Without a 
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second thought, she transgresses the boundary between the quotidian reality and the 
world of distant realms that Koepnick conjures up. In the moment of transgression, 
Käthchen takes all the forces she represents, the force of fantasy, the unconscious, and 
the unknown, and enforces them on the rational world outside to ultimately conflate both 
of the seemingly opposite realms. 
 If we followed a traditional interpretation and function of windows as thresholds, 
the worlds of Käthchen and the Duke, that is the world of dreams and fantasy and that of 
reason and (superficial) reality, would exist close to one another, but instead of merging 
they would exist on two different planes separated by a boundary, for example a 
threshold. In his Käthchen von Heilbronn however, Kleist shows that this non-contact 
coexistence simply cannot be. The vehemence of the initial contact—Käthchen’s falling 
out of the window—mirrors not only the force of the fantasy, but also its urge to finally 
break the surface. Now that Käthchen’s ruptured an inlet into the barrier that kept both 
worlds separated the influx of fantasy, and thus the subconscious, is free to develop 
momentum. The window as a medium becomes almost obsolete, and functions now 
rather as a junction and resembles a TV set with a hole in its screen that allows us to 
enter the TV world, and our TV hero enter our world. This renegotiation of all 
perceptual instruments and the concepts on perceptions in addition is a radical 
reevaluation of the purposes of our imagination (including dreams, fantasies, and 
visions, to name but a few) and the way we handle imagination. Thus, it represents new 
aspects into the mind-body issues in the early 1800s. The vehement irruption of 
subconscious forces into the rational surface highlights Kleist’s admonition to keep both 
realms in balance. Yet instead of solely acknowledging its adjacent existence, the fusion 
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remains inevitable, regardless whether Graf Strahl, for instance, is willing to accept it or 
not.  
 The inevitability of merging both dimensions--fantasy and reality--manifests 
itself at several occasions and the play employs visual markers of the reminder to merge 
fantasy and reality multiple times. Particularly interesting is the aforementioned 
encounter between the Duke and Käthchen, who sits at the threshold to a stable. The 
allusion to the then flourishing phenomena such as animal magnetism, in which the soul 
plays the central role in tracing the origins of an ailment for example, is evident. By the 
means of a trance-like state, the patient explores his or her soul in search for a remedy, 
or a solution to a problem. Käthchen, standing at the threshold with the symbolism of the 
(animal) stable in her back, becomes a landmark for the world of the unconscious. At the 
same time, I interpret it as one of Kleist’s attempts to portray the very vague world of 
fantasy and the unconscious in its materialized version. The unconscious, which is also 
unknown, maybe even wild and dangerous, is trapped within the four walls of the stable. 
It is visible to everyone, yet only very few venture a look inside. Standing at the 
threshold, Käthchen is a representative and advocate of that world. With her jump out of 
the window earlier, she looms out of her world, which for vast amounts of Kleist’s play 
is almost exclusively associated with the world of dreams, visions, and angelic 
guidance.212 Moreover, her introductory description portrays her as a “Kind recht nach 
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blondlockig, Fittiche an den Schultern und einen Palmzweig in der Hand. 
... 
Der Cherub. Berührt ihr Haupt mit der Spitze des Palmenzweigs, und verschwindet.” 
 
[“Käthchen with a paper roll in her hand enters swiftly through a great portal that has remained 
standing; behind her a cherub in the shape of a youth, flooded with light, blonde-haired, with pinions on 
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der Lust Gottes” [“after God’s pleasing”] whose virtue and beauty even enchants “[die] 
lieben, kleinen Engel[…], die, mit hellen Augen, aus den Wolken, unter Gottes Händen 
und Füßen hervorgucken” [“to the dear little angels who peep out with bright eyes from 
under God’s hands and feet”].213 Käthchen’s almost divine nature elevates her above all 
other characters in the play and suggests her character be interpreted more positively 
than all others. As I will show in the following paragraphs, the way Käthchen’s 
character is set up implies that she is the one who bears the closest resemblance of the 
virtue Kleist debates in his letter quoted in the opening paragraphs of the chapter.  
 
 
  
The Wilder the Better? 
 Raising Käthchen to the level of a near deity, Kleist makes a remarkable 
intervention. On the one hand, Käthchen is evidently a model of angelic virtue and thus 
a role model for her peers. On the other hand, her association with nature, and 
simultaneously its untamed forces resurfaces in regular intervals in the course of the 
play. Musing about his daughter, Theobald, for example, observes that: 
 
 Die Eichen … so still [sind], die auf den Bergen verstreut sind: man hört den  
 Specht, der daran pickt. Ich glaube, sie wissen, daß Käthchen angekommen ist, 
 und lauschen auf das, was sie denkt. Wenn ich mich doch in die Welt auflösen 
 könnte, um es zu erfahren. (III.1.1395-99) 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
his shoulders and a palm-branch in his hand ... The cherub touches her head with the tip of the palm-
branch and vanishes.”] 
 
213KH I.1.69-73. 
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[The oaks scattered over the mountains are so still that you van hear the 
woodpecker hammering at their trunks. I believe they know that Käthchen has 
come, and are listening with open ears to learn her thoughts. If only I could be 
dissolved into nature so as to learn it too.] 
 
Clearly, Käthchen is wired differently. Her thinking and her feeling operate on a level 
that is united with nature. Trees and animals are likelier to perceive and understand her 
thoughts and emotions than her (human) peers, like her father for example. This unity 
with nature blatantly foreshadows the introductory scene in Prinz Friedrich von 
Homburg. Both protagonists seemingly naturally interconnected their thoughts and 
emotions with the nature around them. Furthermore, among the characters constituting 
their play, both Käthchen and Friedrich are unique in their ability to interact with nature. 
The oak motif intertwines both plays and imbues the scenes with heavy symbolism. Be it 
in the bible or pagan religions, in Western culture most societies accepted the oak as a 
symbol for strength, sacredness, and wisdom, going even as far as idolizing oaks as 
thresholds between the material world and the spiritual beyond.214  By creating a 
character that is so closely connected to the untamed and unfathomed forces of nature, 
yet at the same time, one who embodies virtue like no other in the play, Kleist casts a 
positive light on something that had to be barred and contained: our creative forces.  
 Käthchen as well as Friedrich both are established as chosen ones, whose abilities 
to cast a look into both worlds set them apart from the masses. In addition, both struggle 
with this ability that does not reveal itself as a gift until the final scenes of each play. 
                                                 
214
“Eiche,” Lexikon der literarischen Symbole, Stuttgart: Metzler, 2008. 
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Friedrich is a character who suffers from his double role as a public figure, a charismatic 
prince and commander, and his dreamy and disoriented private persona. His fits of 
sleepwalking and sleeptalking surround him with an aura of madness and aloofness, and 
trouble him personally more than the others. Meanwhile, Käthchen maintains an entirely 
different tactic. Instead of wasting time on a perpetual denial and futile attempts to 
contain the outbreaks of fantasy, Käthchen never even doubts the truthfulness of her 
dreams.  Hence, the pursuit for the materialization of her dreams is what inspires her 
every move. As becomes visible in the final stages of Prinz Friedrich von Homburg, 
Friedrich’s denial of his dreams is so deeply rooted that even in the very moments of its 
one-to-one materialization, he still does not want to acknowledge their physical 
existence. Instead, he relies on his company, here in the form of Stranz his cavalry 
captain, who approaches Friedrich with the words: “Die Augen bloß will ich dir öffnen” 
[“I only want to open your eyes”].215 Friedrich’s desperate holding on to the dictates of 
his reason as well as those of societal norms and standards render him unable to embark 
on the journey into the world of his imagination. His actions imply a fear that feeds of 
the possibility of succumbing to his fantasies and dreams and getting lost in the maze of 
his own imagination. In contrast to Käthchen’s case, it takes a third party for Friedrich to 
realize that his imagination does not create illusions, but rather a glimpse into his future 
that he can trust. 
  Reconnecting with nature, a feature Kleist portrays repeatedly in a very positive 
light, is a constitutive element in the process of accessing the unconscious that holds so 
much of the self that we need to explore in order to be able to understand us and the 
world around us. As the two plays discussed in this chapter show, the general 
                                                 
215PH V.11.1848. 
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development that Kleist appears to have observed among his contemporaries led away 
from the unknown forces of our (animalistic) nature. The urge for rationalizing the 
understanding of human nature is the key factor in our failing in this endeavor—a 
phenomenon Kleist devoted most of his works to. In Kleist’s works, venturing into the 
unexplored realms of the darker side of the human soul is as tempting, as it is necessary, 
but also complicated. Both Käthchen as well as Friedrich show clearly how many 
cumbersome this process at time may be. Regardless, whether we vehemently deny this 
part of ourselves, or whether we hone in on it like Käthchen, each time the surrounding 
will be inclined to see the lunatic in us. Yet, as Kleist does not grow tired of 
emphasizing, it is a part of us that is equally essential and constitutive of the self as the 
conscious and awake part driven by logic and reason. The necessity to reconcile both 
sides of the self, the conscious and the unconscious, is not fueled by a fascination with 
the untamed and uncontrollable that is often associated with Kleist’s works, but rather 
the only chance there is to achieve the said reconciliation and thus gain the ability to 
communicate without boundaries. The idea of being one with nature, as we have seen in 
Käthchen’s case, is an illustration of the infinite sources of knowledge that become 
available that way. Käthchen’s and Friedrich bewildering air at times is not a result of 
their attunement with that nature, but rather a consequence with either their denial of it 
(as Friedrich’s case shows), or the lack of understanding of it on the side of society (in 
Käthchen’s case). Since human nature is complex and unexplored it is impossible to 
speculate what we could find and learn once we embarked on this journey. In any case, 
as Kleist’s oeuvre implies, it is certainly worth trying.  
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 The creative imagination is in Kleist’s works is the most useful tool in the 
endeavor to get to the bottom of human nature. Its function is to translate whatever the 
unconscious holds available into images that are comprehensible, in other words it is a 
medium between the conscious and the unconscious. Throughout Kleist works, creative 
imagination finds a vast array of outlets: dreams, fantasies, and visions are all employed 
as a vehicle to facilitate the dialogue between the conscious and the unconscious part of 
the self. In parallel to the works discussed in previous chapters of this dissertation, the 
strong urge to rationalize and then dismiss anything that does not strictly follow obvious 
physical laws has to be circumvented in order to maintain the exchange. This, again in 
parallel to Goethe and Moritz, occurs with the help of a weakening of the physical body 
and a simultaneous blur of the (overly) critical ratio of the conscious side of the self. 
Moritz’s case studies foreground the lucid dream during a high fever, while Goethe’s 
“Confessions of the Beautiful Soul” do so with excessive daydreaming due to a 
hemorrhage. Kleist, on the other hand, does not seem to be selective: a faux-biblical 
vision in the shade of ancient oaks will serve the same purpose as a dream experienced 
in regular sleep, or a vision during a fainting spell. What all these examples have in 
common are three facts: first, there is an imbalance in the ways of perception and 
therefore, Kleist, analogously to Moritz and Goethe, calls for a reevaluation and 
restructuring of the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious. Second, 
Friedrich’s case shows that fighting and denying the mere existence of the unconscious 
is futile, as it always will find a way to surface. The decision to trust it and thus employ 
it in a productive way is ultimately the choice of each individual. Constant denial does 
not lead anywhere but to disorientation that borders on a loss of one’s identity and the 
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sense for what is real. Third, in the examined works of all three authors thus far, the 
creative imagination is not something that has to be contained or feared. On the contrary, 
it is a constitutive part of human nature, and a positive and productive force that is 
essential in understanding one’s own nature as well as human nature. To be sure, all 
three authors deliver a number of counter examples. However, these negative examples 
do not function as a warning not to engage in a dialogue with one’s own imaginative and 
unconscious forces. In fact, they constitute a warning not to attempt to understand it and 
simply contain it. Engaging in a dialogue with the unexplored parts of the self is what 
facilitates the productivity and progress of the human kind in all its aspects because it 
completes the only the painting that Kleist bemoans as fragmentary. 
 
 
 
Conclusion and Outlook 
 Nearly all of Kleist’s works portray struggle. Throughout all of the genres he 
utilized, Kleist depicts struggle with almost all thinkable aspects of life. The struggle 
between the private versus the public self, the struggle between reality and fantasy, or 
the struggle between power and feeling the lack of it, have led many scholars to consider 
Kleist as being perpetually at war with his inner conflicts.216 What causes these conflicts 
is a deep distrust towards physical perception Kleist feared were the only one available 
to us. Turning away from the perceptional modes offered by empiricism, and criticizing 
a glorification of reason, Kleist embarks on a quest for alternative modes of perception. 
He is regularly haunted by frustration and the impulse to simply capitulate facing such 
an overwhelming endeavor. Yet repeatedly, Kleist blazes a path into realms of 
                                                 
216
 See for example Mathieu Carrière, Für eine Literatur des Krieges, Kleist (Frankfurt am Main: Roter 
Stern, 1981), who traces the motif of war and combat through Kleist’s life and work. 
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imagination, the unknown and the unconscious parts of the self. And again, Kleist does 
so in his very own tried and tested way. As Prinz Friedrich von Homburg shows, the 
first step to success is a willing acceptance of these elements as equally legitimate and 
relevant to the perception and creation of the self. The creative imagination, whichever 
vehicle it chooses to surface, is what it takes to weave the, at times seemingly random, 
fragments we are doomed to face if we maintain the status quo informed by rationalism 
and empiricism. Disregarding the wild and unexplored side of human nature leads not 
only Friedrich to the verge of insanity. Luckily, the acceptance of its mere existence 
leads Friedrich back to life again. The help of the creative and imaginative forces 
enables the individual to compile the incomprehensible array of fragments and 
impressions the socalled reality confronts us with daily into a coherent whole. The voice 
of reason permeates the perception to such a great extent that most of Kleist’s characters 
are ignorant to the existence of an alternative until they are confronted with it by force. 
Fainting spells, physical as well as (seemingly) mental diseases, and a number of other 
strokes enforce an encounter with the faculties of the creative imagination. Ironically, it 
is the feared unconscious that is productive in deciphering the incomprehensible 
fragments that the rational reality leaves us with.  
 What sounds simple is not. The flip side of Kleist’s suggested solution is also 
depicted in the same works that propagate it. Following the path leading towards one’s 
unconscious means simulateneously to following a path leading away from what 
constitutes us as human. The loss of the upright position represents in the eighteenth-
century drama the loss of one’s entire status within the political, social, and emotional 
hierarchy. For Kleist, however, this loss is inevitable. The access to the greater 
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knowledge he seeks cannot be gained through contemplation and reasoning, but through 
their radical and threatening rejection. Both examples, Friedrich as well as Käthchen 
show how much is at stake for each of them. The loss of the status is but a first step of 
this journey, while the loss of sanity is its potential outcome. The portrayed ambivalence 
is symptomatic for Kleist’s work. It foregrounds how much is at stake, on the one hand, 
but also how much one can gain from the other. Ultimately, in order to become the 
civilized, cultured, and knowledgable human being that his characters struggle for, one 
has to face whatever is dormant and unconscious. As both plays show, it is 
quintessential to gain an understanding of the unconscious in order to know what it is 
that we actually deal with. The path is as radical, almost belligerent, as any other of 
Kleist’s paths. The solution to Kleist’s epistemological struggle is not given as a gift to 
anyone. Rather, it is something one has to consciously and bravely fight for—even 
though there is no promise for a positive outcome. 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
“BILDERLOSES ANSCHAUEN:” F.W.J.  SCHELLING’S CLARA’S AND THE BLISS OF 
IMMEDIATE COGNITION 
 
 
Introduction: Schelling—An Ebb and Tide of Popularity  
 Schelling is arguably one of Germany’s most cryptic and mysterious 
philosophers. Despite his general influence on thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, 
Jürgen Habermas and Ernst Bloch, Schelling’s oeuvre has not always been considered 
canonical for German thought. Though Schelling’s work is certainly not under-
researched, scholars attention on Schelling’s work goes hand in hand with the general 
peaks of popularity, and naturally also the lack of them. After disappearing into oblivion 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the centenary of Schelling’s death in 
1954 created the first waves of scholarly attention that subsided shortly after, only to 
reemerge in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Only few scholars, such as Emil 
Frankenheim, as well as Fiona Steinkamp and Jason Wirth more recently, never left their 
eyes off Schelling’s works. Remarkably, these scholars are also among those who 
ascribe continuity to Schelling’s work—a continuity that many others bemoan as 
absent.217 Though it is only tangentially relevant to this project, it is worth mentioning 
                                                 
217For further reading on this debate see: Judith Norman and Alistair Welchman: “Introduction: The New 
Schelling” in The New Schelling, ed. Judith Norman and Alistair Welchman (London, New York: 
Continuum, 2004).  
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that the issue of presence or absence of continuity in Schelling’s works is one of the 
focal points in the debate as the diagnosed lack of continuity led many scholars to 
dismiss Schelling’s philosophy as extremely volatile. His rejection as a “protean thinker, 
never sticking with a view long enough to develop it” has ultimately to a large extent led 
to his only relatively marginal representation in scholarship.218 The scholarship that 
exists bears witness to Schelling’s procreativity, and as some claim, his genius. 
Schelling not only has “inspired physicists, physicians, theologians, historians, and 
poets,” but also scholars from all these disciplines to explore Schelling’s work as an 
intersection of all these disciplines. Today’s scholarship on Schelling is beyond the point 
of being a matter of German literature and thought. Instead, it unites scholars with 
backgrounds in psychoanalysis, art history, and sociology in order to foreground the 
complexity and interdisciplinarity of Schelling’s work.219 In fact, both characteristics, 
complexity and interdisciplinarity, appear to be the reason for an increasing popularity 
of Schelling in the past decade—a phenomenon that some scholars euphorically, yet 
hopefully not prematurely, celebrate as a Schelling Renaissance. As will becomes clear 
in the following passages, currently scholarship places its focus on the philosophical 
content of Schelling’s works, even the case of Clara, disregarding thus the fact that 
Schelling envisioned Clara to be a novel. Therefore, after a brief research overview, I 
will examine Clara as a literary text. As my analysis demonstrates, a literary 
                                                 
218Norman and Welchman 2.  
 
219
 With regard to art history see for instance, Hans Dieter Huber, Phantasie als Schnittstelle (Berlin: 
Epubli, 2010); with regard to psychoanalysis see Matt Ffytche, The Foundation of the Unconscious. 
Schelling, Freud and the Birth of the Modern Psyche (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2012); and finally, with regard to sociology see Alberto Toscano, “Philosophy and the Experience of 
Construction,” in Judith Norman and Alistair Welchman: “Introduction: The New Schelling” in The New 
Schelling, ed. Judith Norman and Alistair Welchman (London, New York: Continuum, 2004) 106-127.  
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examination of this text reveals nuances that contribute to the general content, but are 
not verbally expressed, proving thus that Clara is far more than a summary of 
Schelling’s main philosophical points.  
 
Research Overview  
  With regard to scholarship conducted explicitly on Schelling’s Clara, the work 
of four scholars should be brought to attention. Alexander Grau, whose article “Clara. 
Über Schellings gleichnamiges Fragment” compares Schelling’s main philosophical 
points with those presented in Clara.220 Laurie Johnson, who in her article contends that 
Clara constitutes a meaningful contribution to the Romantic thought and to the historical 
trajectory of the uncanny.221 Fiona Steinkamp discussion of editorial inadequacies in her 
article “Schelling's ‘Clara’: Editors' Obscurity” and her translation and thorough 
introduction to the English version of this text constitute the most thorough analysis of 
the text itself and its creation.222 Finally, Konrad Dietzfelbinger should be mentioned, 
who edited and introduced Clara’s German version.223 As becomes clear from reading 
Clara, the focus of the original text revolves around questions of religion, psychology, 
and philosophy. All three scholars foreground the tightly knit interrelation between 
                                                 
220Alexander Grau, “Clara. Über Schellings gleichnamiges Fragment” Zeitschrift für philosophische 
Forschung 51/4 (1997): 590-601. 
 
221Laurie Johnson, “Uncanny Love: Schelling’s Meditations on the Spirit World,” Image & Narrative 
11.3 (2010): 64-86, 1.  
 
222Fiona Steinkamp, “Schelling’s “Clara”: Editor’s Obscurity” in The Journal of English and German 
Philology 101.4 (2002): 478-96, as well as F.W.J. Schelling, Clara, or, On Nature’s Connection to the 
Spirit World, ed. Fiona Steinkamp (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002).  
  
223F.W.J. Schelling, Clara—Über den Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt, ed. Konrad 
Dietzfelbinger (Königsdorf: Königsdorfer Verlag, 2009).    
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Schelling’s philosophy and the content of Clara, arguing that the story’s foremost 
objective is to facilitate an easy access to Schelling’s philosophy. This, naturally, is 
almost guaranteed through the easily accessible prose of the book as well as its relentless 
explanations in the best Platonic manner. This approach is not far fetched because, as is 
known from Schelling’s letters for example, Clara in fact does reveal a certain degree of 
similarity to Schelling’s Die Weltalter.224 Despite the debates whether Clara’s purpose is 
to simply to present the content of Die Weltalter, or to constitute one of the follow-up 
volumes to it, all scholars approach this text from a strictly philosophical point of view. 
While this perspective is productive for a close analysis of the content, it loses sight of 
the fact that Clara is also Schelling’s attempt to present his philosophical ideas in the 
form of fiction. It is, in other words a literary text.  
As this chapter will demonstrate, Clara—Über den Zusammenhang der Natur mit 
der Geisterwelt is far more than a philosophical treatise written in quotidian prose. It is a 
fragment that was posthumously published by Schelling’s son as part of his Sämmtliche 
Werke in 1861 and is today considered Schelling’s only novel.225 Thus, it is not (only) a 
philosophical treatise, but also a piece of fiction, which certainly helps explain the fact 
that it was Schelling’s most popular work. As Steinkamp explains, “[Clara] is popular in 
the sense that it is written for the general public and not just for philosophers. It is also 
popular in the sense that there have been six separate editions of the work published.”226 
                                                 
224Fiona Steinkamp, “Situating Clara—The Ages of the World and Bruno” in F.W.J. Schelling, Clara, or, 
On Nature’s Connection to the Spirit World, ed. Fiona Steinkamp (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 2002) x-xiii.  
 
225Dietzfelbinger 18.    
 
226Fiona Steinkamp, “Schelling’s “Clara”: Editor’s Obscurity” in The Journal of English and German 
Philology 101/4 (2002): 478-96. 
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The oblivion Schelling’s Clara fell into is, according to Steinkamp, motivated by its 
explicitly popular orientation as it is a narrative treatment of the main pillars of 
Schelling’s philosophy. As Dietzfelbinger points out in the introduction to Clara, in this 
fragment “trägt Schelling seine Philosophie in lebendiger, einfacher Sprache vor, so dass 
sie jedermann klar verständlich sein kann.”227 Grau observes that facilitating popular 
understanding is by far not Schelling’s only objective for Clara. Rather, “es soll 
dasjenige rational geklärt werden, was das Volk ... schon immer empfunden hat” [this 
needs to be explained rationally, what the people have always intuited“].228 In other 
words, what Grau emphasizes is not a planned explanation of Schelling’s philosophy to 
the general public, but, on the contrary, a reconciliation of scientific versus popular 
belief, as it is the non-experts to first intuit, see, and know those things that matter.   
 In a more simplifying light, as Grau suggests, those things that matter constitute 
the knowledge of a continued existence of the soul after the death of the body.229 To be 
sure, Grau’s discussion of Clara addresses the more complex concepts involved in the 
potential existences in a hereafter, for example the nature of the relationship between the 
spirit, the soul, and the body. Nonetheless, Grau’s main objective remains the fact that 
after suffering from the sudden loss of his wife Caroline, Schelling himself was seeking 
comfort in the belief in an afterlife. While this approach sounds plausible, it disregards 
                                                 
227Introduction to F.W.J. Schelling, Clara—Über den Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt, ed. 
Konrad Dietzfelbinger (Königsdorf: Königsdorfer Verlag, 2009) 8. 
 
228Grau 594. 
 
229Grau 590-91: “Tatsächlich geht es Schelling nicht nur um die Geisterwelt im metaphorischen Sinne, 
sondern um die Frage, ob es ein Leben nach dem Tode gibt und in welcher Form dies wohl existiert.” 
[“Indeed, what matters for Schelling is not only explaining the world of spirits in the metaphorical sense, 
but rather the question whether life after death really does exist and in what form.”] 
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the ramification of the statement that it is popular belief that has an advantage in the race 
for eternal and absolute truths.230 As this chapter will demonstrate, Schelling’s 
conviction of the verisimilitude of popular knowledge is not an attempt to find comfort 
in popular, almost folkloristic beliefs in the afterlife or the existence of ghosts and spirits 
that roam the physical world. Though the existence of a spirit world, a Geisterwelt, as 
invoked in the title, is one of the topics, it is by far not the end of the scope of the 
discussion in Clara. As I contend, this discussion serves as a vehicle for implications 
that reach further. The knowledge of a continued existence on the one hand, as well as 
the urgent call to explore the awaiting spirit world on the other, are the main landmarks 
of the human mind-body mechanism that Schelling is eager to map out in Clara. In an 
analysis of Clara, I will show that striving for a highest possible reconciliation and 
unification of these two levels of existence may indeed be comforting at times, but more 
significantly, it is a method of solving the problems all thus far discussed thinkers, 
Moritz, Goethe, and Kleist, were anxiously exploring.  
Among additional motives and topics recent scholarship has turned toward and 
which play an important role in Clara are psychoanalytic readings of the unconscious in 
Schelling’s works as well as his influence on theories of imagination. Generally, 
scholarship on Schelling does not examine individual texts. What current scholarship 
emphasizes instead is the importance of focusing on and tracing of leitmotifs and 
concepts throughout Schelling’s literary and philosophical legacy.231 For instance, in his 
                                                 
230Strikingly, the term that Schelling uses is der Volksglaube, which in German alludes to der 
Aberglaube, superstition, as for example the coinage der Volksaberglaube, popular superstition, implies. 
 
231For the purposes of this chapter, I will only point out those works, which examine Schelling’s relation 
to psychology. However, a few contributions that lie outside the trajectory of this dissertation should 
nonetheless be mentioned. Among the most notable contributions are Jürgen Habermas, Ernst Bloch, and 
Slavoj Žižek.  
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The Foundation of the Unconscious, Matt Ffytche examines Schelling’s work with 
regard to the origins of the theoretical concept of the unconscious, arguing that it is “in 
the work of…F.W.J. Schelling and the nature philosopher [that] one finds many of the 
characteristic idioms associated with psychoanalytic theory in the twentieth century: the 
notion of an internal mental division and a dialogue between a conscious and an 
unconscious self.”232 As Ffytche lays out, in contrast to psychoanalysts such as C.G. 
Jung or F.A. Carus, who openly rendered homage to their Romantic forerunners, Freud 
never acknowledged this line of influence, even though his work reveals numerous 
parallels that Ffytche traces through Schelling back to Fichte. Odo Marquard’s “Several 
Connections between Aesthetics and Therapeutics in Nineteenth-Century Philosophy” 
compares likewise the parallels and differences between Schelling and Freud.233  
Unlike Ffytche, who locates Freud’s conceptual origins in Fichte’s oeuvre, 
Marquard refers to a particular moment in time as the cradle of the main concepts of 
Freudian psychoanalysis. For Marquard, the particularity of the beginning of the 
nineteenth century facilitates the “increasing aesthetic interest in medicine and medical 
interest in aesthetics,” and thus sparks the dialogue between psychology and literature, 
theater, philosophy, and poetry.234 
 My contribution to current scholarship on Schelling lies in the focus on Clara as 
a literary text. To be sure, I too recognize how closely intertwined Clara’s story is with 
Schelling’s philosophy. After all, not scholars, but also Schelling himself does not miss 
                                                 
232Matt Ffytche, The Foundation of the Unconscious. Schelling, Freud and the Birth of the Modern 
Psyche (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 2-3. 
 
233Odo Marquard “Several Connections between Aesthetics and Therapeutics in Nineteenth-Century 
Philosophy,” in The New Schelling, ed. Judith Norman and Alistair Welch (London, New York: 
Continuum, 2004) 13-30. 
 
234Marquard 23.  
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the opportunity to point out the importance of a philosophy that is accessible to and 
understandable for everyone. But in contrast to his earlier attempt to do so, in Bruno, 
Schelling exceeds the formal standards of a Platonic dialogue. In addition to the already 
mentioned conversational, almost colloquial language, Clara also is a narrated dialogue, 
which technically makes it an account of what the narrator remembers took place. It is a 
mediated account, and yet it claims to be as much a philosophical text as any other 
scholarly essay. The mysterious narrator adorns the account of the conversations with 
long and very detailed descriptions of the surroundings. As I argue, the narrator does so 
by making use of contemporarily popular literary genres and visual aesthetics. As a 
consequence, numerous passages are ostentatiously based on the aesthetics of the Gothic 
novel, for example, as well as landscapes of moss-grown tombstones and ruins of castles 
long abandoned. To what end Schelling employs such imagery and why he paints such a 
detailed and particular background, invoking thus an almost magical and mystical 
atmosphere to introduce his philosophical excursions, is the main objective for this 
chapter, which will demonstrate that the socalled objective discourse on philosophy is as 
much a matter of interpretation as a fictional novel. Through the analysis of Clara as a 
literary text, I elicit Schelling’s rationale and motivation for the choice of genre on the 
one hand, and the renegotiations of its formal limits on the other. As I shall claim, these 
revisions have, for Schelling, far reaching repercussions for the interaction between 
literature and philosophy. First, the aspired accessibility of philosophical concepts, 
which is central for Schelling in this project, is thus not only guaranteed, but even 
surpassed. The newly negotiated boundaries allow for flexibility in coping with the 
subject matter from both perspectives, the author’s and the reader’s. Second, the 
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narrativization of philosophy that Schelling undertakes in Clara displaces (his) 
philosophy from the space of scholarly objectivity into a realm of creativity, inspiration, 
and most importantly interpretation. The matter of interpretation is decisive here for 
Schelling’s narrativization clearly alludes to a fictionalization, which again, places 
philosophy as a matter of personal interpretation rather than accumulation of impersonal 
data.  
With respect to the content expressed in and through Clara, I will focus on 
continuities and discontinuity to those aspects and authors already discussed in this 
dissertation. First, and with regard to Moritz, I will show that Schelling’s envisioned 
interaction with the spiritual world, as well as the dialogue between scientific and 
popular knowledge, not only perpetuates epistemological progress, but also facilities 
true creation instead of mere imitation. Second, in analogy to Goethe’s search for a 
visualization and communicability of science in a universally comprehensible manner, I 
will show how Schelling’s intended return to popular beliefs exemplifies a return to the 
origins as popular beliefs appear to lie closer to the nature of humankind. Third, in 
analogy to the discussion on Kleist in the previous chapter, Schelling’s dialogue with a 
spiritual hereafter is an attempt to get in touch with the subconscious forces that Kleist 
staged in his plays so vigorously, yet in a way that reaches beyond the discourse of 
psychology and into that of cognitive science. For both authors, Schelling and Kleist, as 
well as in part for Goethe and Moritz, the belief is true that everything lies in us and is 
only available through us, and the imagination that is most creative in our dreams is 
instrumental in unearthing the knowledge that lies in us.   
 185
 Despite all the parallels between Schelling and the authors analyzed earlier, for 
each similarity there is a way in which Schelling diverges from each of the thinkers. 
Each goal that Schelling shares with Moritz, Goethe, or Kleist is accompanied by an 
entirely different set of instruments and methods that help him get at the results and 
revelations Schelling sets out to find. To elicit the unique position that Schelling’s Clara 
assumes within the spectrum of literature and philosophy, I will frame my close reading 
with art historian Hans Dieter Huber’s 2010 book Phantasie als Schnittstelle, a study 
which explores the benefits of the creative imagination and is thus useful for the 
examination of the creative imagination within the discourse of science and medicine.235 
Huber argues that Schelling’s binary of productive and reproductive imagination works 
as a switchboard that balances external irritations and internal, autonomous activity of 
the imagination—an approach that is not only applicable to understanding art creation, 
but medical issues as well. This interplay constitutes the core of the examination in this 
chapter. Yet in light of the obscurity of Schelling’s Clara, I will begin my analysis with 
a synopsis of this fragment.  
 
Clara’s Who’s Who 
 The heroine Clara loses her husband and with him nearly all of her financial 
means. The time setting (All Souls’ Day) in addition to Clara’s disastrous material and 
immaterial situation set not only the tone and atmosphere, but also the content of the 
narrative. The narration is a conversation between the three characters: Clara, the priest, 
and the physician, and thus divided into three large chapters. Even though all three 
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characters participate in and contribute to the conversation in each chapter, one character 
stands in the focus of one particular chapter. In other words, he or she receives the 
greatest attention in so far as their talk time is concerned. The conversation dwells on 
topics and questions regarding the earthly life and the thereafter. This discussion gives 
rise to a host of entailing questions such as: the mind-body problem, living on the hot 
seat between nature and the spirit world, transformation and blessedness (Verklärung 
and Seligkeit), different qualities of the hereafter (according to the quality of the 
deceased), to name but a few. The two male characters surrounding Clara conveniently 
represent the spiritual world in the character of the priest, and a physical and scientific 
world in the body of the doctor. The quality and line of arguments do not allow for any 
surprise as they strictly follow the expected pattern. Briefly speaking, the doctor 
advocates for pushing and extending the boundaries through perpetual research and 
analysis, while the priest suggests a recollection and respect of the mysteries of the 
world and its beyonds. The novel ends in the springtime and with a rather positive 
outlook on the future: the doctor urges the upcoming generations of scientists to unveil 
the mystery as to whether the earth is the only populated planet in our solar system, and 
if so, what the reason could be. The priest concludes with a skeptical statement that 
according to the traditional counting of the planets, earth is allotted number seven, 
which puts her in the center of the system. As such, it appears to be determined to unite 
“die äußersten Enden des Daseins, wie Gott” [“the extreme ends of existence in itself, 
like God”].236 In other words, the priest dismisses the doctor’s ambitious efforts to 
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Nature’s Connection to the Spirit World, ed. Fiona Steinkamp (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002).  
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expand the boundaries through a traditional and conservative geocentric worldview, in 
which the earth appears as a confluence and merging of different levels and spheres of 
existence and realities. At the same time, the earth poses the greatest, seemingly 
unsolvable mysteries, and bears the answers to all these mysteries in itself. Without 
knowing the earth there is no way for humanity to ever truly study and understand other 
worlds or other dimensions. The human body, on the other hand, is “eine kleine Natur in 
der großen … die unglaublich viel Analogien und Verbindungen mit ihr hat” [“a smaller 
nature within a larger one … that has unbelievably many analogies and links to the 
larger”]—an argument that resurfaces repeatedly and is therefore hard to ignore for both 
the character of the priest as well Clara’s readers.237 
 
Getting in the Mood—Clara’s Introduction  
 It is All Soul’s Day. On their way to the eponymous Clara, the priest and the 
physician pass through a nameless town. Touched by the geographical beauty of the 
town, they decide to follow a large group of people who all go to the local cemetery to 
commemorate and, as the reader later learns, to reunite with the souls of the dead.  
Around the graves in the cemetery they find “blühende Mädchen, mit jüngeren 
Geschwistern an der Hand das Grab einer Mutter bekränzend, dort eine Mutter still am 
Grab früher verlorener Kinder stehend” [“girls in their bloom, holding hands with their 
younger brothers, crowned theirs mother’s grave; their at the grave of her children lost 
so young a mother stood in silence”].238 The atmosphere is filled with “süßer Wehmut,”  
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a sweet melancholy that is emphasized with “Blumen des Herbstes” [“autumn flowers”] 
that cover the graves as well as the “alten bemoosten Grabstein[e]” [“old and mossy 
gravestones”].239 This all-permeating evanescence and the sometimes tearful melancholy 
of the women are framed by the seriousness, contemplation, and reverence of the men 
that surround the graves which “vielleicht einen früh hingegangenen Freund oder eine 
unvergessliche Freundin verschlossen” [“that held perhaps an early departed friend or a 
girlfriend they would never forget”].240 The two observers of this situation, the physician 
and the priest, illustrate a background setting that invokes symbols of Romanticism in 
the most obvious way. Decaying, moss-overgrown graves, beautiful young women 
suffocating in their grief for their passed beloved, the reverent men mourning for the 
dead friend, is a picture that may have been taken out of a Gothic novel, or even better, a 
pastiche of it. And yet, this invoked imagery is not meant to amuse the reader, but on the 
contrary, its goal is to generate the right mood and atmosphere for the rest of the text 
and to depict the melancholy opulence of Romanticism.  
 For readers expecting a philosophical dialogue, as they may already know from 
Schelling’s 1802 Bruno, the absence of (pseudo-)scholarly language and the 
omnipresence of the overflowing Romantic imagery they face in Clara may indeed come 
as a surprise. Yet there is no doubt that precisely this exaggerated invocation of 
Romantic clichés and the chronological order is a deliberate choice. Beginning with All 
Soul’s Day, Schelling sets the scene for his later discussion of a continued existence in a 
hereafter, which is then followed by elaborations of the proximity of the two dimensions 
of existence: the physical and the spiritual world. As I argue, the stark emphasis on the 
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seemingly binary structure of his argument serves the purpose of highlighting the need 
of intersection and reconciliation of the two opposing elements involved, which he 
orchestrates gradually with a culmination of its positive effects in the last chapter of 
Clara. The proximity of the spiritual world, which as Schelling later states is populated 
by the souls of the deceased, is further underlined by the fact that All Soul’s Day is in 
the fall. The fall interlinks, naturally, the life and abundance of the summer with the 
barrenness of the winter months. This is important in so far as it highlights the 
prominence of the idea of a kind of overlap that Schelling repeatedly calls upon. The 
exact nature of this state remains unexplained. It is a period that visualizes a transition 
from one state to another. Yet at the same time, it is also a period of overlap in which the 
two other states can at times unite. With such a beginning, Schelling directs the spotlight 
to a dichotomy that is indicative of the rest of his tale. By doing so, namely, Schelling 
adjusts the focus for his readers and chooses the lens through which his text should be 
read and interpreted. Thus, the readers are on the lookout for similar patterns, only to 
learn later that the intersection of the both opposites is a productive and necessary 
intersection. In this manner, Schelling points to the two states of being awake and being 
asleep. As I will later demonstrate, the brief moment between these two states of 
consciousness is of particular importance for causes advanced in Clara. Likewise, the 
dichotomy of life and death itself is a thread weaving through the entire text. The 
linkage there is a particular approach to perceiving and comprehending the world around 
us. How to link these two dimensions of existence—because both of them are for 
Schelling equally populated—is the main objective of Clara. Generating the possibility 
to perceive the world through physical as well as spiritual senses will enable us to 
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ultimately conjure up this intersection, which for Schelling is the preferable mode of 
living as it facilitates improvement in all thinkable respects. 
 By invoking such overtly Romantic imagery, Schelling appeals to the emotional 
receptiveness of his readers on the one hand, but additionally he also instrumentalizes 
this very popular imagery—popular in both senses: popular in terms of people oriented 
as well as popular as in fashionable and well liked. The overloaded Romantic imagery 
from the introduction to Clara is part of the world that Clara, the heroine, leaves behind 
at the end of the text. The described Romantic decoration equals yet another interference 
in the endeavor to strive for utmost clarity and immediacy with respect to how we 
communicate and how we perceive. This becomes especially clear in the juxtaposition of 
the beginning and the ending. At the beginning, the readers encounter Clara surrounded 
by such obstructive and redundant imagery. Laurie Johnson interprets Clara’s 
“entombment” as her longing for the past that fails to manifest for her.241 Accordingly, 
she is unable to connect with the spiritual world, and therefore suffers not only from 
melancholy, but also from a general standstill in her life. In the final chapter, Clara is 
outside in nature. The nightly gloom is replaced by the brightness of the sun and the 
clarity of the spring air. This strengthens Schelling’s call for a simplicity and clarity in 
the communication of philosophy, for example. Unlike Johnson who interprets Clara as 
Schelling’s “encourage[ing] us to accept that we have always been modern” as an 
attempt to balance accounts with the past, I argue that it is not the past solely, but the 
way we obscure knowledge through romanticizing ideals and aesthetic preferences. In 
contrast to many of his contemporaries, yet similar to the authors discussed in this 
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dissertation, Schelling consciously turns his back on both academically philosophical 
writing and its readership. His statement, “Der Naturforscher gehört aufs Land. Ich habe 
von der Physik der Bauern mehr gelernt als von der in den Hörsälen der Gelehrten. 
Beobachtung bleibt das Größte” [“the natural scientist belongs in the country. I have 
learned more about physics from the farmers than from the academics’ lecture hall”] is 
not only valid for the discipline of physics. It should be seen as a general approach to 
any endeavor that is meant to further our knowledge.242 Setting the stage for Clara’s 
later discussions on the immortality of the soul in such a dramatic way enables everyone 
to participate in science and philosophy. At the same time, Clara’s introduction, as 
gloomy as it is, is also equally meticulously structured. It foreshadows all major points 
of Schelling’s philosophy that Clara elaborates in its wake. The gloomy setting of the 
introduction exemplifies Schelling’s belief that customizing one’s philosophical work to 
the needs and requirements of the broadest possible audience will not decrease the 
quality or the importance of this work. On the contrary, since engaging with and 
observing the cycles and rhythms of normal life yields more benefits to our thought than 
holding or attending scientific lectures, it appears almost natural for Schelling to use his 
lay audience as a source and a target at the same time. 
 
 Following the Circles of Life—Clara’s Structural Frame 
   With regard to the chapter distribution, Schelling follows the rhythms and 
cycles he observes in nature, and he does not grow tired of stressing their importance.  
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Though Clara is a fragment, the chapters we have imply that they follow the course of 
the seasons, beginning in late fall and ending in the spring. This plays with the notion of 
an inversion: Clara’s story begins at a time when many of nature’s cycles come to an 
end, and ends at the threshold of a new beginning. By inverting this rhythm, Schelling 
emphasizes the urgency for traditional views to die in order for new and more productive 
ones to come to life. Accordingly, Clara’s course takes the readers through the fall, the 
winter, and the spring season. The force that enables Clara to venture a new beginning is 
the force of her dreams and imagination that weaves itself throughout the narrative and 
is brought face to face with a meticulously reasoned structure. Apart from the strict 
chapter division, Clara reveals a detailed table of contents preceding each of the 
chapters and giving thus an outlook but also a guideline with the most important 
keywords for the readers. This rigorous structure appears to be at odds with the motifs of 
the narrative. The descriptions of the seemingly limitless possibilities in the beyond, as 
well as the actual chance of experiencing this infinity in dreams, generate a stark 
contrast. This contrast is not the attempt to impose structure and order on unknown 
forces that many of Schelling’s contemporaries feared.243 Rather, this chosen structure 
suggests that these untamed forces all fall within the scope of the same physical laws as 
the rest of the world. The rhythm and inclusive nature of natural laws occurs regardless 
of whether we are aware of it or not, yet it is Schelling’s premise to admonish everyone 
                                                 
243See for example Laura Otis “Sciences of the Mind” in Literature and Science in the Nineteenth 
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could be controlled against their wills, the public feared being manipulated by magnetic figures.” Though 
mesmerism is but one element of the large discourse on unconscious forces, of which imagination is a 
part, it clearly shows the reservation and fear that accompanied this discourse at that time.  
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to sharpen this awareness. By following the course of the seasons, the text suggests that 
the feared forces—be they called imagination, the unconscious, or animal magnetism—
are as much embedded in nature as everything else and for that reason can and should be 
equally explored and made use of. The better we study this world (Natur), the better we 
will be prepared for the one to follow (Geisterwelt). Furthermore, through the thorough 
knowledge of this world as well as the many parallels that connect the physical with the 
spiritual world, it becomes possible to connect these two worlds and enjoy the best of 
both. The characteristic of a successful connection is a balanced and clear mind. 
Problems of any kind have a minimum impact due to this newly gained balance and 
clarity. 
 There is further indication that Clara’s chapter division also makes a reference to 
its content. The narrative begins with the heroine Clara in an emotionally and financially 
desolate situation. For a large part of the narrative Clara stays at a nunnery, isolating 
herself deliberately from the outside world and breeding over her problems. The 
narrator’s descriptions of Clara and her situation further imply that she struggles with 
melancholy, if not to say depression. The progress of Clara’s depression is analogous to 
the course of the chapters. At the beginning, that is, in the fall, Clara is just as gloomy as 
her surroundings. It is All Saints’ Day, and the narrator (at this point the physician) 
works his narrative through layers of gloomy cemetery imagery, and silently mourning 
bereaved to finally zone in on Clara. In analogy to the descriptions of the surroundings, 
Clara too is mourning silently, finding herself as “eine Seele auf der Suche nach Klarheit 
über die letzten Dinge” [“a soul in search for the meaning of last things”].244 As I will 
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demonstrate in the course of this chapter, Clara’s emotional misery cannot be resolved 
until she fully embraces the curative force of her dreams and imagination to make use of 
them to venture a look into the spiritual world, the world that bears all the answers she 
needs. For now however, it is important to emphasize that Clara’s disorientation and 
desperation, but also the beginning of the convalescing process coincide in the winter 
chapter. Being the middle chapter, it does not come as a surprise that these two opposing 
development overlap at this point, as it is both the middle of the narrative but also the 
season of the death of nature but also the budding beginnings of the spring.  The further 
the conversations between Clara, the physician, and the priest, take all three characters 
into the exploration of the immortality of the soul, the better Clara’s disposition 
becomes. Analogously, the more she is aware of how imbalanced her life has been thus 
far, and the more she learns about the therapeutic effects of dreams, for example, the 
healthier and happier she becomes. At the end of the narrative, we find Clara for the first 
time not confined within the walls of the nunnery. She steps out of the physical and 
psychological confinement and is now on the move. The last chapter takes place during a 
walk in springtime, and the interlocutors express their contentment with the achieved 
status quo, and with the prospect of reaching even higher levels of personal growth. The 
absence of a chapter devoted to the summer is certainly unfortunate, yet the last sentence 
of the spring already alludes to what the summer could bring, namely “ein Wesen…, das 
bestimmt scheint, in sich die äußeren Enden des Daseins, wie Gott, zu vereinigen... ” 
[“an essence that, like God, seems destined to unite the extreme ends of existence in 
itself”].245 What the summer brings is the fulfilling of the cycle and a rich harvest: the 
achievement of the highest possible quality of life. 
                                                 
245Clara 185. 
 195
 Last but not least, the gloomy melancholy beginning is to be regarded as a 
contrast to the bright and elated ending. In a comparison to the Clara whom the readers 
meet at the beginning of the narrative, the woman they encounter in the last chapter must 
strike them as an entirely different character altogether. In the process of her 
conversations with the priest and the physician, and at the same time, her own 
experiencing of the creative force of dreams and reveries, Clara is now free of the 
confinement that surrounded her at the beginning of her story. The last chapter takes 
place during a walk alongside a lake and foregrounds thus that Clara has left the 
confining walls of the monastery. In other words, she has traded stasis for mobility and 
is now moving forward not only literally but also intellectually and emotionally. The 
depressing months of the fall and the winter season appear far behind her, as the readers 
witness now a Clara who is emotionally stable and looking forward to a new future. At 
the same time, she is also a conversation partner who is equal to the priest and the 
physician. All the pieces of advice they had given her in addition to the experience she 
embraced in her dreams bring her closer to Schelling’s aspired aim of achieving clarity 
of the mind and the soul. This clarity is only attainable with the help of the creative 
force of dreams and imagination. Exactly those forces which are traditionally allotted to 
the realm of the unconscious serve in Clara’s case as instruments bringing light and 
knowledge to states of ignorance. Schelling represents the contrast between the state of 
(personal) enlightenment or cognitive clarity and that of the opaque and meandrous 
unconscious in the opposition of the dark and gloomy fall and the bright and lively 
spring. 
 
Communicating Philosophy—Clarity of Language in Clara 
 At the very beginning of the spring chapter, Clara picks up a “philosophisches 
Buch” and remarks: 
Warum ist es doch unmöglich, dass die jetzt Philosophierenden nicht so 
schreiben, wie sie zum Teil wenigstens sprechen können? Sind denn diese 
erschrecklichen Kunstworte durchaus notwendig, lässt sich dasselbe gar nicht auf 
allgemein menschliche Weise sagen, und muss ein Buch ganz ungenießbar sein, 
damit es philosophisch sei? (150) 
 
 [Why do today’s philosophers find it so impossible to write at least a little in the 
same way that they speak? Are these terribly artificial words absolutely 
necessary, can’t the same thing be said in a more natural way, and does a book 
have to quite unenjoyable for it to be philosophical?] 
  
Though Clara’s question does not occur until the last chapter, it is central to the entire 
text. Scholars believe this remark to be a reference to Hegel’s Phänomenologie des 
Geistes and thus a “Versicherung, daß Probleme der Philosophie durch eine falsche, 
mithin künstliche Verwendung der Sprache entstehen und das alles was sich sagen läßt, 
auch einfach sagen läßt” [reassurance that [philosophical issues come into existence 
through a wrong, at times even artificial use of language, and that everything that can be 
said can be done so in a simple way”].246 But Clara’s question also brings up a point that 
lies not only at the heart of Schelling’s intervention in Clara, but more importantly that 
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criticizes scientific and philosophical discourses in general, and to an equal extent. As 
this dissertation shows, the communicability of philosophy and science preoccupied 
Moritz, Goethe, and Kleist in equal measure. Each of these authors found his own way 
of dealing with this problem. Yet none of them addressed this issue in such a direct way 
as Schelling in Clara. For after announcing in the first chapter that he learned more from 
farmers than scholars, the narrating physician moves on to state in the third: 
 
Das Tiefe verhält sich, wie sein scheinbares Gegenteil, das Erhabene, das, wenn 
es in die schlichtesten Worte, die auch Arbeits- und Handwerksleuten nicht 
unverständlich sind, gekleidet wird, desto größere Wirkung macht. Die Sprache 
des Volks ist wie von Ewigkeit her; die Kunstsprache der Schulen ist von gestern. 
(151) 
 
[Depth behaves like what appears to be its opposite, the sublime, in that it has all 
the greater effect if it is closed in the simplest words that even working people 
and craftsmen can understand. The language of the people is as if it were from 
eternity; the artificial language of the schools is that of yesterday.] 
 
The obvious criticism Schelling formulates here surpasses that of Moritz’s with regard 
to how direct and radical it is. Schelling’s call for a rejection of the entire etiquette and 
traditions leaves no doubt that lay people are not to be included in the scientific or 
philosophical community, but rather followed and studied. It is in the traditions of 
common people that philosophy can find a way of expression and communication in a 
meaningful and sustainable way.  
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Venturing a look at Clara, it quickly becomes clear what Schelling means and 
that he is serious about his criticism. Clara’s language is that of quotidian conversation. 
Schelling chooses the genre of a dialogue between three characters of various 
backgrounds. As becomes clear, all three characters maintain a great interest in the 
pursuit of knowledge in a number of disciplines ranging from medicine to theology, to 
philosophy, and finally art. The circumstances that bring them together, though, make it 
impossible to engage in a dialogue using technical terminology or academic jargon. The 
circumstances, namely, Clara’s grief over her late husband, are too personal and 
intimate. Further, Clara is not a case that should be examined like a fossil, but a friend 
whom both the physician and the priest seek out to console rather than lecture to. With 
respect to the quality of language, a look at Schelling’s earlier dialogue Bruno (1800) 
proves interesting. There, four men gather to discuss mysticism and metaphysics. This 
discussion constitutes the sole reason for their gathering and as the reader learns at the 
very beginning, this dialogue is only one in a succession of many.247 The language the 
men use to converse, however, though not inaccessibly scientific appears artificial.248 
Clara was not written until presumably 1810 and the span of this decade evidently 
reveals a development away from a language that still sounds antiquated and artificial, 
clearly trying to emulate that of Plato’s dialogues.249 The striking difference in word 
choice and structure in Bruno and Clara proves graphically that Schelling indeed 
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intentionally chose this very conversational, almost colloquial style. Thus, it also proves 
that Clara is much more than an attempt “hier nichts anderes zu zeigen, als dass es ein 
Leben nach dem Tod gibt und wie wir uns dieses vorzustellen haben” [to show nothing 
else than there is life after death and how we are to imagine it”].250 There can be no 
doubt about that the choice of Clara’s characters and setting was made deliberately in 
order to facilitate and showcase a casual yet fruitful engagement with philosophy. In 
other words, instead of formulating this appeal in lectures or essays, for example, 
Schelling puts the demands he makes on his fellow philosophers right into action in 
Clara.   
In this manner, Schelling foregoes the necessity of explaining his reasoning to his 
contemporaries and thus complicating this matter even more, making more aloof and 
less applicable to those Schelling tried to reach. On the one hand, the clarity of language 
contributes greatly to the general accessibility and popularity of this text. Yet on the 
other, the same clarity generates an additional benefit: it enables its readers to delve into 
the world of philosophy without hesitation and engage in conversation similar to those 
Clara showcases. Through the process of initial imitation the true experience cannot be 
missed, and emulation becomes the creation of one’s own experiences and ideas. 
 
Clara’s Character Constellation 
 In addition to a specifically targeted chronology and language, Clara’s triangular 
character constellation makes a significant contribution to Schelling’s cause. The men of 
this narrative represent the two opposing sides of (natural) sciences and spirituality. It 
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never becomes clear in the course of Clara how well the three characters had been 
acquainted before the death of Clara’s husband. The readers chime in at a moment when 
both men unite their forces in order to help Clara overcome her malaise. Throughout 
most of the first half of their conversation, Clara is a character who sporadically 
participates in the conversation, yet generally appears to be passively absorbing the 
opinions and ideas the two other characters elaborate on extensively. Her function 
aggregates to asking comprehension questions, which trigger more and even clearer 
explanations on the side of the physician and the priest. Clara serves here in the role of a 
student who needs instruction, which she receives plenty of. This instruction, however, 
is not restricted to her passive intake of information. On the contrary, the further the 
conversation progresses the more obvious it becomes that the physician’s and the 
priest’s intention is not to indoctrinate Clara to obediently follow their lectures, but 
rather to step out of this stereotype and embark on a quest for knowledge and resolution 
on her own. After her passive absorption in the first chapter, Clara undergoes a stunning 
change from the role of an instructed student to an equal partner in the dialogue on the 
most pressing issues in Schelling’s philosophy.   
 Despite her initial passivity and with regard to the character constellation, Clara 
plays a central role in this narrative. Rather than a mere canvas for the expression of the 
discourses on science and spirituality, Clara functions as the middle ground which 
Schelling describes as a “Vereinigungspunkt beider Welten” [“turning point between the 
two worlds”] and Hans Dieter Huber as “die Schnittstelle der Fantasie” [“intersection of 
fantasy”].251 After all, it is Clara who is the sole reason for the coming together of the 
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two opposing camps of science and religion. Because she pays so close attention to the 
initial conversation, Clara soon is able to put into practice what she learns in the 
conversations and experience the benefits herself. The engagement with scientific and 
spiritual aspects of the soul enlightens and intrigues Clara with regard to how to provide 
the right care for her soul.252 The further the discussions progress and the more Clara is 
able to learn, the more independent a thinker she becomes because she, consciously or 
not, puts the theories into practice. The readers can thus partake not only in the 
theoretical discussion, but also in tits very concrete application and usefulness. The 
danger to simply emulate, instead of originally create, is something the narrators are 
aware of, yet not threatened by. As Clara demonstrates, the methods that bring about a 
remedy for her do not allow for a dull imitation for the main instrument is the creative 
faculty of dreams and imagination. Thus, embarking on a journey through the landscapes 
of our creative imagination is the only point of imitation for the readers. Once this 
journey has begun, it becomes an entirely individual experience, which by default cannot 
be imitated. The overlap of the two sides represented by the male characters in 
Schelling’s narrative induces Clara to create her own new world “die der Größe ihrer 
Empfindungen angemessen ist” [suited to the measure of her feelings”].253 In other 
words, the world that everyone can create through his or her imaginative faculties 
accommodates all of one’s emotional needs and desires.  
  Apart from the fact that Clara is the only character that is able to unite both 
extremes, she is also the only female character. With regard to the title, Arsenij Gulyga 
                                                 
252Engrossing into the dreams is a constitutive element of this soul care, for example. 
 
253Clara 69. 
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argues that Schelling’s use of the name Clara as a title is reminiscent of his late wife 
Caroline, whereas Grau contends that it is not his wife Caroline whom Schelling alludes 
to, but rather Clare of Assisi, the founder of the Order of the Poor Ladies, also known as 
the Poor Clares.254 While both contentions appear reasonable, choosing this particular 
title for his narrative was more than homage to a historical person. Naming his novel 
after a woman who is also the main character performs for Schelling’s purposes a double 
service.  On the one hand, a heroine may attract female readers and gain a larger 
audience that way. On the other hand, this decision evidently alludes to popular novels 
such as Die Geschichte des Fräuleins von Sternheim (1771), whose eponymous heroine 
serves as a model of virtue and morality for her (female) readers. To be sure, Schelling’s 
Clara need not to be interpreted as a sentimental heroine. Yet Schelling playfully alludes 
to the popularity and clichés of that genre for these two reasons. By organizing his 
narrative around a heroine, Schelling creates yet another role model for readers, 
targeting female readership. At the same time, Schelling reinvents the roles his heroine 
embodies entirely. Instead of rehearsing a sentimental story of a woman victimized by 
fate and saved by her virtues such as was the case in Die Geschichte des Fräuleins von 
Sternheim, Schelling portrays a woman who will not be victimized by her ill fate.  In 
contrast to a traditional sentimental heroine suffering through her ordeal, Clara embraces 
the chance of becoming an independent agent. In long conversations and through many 
dreams, Clara not only attains equal rights in the character triangle, but also surpasses 
the two other members, as she is the one who manages to strike the balance between the 
physical (Natur) and the spirit world (Geisterwelt). Clara refers thus neither to 
                                                 
254Arsenij Gulyga, Schelling. Leben und Werk, (München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1989) cited in 
Alexander Grau, “Clara. Über Schellings gleichnamiges Fragment” in Zeitschrift für philosophische 
Forschung, vol. 51/4 (1997) 598. 
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Schelling’s wife Caroline nor to Clare of Assisi, but rather to state of clarity that, 
according to Schelling, is the ultimate goal we are to strive for in our life.    
 
Schelling’s Spiritual New World  
 Creating a new world that can provide the sought after clarity requires two 
simultaneous steps: the thorough study of nature, by which Schelling means the physical 
world, and a perpetual confrontation with the dimensions invoked and accessed in 
dreams. Though the importance and special meaning of dreams in Clara will be 
discussed in detailed later in this chapter, it is important to point out that in analogy to 
the previous chapters, dreams here function as a mutual language that the faculty of 
imagination produces and the dreamer can understand. Thus this new world can only be 
conceived and created by the means of the creative imagination. It is the imagination 
that creates the images that we see and, particularly in Schelling, feel during the nightly 
dreams. Even though as Huber points out, Schelling acknowledges the significance of 
the receptive imagination, in Clara he evidently valorizes the active and productive 
imagination.255 When it comes to the beneficial effects of imagination, Clara does not 
leave much room for its strictly reproductive function. Creative imagination is for 
Schelling “eine Tätigkeit des lebenden Organismus …, die von innen nach außen wirke” 
[an activity of the living organism … that works itself from the inside to the outside”].256 
Simultaneously, it is also the “äußere Natur, [die] ständig gegen die Tätigkeit der 
                                                 
255Huber 58-60. “Es gibt eine Geistestätigkeit oder kognitive Funktion, welche diese wechselseitige 
Verknüpfung von Rezeptivität und produktiver Tätigkeit steuert und kontrolliert; und zwar die Phantasie. 
Sie ist die zentrale Schnittstelle zwischen Innen und Außen, zwischen Rezeptivität und Produktivität 
zwischen passivem Erleiden und aktivem Handeln.” 
 
256F.W.J. Schelling, Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft 1990) 70 cited in Huber 24. 
 
 204
menschlichen Produktivität kämpft” [external nature that constantly strives against the 
activity of human productivity”].257 Thus, in order to consolidate its position, the 
creative imagination resorts to the powerful language of dreams because it is there that 
this faculty can evoke a persuasive mental imagery. Each dream, but also the sum of 
these dreams generates an entirely different world. This newly generated world 
influences the physical reality by curing poor health, for example, or furthering the 
dreamer’s knowledge.  
The faculty that facilitates such a creative act lies dormant in everyone; the term 
Schelling uses here is “manches bewußtlos … Schlummernde” [something 
unconsciously sleeping”].258 Clara serves here as a character representative for an 
indiscriminate number of others. In addition, the conscious dialogue with the imagery 
world that the creative imagination evokes is quintessential. According to Schelling, its 
negligence has two possible consequences, both of which are negative. First, without a 
prior exposure to and an exchange with the creative forces one may simply be not ready 
for making certain discoveries because, as I suggest, it will be impossible to 
intellectually discern these discoveries once we see them.259 The ability to perceive is in 
this case built upon the structures of creativity rather than logical reasoning and 
deduction. Thus, the inability to comprehend one’s own creative imagination reduces the 
scope of the (intellectual) vision because one repeatedly perceives things already known. 
Furthermore, speaking the language of the creative imagination means understanding the 
                                                 
257Huber 26-27. 
 
258Clara 69. 
259The term discovery does not refer to solely great discoveries in the fashion of Isaac Newton or 
Nicolaus Copernicus. While it does not exclude such grand discoveries, it certainly includes those of a 
considerably smaller scale that everyone makes during their learning process.  
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imagery that this faculty draws up. This imagery is not only of visual nature, but also 
emotional and cognitive. Being fluent in this communicative method ensures that even 
those contents can be communicated that do not have a name yet because they are utterly 
novel. Again, this does not relate to grand discoveries, but to each and everyone’s 
individual learning processes.  
The second consequence is that our physical and mental health will not be strong 
enough to develop further in any respect. A rejection of the creative faculties equals a 
“gehemmte Entwicklung,” [“inhibited development”] and has “schrecklichen Folgen auf 
den menschlichen Körper” [“terrific consequences for the human body”].260 For 
Schelling, mental but also physical disease comes into being due to “Verdrossenheit zur 
Entwicklung [und] daher, dass die einzelne Kraft nicht mit dem Ganzen fort will, nicht 
dem Ganzen ersterben, sondern eigenwillig für sich selbst zu sein” [“churlishness toward 
development, other than the individual strength not wanting to continue with the whole, 
not wanting to die away with the whole, but obstinately wanting to be for itself”].261 By 
acknowledging the drive towards a perpetual developing, an individual reunites with 
nature. The reconciliation between an individual and the natural forces was already 
evident in my analysis of Kleist’s work. Yet for Schelling this reconciliation has a much 
more radical and urgent character. Schelling’s vision of this reconciliation exceeds the 
                                                 
260Clara 75. “Wer es je mit Augen gesehen hat, welche schrecklichen Folgen auf den menschlichen 
Körper eine gehemmte Entwicklung hat, nach welcher die Natur mit Heftigkeit verlangt, wie die durch 
ungeschickten Eingriff aufgehaltene oder durch bereits vorhandene Entkräftung möglich gewordene 
Krisis in der Krankheit unmittelbar das Zurücksinken der Kräfte in Todesschwäche und unfehlbar den 
Tod verursacht: Der wird sich einen ungefähren Begriff machen können von den zerstörenden 
Wirkungen, welche die durch den Menschen plötzlich eingetretene Hemmung ihrer Evolution auf die 
ganze Natur haben musste.” 
 
261Clara 80. 
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scope of solely acknowledging all sides of one’s own nature or making use of natural 
laws and forces. Though nature is the opposite of the spiritual world and thus the 
opposite of the ultimate, aspired ideal, it has to be studied and observed with greatest 
care and insight.262 “Der Mensch ist ein Vereinigungspunkt beider Welten,” as Schelling 
writes, and thus the equally thorough knowledge of both parts is quintessential for the 
ability to reach out into the spiritual world.263 Further we learn that  
 
Wer das Leben der Natur nicht im Großen und Ganzen beständig sieht, lernt ihre 
Sprache im Einzelnen und Kleinen nicht verstehen, er weiß nicht, in welchem 
Grad es wahr ist, dass der menschliche Körper eine kleine Natur in der großen ist, 
die unglaublich viel Analogien und Verbindungen mit ihr hat, an die kein Mensch 
denken würde, wenn nicht Beobachtung und Gebrauch sie uns gelehrt hätte. (67) 
 
[Whosoever does not see natural life as a whole, ho doesn’t come to understands 
its language in its very details, also does not know the extent to which the human 
body is itself truly a smaller nature within a larger one, a smaller nature that had 
unbelievable many analogies and links to the larger—links that no one would 
think to exist had observation and application not taught us that it is so.] 
 
Studying nature, that is the manifest and physical side, is constitutive of understanding 
the spiritual world, too. By understanding the human body, for example, we can draw 
parallels and analogies to patterns and laws on a greater scale. Moreover, since the 
spiritual world is a part of nature in equal measure, the drawn conclusions will not only 
                                                 
262Clara 74.  “Der Natur setzen wir doch die Geisterwelt entgegen.” 
 
263Clara 74.  
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facilitate new insights with regard to the physical world, but also an unlimited contact 
with the spiritual one. The bliss the other world has to offer is “das höchste durch kein 
Erwachen unterbrochene Hellsehen” [“the highest clairvoyance uninterrupted by a 
waking up”] and annihilates the efforts for knowledge and insight as it will all be 
granted naturally in the other world.264 The other-worldly cognition that we can 
experience in transition states helps us restore bliss and blessedness in our physical lives 
on earth. Further, since we are given the opportunity to understand certain things in our 
lives or see them from a different perspective, it facilitates a smoother interaction with 
the physical/material world. In the end, this alleviation in neighborly relations helps 
eliminate ego(t)ism and enhance altruism.   
 
 
Getting Smart and Healthy: The Importance of Dreams 
 While Schelling shares his call for a positive revalorization of altered states of 
consciousness with a number of his contemporaries, his particular attention for the 
socalled hypnopompic and hypnagogic dreams is rather unique. These states refer 
respectively to the state of consciousness leading out of the sleep or the onset of sleep. 
Sleep science today also pays particular attention to both of these states understanding 
them to be similar, yet not identical. The state of consciousness leading dreamers out of 
their slumber into the waking consciousness is generally associated with the attempts of 
coming to terms with all sorts of experiences in a rational way, while the state of 
consciousness leading from the waking life into the sleep stands for the emotional 
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aspects of coming to terms with the same experiences.265 As Clara shows, the brief 
moments transitioning the waking consciousness from one state to the other are of 
utmost significance. They not only bridge two states of consciousness, but moreover, 
they link the two levels of existence Schelling’s Clara is so concerned with: the physical 
dimension as well as the spiritual one. The connection between these two dimensions is 
frail as it only lasts for a blink of an eye before the dreamer either wakes up, or 
transitions into another phase of the sleep. More striking however is the fact that these 
brief moments of transitioning are accompanied by the most vivid dreams. The term 
vivid is for Schelling not stringently related to opulent visual effects, but can be 
cognitively or emotionally intensive and enlightening, too. Thus, in his work Schelling 
foreshadows significant aspects of cognitive science, many of which had not been 
discovered until recently.266 The moment of being suspended from the dominance of 
traditional consciousness is in Clara the moment that the spiritual and physical 
dimensions intersect. According to Schelling, the cognition gained in either 
hypnopompic or hypnagogic states is never to be equated with a regular dream.267 
Usually reserved for the afterlife, the dreamer now receives the chance to cast a glance 
into the spiritual dimension to see, feel, and experience it individually. The already 
mentioned “höchste durch kein Erwachen unterbrochene Hellsehen” that every 
transitioning dreamer can experience is supplemented by a “Klarheit [, die] sogar die 
                                                 
265For more detailed information on the neurological aspects of these states of consciousness see T.J. 
Balkin, A.R. Braun, et al., "The process of awakening: A PET study of regional brain activity patterns 
mediating the reestablishment of alertness and consciousness," Brain, vol. 125, 2002, 2308–19.  
 
266Michelle Maiese, Embodiment, Emotion, and Cognition. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive 
Science (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
 
267Clara 119. “Von allem, was Traum heißt, sei dieser Zustand unterschieden...“ 
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lebhaftesten Vorstellungen beim Wachen weit übertreffe, und jede gewöhnliche Art zu 
existieren gegen diese nur Traum, Schlummer, Tod zu sein scheine” [clarity [that] 
surpasses even the most vivid waking thoughts and any normal mode of existing seems 
to be only a dream, a slumbering, or a death by comparison”].268 The encounter with the 
spiritual dimension is vehemently vivid and leaves an impression behind which makes it 
impossible to doubt the existences of this dimension. In fact, its vividness makes the 
physical life seem bland and pale, and the comparison to death implies that it is the 
spiritual dimension where life can be lived and experienced in full force.   
 Though such vivid visions may be alluring for the sake of an aesthetic 
experience, the actual motivation for seeking such an experience reaches further than the 
inspiring surface. For art historian Hans Dieter Huber the “Phantasie ist die 
Schaltzentrale, das switchboard oder Relais, in dem ein Abgleich zwischen den von der 
Außenwelt kommenden Irritationen und der inneren, produktiven Eigenaktivität des 
Beobachters stattfindet” [“fantasy is the control center, the switchboard or relay, in 
which the comparison and tuning between the external irritations and the internal 
creative autochthonous activity takes place”].269 Indeed, the idea of an overlap or 
intersection of two opposite states of consciousness is not far from Huber’s idea of the 
fantasy as a switchboard. For Huber as well as Schelling this state is the coming together 
of two seemingly opposing states of consciousness. For Huber these two states are 
tantamount to the external world with all its stimuli and the internal activity of the 
person affected. The intersection of these two states is according to Huber central 
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because it is at this very “Schnittstellen…an denen die produktive Phantasie eines 
Betrachters aktiv wird” [“point of intersection … where the productive fantasy of a 
beholder becomes active”].270 In other world, this intersection generates productivity and 
creativity, or “Rezeptivität und Produktivität” [“receptivity and productivity”], a 
reciprocal relationship “zwischen passivem Erleiden und aktivem Handeln” [“between 
the passive bearing and active acting”]—concepts he borrows from Schelling’s “Erster 
Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie.”271 Furthermore, for Huber, imagination 
fulfills a cognitive-emotional function, which facilitates a synthesis of external as well 
as internal factors. It is the synthesis process that is responsible for the creation of 
mental images that can later be experienced in dreams, visions, or daydreams.  
 Another reason why Clara’s three characters discuss these visions is Clara’s 
health. Mourning her husband’s death and finding herself in a desolate financial 
situation, Clara oscillates between bittersweet melancholy and a far-reaching depression. 
The physician and the priest initiate the discussion on the immortality of the soul and the 
positive effects of dreams only in order to show Clara a way to cure her emotional and 
financial woes. Delving into the intersection of waking and sleeping is a crucial 
instrument in improving one’s situation, or more specifically the understanding of one’s 
situation, which then triggers the improvement. For once in the transition state “[wird 
man] dann in ganz neue Gesichtspunkte versetzt, in eine Art bilderlosen Anschauens, 
worin doch alles aufs Genaueste unterschieden und durchaus ohne Verwirrung sei” 
[“transposed into a completely different point of view, into a kind of watching without 
                                                 
270Huber 98-90. 
 
271Quoted in Huber 334. 
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pictures, wherein everything is nevertheless differentiated in detail and is completely 
without confusion”].272 In Clara’s case this means that the immediate and unadorned 
comprehension that she gains in this particular kind of dream unveils the reasons as well 
as the cure for her salutary and financial problems. The physical and psychological 
healing process that Clara subsequently undergoes is almost an automatic byproduct of 
the enhanced knowledge she has access to. This positive effect works in favor of Clara 
health, but is only one possible way of manifestation. Since the gained cognition is all-
encompassing basically any situation can be improved because the sources of a problem 
and the adequate remedies are now available. The statement “bilderloses Anschauen” 
[“watching without pictures”] additionally eliminates the danger of misinterpreting a 
dream opulent in imagery. In contrast, he lays the emphasis on the simplicity of the 
dream experienced that makes it unmistakably clear and transparent.  
Like many scholars, Ffytche sees the connection between the conscious 
dimension and the dreaming spiritual dimension in Schelling’s works as the “the notion 
of an internal mental division and a dialogue between a conscious and an unconscious 
self; the sense of concealed or repressed aspects of one’s moral nature.”273 Ffytche’s 
psychoanalytic reading of Schelling’s work is compelling, but it disregards the fact that 
Schelling’s cause is not to establish or even reprimand the existence of the unconscious. 
Its importance lies instead in its focus on the opposite, namely on consciousness and 
how we can perpetually enhance it. For all its merits, Ffytche’s integration of the 
unconscious into this equation reduces Clara’s message to the discourse of 
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psychoanalysis. In contrast to Ffytche, I argue that the way Schelling utilizes dreams in 
Clara preempts the need of interpretation of these dreams because there is no distinction 
between latent or manifest content, hence, there is no need of mediation between the 
depicted content and the one intended. Furthermore, Ffytche’s interpretation disregards 
the fact that psychoanalytic discourse is only one of many embedded in Schelling’s text. 
The opposing realm is not the unconscious, as this concept is too restricting to what 
Schelling had in mind while writing this dialogue, and, more importantly it introduced a 
state of mind that the conscious-unconscious binary in its strict sense does not include. 
Technically speaking, it is even difficult to understand the communication as a dialogue 
because neither words nor images come into play. As Clara herself notices what is 
particular to the transitory state of consciousness is that none of the usual 
communicative tools are necessary for the knowledge to be conveyed. The mere 
exposure to this dimension is sufficient to trigger an instant cognition. Those affected 
need no language or vision because the cognition does not necessitate a medium. What is 
then experienced is the clarity of knowledge, and even though no physical senses of 
perception are involved in this process there is no room for mistakes and confusion. 
Thus, it constitutes a unique model of the human consciousness as it reaches beyond the 
limits of psychology, into those of today’s cognitive science. 
Both Huber’s description of the nature of creative imagination as well as 
Ffytche’s tracing the advent of the unconscious, indeed lay out what Clara appears to 
suggest, but do not trace it deep enough. Huber’s exploration of the benefits of the 
creative imagination on the expression of art is a valid reading, but neglects countless 
other discourses that are also positively influenced by the deliberate use of this faculty. 
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Analogously, Ffytche correctly observes the significance of psychological processes in 
Schelling’s paradigm, but again disregards most other discourses that intersect here. 
Acknowledging the plethora of discourses that intersect in Clara’s conversations is 
pivotal because only due to this multiplicity the all-encompassing cognition arises. 
Indeed, without the inclusion of a multitude of various discourses Schelling’s envisioned 
unmediated cognition is impossible. Leaving the intersection discourses out of the 
interpretation produces a lopsided interpretation of Schelling’s work.   
 
Moritz, Goethe, Kleist, and Schelling—Common Grounds and New Horizons 
As my analysis of Clara shows, approaching this text as a piece of literature and 
not solely a philosophical treatise brings a more nuanced understanding of the 
intervention Schelling set out to make writing this narrative. Thus, his work Clara can 
be aligned with the literary works of the authors discussed in previous chapters of this 
dissertation.  By struggling for a way and a medium to convey philosophical and 
scientific concepts in an accessible way is a task Schelling shares with Moritz, Goethe, 
and Kleist. Yet, though Schelling revisits many of the phenomena and motifs already 
examined in the previous chapters of this dissertation, he nonetheless does so in a unique 
way. The most distinct feature in Schelling’s Clara is the belief in an actual spiritual 
beyond that we can access through our dreams, gaining thus not only access to an 
entirely new dimension of existence, but also to an infinite archive of knowledge. It is a 
place where “die Befreiung der inneren Lebensgestalt von der äußeren, die sie 
unterdrückt hält” takes place [“the release of the inner form of life from the external one 
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that keeps it suppressed”].274 Thus the soul, which is the glue between the spirit and the 
body, “das einigende Bewusstsein von Geist und Leib” [“the uniting state of the spirit 
and the body”] is liberated from the corporeal and spiritual habits and restrictions.275  
The act of liberating of the innere Lebensgestalt from the oppression of the 
physical world is something we have already encountered in the examination of 
Goethe’s “Bekenntnisse einer schönen Seele.” In parallel to the eponymous beautiful 
soul, whose daydreaming served the purpose of getting closer to the ideal and improving 
thus her own existence in the physical world, Clara presents the post-mortal dwelling in 
a purely spiritual existence as a motivation for the suffering and hardships experienced 
during the physical lifetime.  The quality of this experience depends on the way of life 
the particular individual leads during his or her lifetime in the physical world. For 
instance, the liberation from the material world and its things would prove to be “eine 
Qual” [“a pain”] for those who “mit äußeren Dingen verkehrt haben, und ganz von der 
Sinnlichkeit äußeren Wesens verzaubert waren” [“had always been associated with the 
body … and thus with external things, too, and who’d been completely bewitched by the 
sensuousness of external objects”].276 According to the priest, these external things 
represent this-worldly goods and pleasures as well as this-worldly norms and standards, 
and are appreciated by those who silenced “das Göttliche in sich.” [the divine within 
them”].277 On the other hand, those who spent their physical lives “rein und befreit von 
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der Liebe zu dem Irdischen” [“pure and free from the love for earthly matters”] find 
themselves in the place of their dreams. The better the conduct on earth, the faster the 
soul can be “losgesprochen und in den obersten Ort gelangen” [released and reach for 
the heightened condition”].278 What requires clarification that Clara does not qualify 
good conduct by any traditionally virtuous life, but rather by a perpetual seeking out of 
contact to the spiritual world and therefore a perpetual use of the imagination. 
Accordingly, the higher the place the greater the degree of bliss (Seligkeit) and what is 
also implied, the lower the level of consciousness.279 Despite the fact that this literal 
self-lessness is the ultimate culmination of our efforts for Seligkeit and Heilserfahrung, 
it should be the goal for all who strive for this bliss in this earthly and physical life 
already. The physical body is in both Goethe’s “Bekenntnisse einer schönen Seele” and 
Schelling’s Clara, first, a surface which receives the imprint of the external world, and 
second, a medium which through physiological processes pass on these imprints into the 
human mind or the human soul. Yet, in contrast to Goethe, who only insinuates that the 
criticism of the said “fremde Formen” could also relate to the socio-cultural system of 
values, Schelling makes this point very clear. During one the walks, the physician 
observes that  
 
“Er [der Deutsche] muss fremde Normen sich aufzwingen lassen, weil die, 
welche es wohl ändern könnten, so selten das Herz haben, eigentümlich in ihren 
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Anstalten zu sein—denn was würde der Nachbar dazu sagen, wenn man die 
Deutschen als Deutsche behandeln wollte!” (64) 
 
[The Germans have to have foreign standards forced on them, because those who 
could change this situation so seldom have the heart to be as they truly are—for 
what would the neighbors say if one wanted to treat the Germans as German!] 
 
Using the words German and neighbor, “Deutscher” and “Nachbar” respectively, the 
physician extends the mind-body discourse from the level of an individual to that of a 
society, and even further to that of an entire nation. As is already established, by 
inhibiting the individual, the criticized alien norms, “fremde Normen,” reach out into 
larger circles such as the society and the nation, and this implies thus that a grand nation 
cannot be based on individuals who are limited in their functions. In that light, alien 
norms are in analogy to alien forms. That is to say, in the same manner as the physical 
body limits our spiritual side and attempts to tame our soul, so too do socio-political 
norms violate our very nature.280  
 Another intersection of Clara and “The Beautiful Soul” is evident in the matter 
of personal development and Bildung, in both its educational and spiritual respect. In 
Clara, the prospect of a rewarding afterlife appears to be the main driving force for a 
virtuous and introspective life aside from material and physical fanciness. As such, it 
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und Gebrauch sie uns gelehrt hätte”(64). 
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could easily be interpreted as a means to bribe or tempt believers into a deeper piety and 
devotion. In order to prevent a conclusion of false piety, the conversations in Clara 
make unmistakably clear that true piety is so deeply anchored within the mind-body-soul 
complex that it is perceivable not only in a person’s conduct and their physiognomy, 
both of which are commonly spread beliefs in the eighteenth century. More interestingly, 
Clara states that virtuous and blessed, i.e. those who have already reached the level of 
Seligkeit during their earthly existence, are able to sense less or not-virtuous people only 
through their presence. It is stated as a fact that “die bloße Gegenwart unreiner 
Menschen in jenem Zustand [dem seligen] aufs lebhafteste empfunden werde, und ihn 
vielfach störe, ja verhindere281 [“the mere presence of impure people is acutely felt in 
that condition”]. In parallel to the beautiful soul, this disturbance of the blessed state of 
mind can result in social solitude. In this light, it is striking that both women, Goethe’s 
beautiful soul and Clara herself, choose such a solitude as for the most part of 
Schelling’s fragment Clara lives in a Catholic convent. Yet, while the beautiful soul 
settles for psychological comfort and support she strives for in her daydreams, Clara, 
again, takes the same idea a step further. On several occasions, physiognomy and the 
aspired blessed state of mind are understood to be a piece of evidence of the exchange 
with the beyond. As the doctor believes to have observed numerous times:  
 
Alle krankhafte Spannung der Gesichtszüge lässt nach, sie sehen fröhlicher, 
geistreicher, oft jugendlicher aus; alle Spuren von Leidenschaft verwischen sich 
aus dem erheiterten Antlitz, zugleich wird alles geistiger, namentlich die Stimme. 
(121)  
                                                 
281Clara 144. 
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[All strains of illness fade from their features, they look happier, more spiritual, 
often younger. All signs of pain fade away from the gladdened; at the same time 
everything becomes more spiritual, even the voice.]  
 
Clara herself delivers another clear example: 
 
Lassen Sie mich der früh verklärten Freundin gedenken, die meines Lebens 
Schutzengel war, wie bei ihr dies alles eintraf; wie, als schon die Schatten des 
Todes sich ihr näherten, eine himmlische Verklärung ihr ganze Wesen 
durchstrahlte, dass ich glaubte, sie nie so schön gesehen zu haben als im 
nahenden Augenblick des Erlöschens, und nie geglaubt hätte, dass eine solche 
Anmut im Tod wäre; wie dann immer melodischen Laute ihrer stimme 
himmlische Musik wurden, geistige Klänge, die noch jetzt tiefer in meinem 
Innern widertönen als der erste  Zusammenklang sanft gestimmter 
Harmonikaglocken. (122) 
 
[You remind me of a friend who became transfigured so young, who had been my 
guardian angels in life, and how all this happened to her. How, as the shadow of 
death was approaching, a heavenly transfiguration shone within her whole being, 
and that I believed never to have seen her so beautiful as in that moment 
approaching her demise and never would I have believed there to be such grace in 
death; how her voice, which always had a melodic sound, then became heavenly 
music, spiritual tones, which even now sound more deeply in my inner being than 
the very first chord of a softly tune harmonica.] 
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According to these passages, the hereafter occurs after our death, or at the moment of 
our death. Once the process of dying is completed and the physical body terminates its 
functions, the soul enters a beyond which is formed in harmony with the moral conduct 
of the soul host’s here on earth. However, not surprisingly for thought around 1800, for 
some the beyond becomes accessible during their lifetime. Sleep, dreams, fainting, and 
abstaining from alien forms and norms as well as possible are typical ports of entry for a 
living person into the beyond.  It is noticeable through an extremely high degree of 
Seligkeit, blessedness or even beatitude, which is not invoked through the proximity of 
death. Rather, it is the brief moment of transition between the waking and the sleep that 
attracts major attention of the three interlocutors in Clara. This transition from waking 
to sleeping seems to bear parallels to the state of regular dreaming, and yet “seine 
Klarheit [übertrifft] sogar die lebhaftesten Vorstellungen beim Wachen” [“its clarity 
surpasses the most vivid waking thoughts in the waking life”].282 This waking sleep is 
typically of an extremely high clarity and thus parallels a precise watching without 
dreamlike confusion. The only state that can be regarded as analogous is that of the 
highest uninterrupted clairvoyance and cognizance in the beyond.  
 The reason for this very special ability lies in our innermost core: our soul, which 
the interlocutors call “das vollkommene Innere” [“perfect internality”].283 In addition to 
regular Bildung, that is, training of talents and skills, we humans should direct our focus 
on our divine core and educate it already here on earth and thus reach a higher level of 
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Seligkeit in the beyond. All three interlocutors agree that it is possible, even 
recommendable, “zuwege[zu]bringen, was uns im andern Leben widerfahren wird, 
nämlich die Unterordung des Äußeren unter das Innere” [“(striving) to posit everything 
external that we will encounter in life as internal”].284 Thus we should “hier schon jenen 
göttlichen Keim in sich pflegen und erziehen ..., und so zum Teil schon hier die 
Seligkeit jenes anderen Lebens genießen.” [“care for and bring up that divine germ 
within oneself, and so one can partly enjoy the bliss of that other life even in here”].285 
Spelled out, it encourages everyone to enjoy the blessedness of the other life simply 
means to abandon physicality and ego (body and spirit) to the greatest possible degree 
and thus reach the closest possible proximity to the transition state experienced in the 
brief moment between sleeping and waking. This transition state bears the greatest 
resemblance to the clairvoyant insight (Erkenntnis) permeating the entire beyond. 
 If we look at the mentioned transition state between sleeping and waking 
(because this is the truly extraordinary instance) we witness a moment in which both 
worlds alloy into a new state or condition. This new condition carries traces of both 
worlds, the physical reactions determining the body as well as the divine clairvoyant 
vision and understanding. At the same time, the “dreamer” or “visionary” these 
particular elements create something new, an awareness that is neither this worldly nor 
otherworldly. Unlike in the other world, the clairvoyant in this world does receive a 
complete insight, yet only for a very limited period of time: usually seconds only. He or 
she can control neither the duration nor the contents consciously. Yet their body thwarts 
                                                 
284Clara 113. 
 
285Clara 114. 
 
 
 221
this blissful experience and merely “eine plötzlich zuckende Bewegung” [“a sudden 
shuddering”] puts an end to the dreamer’s clairvoyance.286 In this respect, the situation is 
yet another parallel to Kleist’s Friedrich der Prinz von Homburg. There, a mere 
movement or an uttered word in the vicinity of sleepwalking Friedrich violently awakens 
him violently, frequently triggering thus another fainting spell.287  The doctor as well as 
Clara understands this twitching as a “Beweis von der Übermacht der äußeren Natur 
über unser jetziges Leben [“proof of the dominance of the external nature over our 
present way of life”].288 For both authors, Kleist as well as Schelling, this surplus of the 
external is a condition that requires an intervention. To solve this problem, Kleist creates 
his Käthchen as a figure that brings to the fore whatever Friedrich would rather forget 
and repress. In the same manner, Schelling’s physician and priest contend that 
something unconsciously dormant lies in Clara that is no longer sufficient and will not 
give peace unless a new world will be created.  
 
 
Conclusion and Outlook 
 Dreams about the hereafter are not a phenomenon unique to Schelling’s literature 
and thought, but rather one that would resurface on a regular basis in, for instance, 
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287See for instance Heinrich von Kleist, Die Friedrich der Prinz von Homburg in Sämtliche Werke und 
Briefe, ed. Helmut Sembdner, vol. 1 (München: dtv, 2001) 1.1.30-40. 
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psycho-medical journals or discussions on religious transformation and salvation.289 The 
majority of these accounts consist of ornate reports on the beauty and bliss observed and 
experienced in the moments of such a revelation. The reports are intense in visual 
stimuli and constitute thus the stark opposite to the same experiences described in Clara. 
As I have demonstrated above, for Schelling the glimpse into the hereafter is not an 
experience that can be grasped through are physiological senses. There are no 
outstanding sensory affects that could compete with spiritual instantiations as we have 
seen in Kleist’s Das Käthchen von Heilbronn or Seckendorff’s “Ein sonderbarer Traum.” 
Nonetheless, Schelling’s descriptions of the encounters with the spiritual world are no 
less intense, even though they are based on the aforementioned “bilderloses Anschauen.” 
The intensity of the experience and the impact on the physical reality of the dreamer are 
conveyed through the immediate knowledge that is somehow felt or experienced by the 
dreamer. There is neither a visual nor a verbal mediation of the content that is to be 
conveyed, just as there is no time delay. All parameters that apply in the physical world 
are either reduced or entirely suspended and what remains is the experience of pure 
knowledge. The straightforward immediacy of this experience is reflected in the genre it 
was written in, and its formal structure.  
As this chapter has demonstrated, Huber’s and Ffytche’s emphasis on creativity 
and the unconscious are certainly valid readings of Schelling’s work. However, they are 
not to be considered the sole motivations of Schelling’s works. What Clara portrays is 
an inclusion of both of these aspects yet to a different end. With respect to Huber, who 
considers Schelling’s work one of the best philosophical accounts on the dynamics of 
                                                 
289See for example a case study from Moritz’s Magazin. In this case study, with the title “A Peculiar 
Dream” (“Ein sonderbarer Traum”) examined in the first chapter of this dissertation. 
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fantasy, but also in contrast to Ffytche, who sees Schelling as the originator of the 
unconscious, I have proved that Schelling’s cause goes further than what both scholars 
suggest. Sources of creativity and the unconscious are certainly a part of Schelling’s 
work, but not the ultimate goal. Clara, being a literary treatment of Schelling’s 
philosophical works, shows clearly that Schelling’s main concern is not with identifying 
the origins of the creative imagination, nor is it the focus on diagnosing the unconscious 
and identifying its means of expression. His cause is rather to urge his readers to explore 
the worlds of dreams and imagination in order to enhance the highest possible level of 
cognition. Thus, in both cases, Schelling reaches beyond the discourses on creativity and 
psychology, and creates instead one on cognitive science. How we perceive, and then 
comprehend what we perceive, and more importantly, how can we make our perception 
and comprehension more efficient is the ultimate set of questions Clara engages with. 
Embedding the (attempted) answers in either one of the aforementioned discourses 
solely restricts the wide scope of the intervention Schelling was eager to make. 
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK:  
REVISING IMAGINATION, REVISING RELIGION, REVISING LITERATURE: EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY LITERATURE AND TODAY’S COGNITIVE SCIENCE  
 
 When asked whether he read and discussed philosophy, just like his father, Hugh 
Dancy, a Hollywood and Broadway actor, answered: “No, … he writes academic 
philosophy for his peers, which has about as much meaning for me as the technical 
handbook for a Boeing 747 would.”290 Dancy’s statement, as casual as it is, reflects two 
major points writers with which thinkers in the long eighteenth century were concerned: 
how can we communicate philosophy and science, and extend these discourses beyond 
the strict boundaries of the academic community? Though it may seem that nothing has 
changed and scientists still write exclusively for their peers, the ambitions to change the 
way we think and communicate complex subject matters, which found a productive 
platform in Karl Philipp Moritz’s Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde, have 
substantially changed the approach to furthering our knowledge of the humankind and 
the world we live in.  By including scientific contributions from experts and laymen 
alike, Moritz’s Magazin compelled both communities to reconsider what and how they 
communicate. What followed was the revelation that established and venerable genres, 
writing styles, and methods were no longer sufficient to capture the ever-changing and 
progressing nature of philosophy, psychology, medicine, or the natural sciences. 
Concomitantly came the recognition that communicating these discourses would not 
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improve unless perceptional paradigms changed. The dominance of reason and the 
striving for materialistic explanations, the focal points in the first half of the eighteenth 
century, were in the second half about to be replaced by a more holistic view of 
perceiving and processing information.  
 The integration of the reader in the process of the production of new discourses 
as well as the inclusion of the readers of literature, and the spectators of a theater play 
plays a significant role in all chapters of this dissertation. While this dissertation 
explored the nature and function of the creative imagination within the production of art 
as well as knowledge, it paid less attention to the nature and function of the creative 
imagination in the recipients of the literary, dramatic, and scientific works. The 
interaction between the author and the recipient is, however, a crucial element of the 
reevaluations made by the authors analysed in this dissertation. Their intervention did 
not call for a passive consumption of a creative work. On the contrary, their 
interventions sought to inspire the recipients to become as creative and original as the 
authors were themselves.  
 As this dissertation has shown, the faculty of the creative imagination became 
one of the central facilitators of the redefinitions of epistemological and literary 
paradigms alike. As the analysis of the survey of works by Moritz, Goethe, Kleist, and 
Schelling has revealed, integrating the creative imagination not only into philosophical 
and scientific thought, but also into everyday life yields benefits and improvement with 
regard to the quality of life as well as the furthering of knowledge on a grander scale. 
For example, each chosen text foregrounded the salutary benefits the incorporation of 
the creative imagination has due to the seemingly unlimited source of knowledge that 
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this creative faculty unlocks. At the same time, readers also learn the significance of an 
active participation in the process of furthering knowledge. Be it for the sake of healing 
a fever or advancing scholarship, the creative imagination was the key ingredient to 
unlock the depths of the unconscious, clarify dreams, draw images to supplement the 
struggling linguistic expression on paper, just as Jonah Lehrer invokes it today in his 
bestselling monograph Imagine: How Creativity Works, echoing current scholarship and 
propagating the benefits of tapping this faculty.    
 The first chapter, “Karl Philipp Moritz’s Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde and 
the Reinvention of the Case Study,” outlines the beginnings of the movement towards an 
alternative way of understanding and communicating new and complex subject matters. 
Moritz’s intertwinging of the case study with literature was instrumental in renegotiating 
the boundaries of literature and thought alike. Communicating science in a narrative way 
helped disseminate and popularize the scientific cause and bring enlightenment to all 
corners of society. At the same time, this chapter demonstrated that the intertwinement 
of the case study and literature empowered previously passively absorbing readers to 
pursue their own interest in science and thought. The new, redefined case study was a 
rather informal and eclectic narrative account of observations made on oneself or others. 
Its language was simple prose. Thus, it became the platform for exchange of experts and 
amateurs of science alike. It propagated a multitude of different approaches, bringing 
thus fresh perspectives into the traditional patterns of thinking and communication.  
The second chapter, “Seeing What’s Right: Eighteenth-Century Metamorphoses 
in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s ‘The Confessions of the Beautiful Soul,’” 
demonstrates the close connection between Moritz’s and Goethe’s cause. Picking up 
 227
Moritz’s trace, Goethe redefines the popular genre of the confession to use it as an 
allegory for furthering science and knowledge. Arguing for the importance of seeing old 
truths from a new perspective, Goethe presents an old genre in a new light. The 
eponymous beautiful soul is arguably a controversial character dividing amateurs and 
scholars of literature alike into two groups. One interprets the beautiful soul as an 
eccentric hermit embodying the worst symptoms of neurosis. The other sees in Goethe’s 
confessing heroine a strong woman fighting eighteenth-century patriarchy. Whichever 
group a reader identifies with is ultimately of minor significance. As I have shown, what 
matters for Goethe is that his readers recognize that for every fact there is an unlimited 
number of possible and valid interpretations. The creative imagination the beautiful soul 
indulges in through her daydreams is one of the crucial elements that make her such a 
controversial character. Yet it is also the characteristic that enables her to see her life 
from different standpoints and choose what is good for her. Those passages in her life 
without the connection to her creative imagination she describes as miserable and 
unproductive. The return of the joy, good health, and productivity is strictly bound to the 
presence of the creative imagination. This is also true for Goethe’s scientists, be they 
experts or amateurs. The absence of creative imagination parallels the beautiful soul’s 
misery as it means standstill for the pursuit of knowledge, whereas a creative abundance 
motivates the scientist to dig further and perpetually shed new light.  
The third chapter, “The Painting of Virtue and Happiness: The Role of Creative 
Imagination in Heinrich von Kleist’s Das Käthchen von Heilbronn and Prinz Friedrich 
von Homburg,” outlines Kleist’s struggle with the insufficiency of language in 
conveying psychological processes. Though Goethe for example had already diagnosed 
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the same insufficiency of linguistic expression for scientific purposes, Kleist’s argument 
surpasses Goethe’s in its vehemence. The impossibility of ever grasping the whole 
picture plays in Kleist’s work, life, and scholarship on Kleist the central role. The 
conclusion to deem one’s creative imagination as reliable as any other source that feeds 
our knowledge appears thus, as I have argued, almost natural. The significance of visual 
representation is a thread Kleist pursues in particular in the two plays examined in this 
chapter. On the one hand, this means that dreams, visions, and reveries are indeed more 
suitable to express what matters than language in any form. On the other hand, this also 
means that the play as a visual genre is more suitable to communicate the same subject 
matters that language fails to express. Either way, as I have claimed, the key role of the 
creative imagination is in Kleist’s work to conjure up images that convey a content with 
all its implications and associations. As the case of the prince of Homburg shows, 
opposing the creative force can have (almost) fatal consequences. The fact the prince 
almost dies because he disregards and excludes his visions from his life establishes 
many parallels to the way his contemporaries approached the discourse on creative 
imagination in general. It is a force that is an equal part of us and therefore can neither 
be excluded nor contained. Rather, as I have shown, Kleist calls for a conscious dialogue 
with the creative imagination, as it is the only source that can bring light into the depths 
of the unconscious. 
The fourth and last chapter, “Bilderloses Anschauen: F.W.J. Schelling’s Clara 
and the Bliss of Immediate Cognition,” showcases an entirely different approach to the 
discourse on creative imagination. Admittedly, Schelling too considers an important 
outlet for the faculty of imagination. Yet unlike all the other works and authors of this 
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dissertation, Schelling sees the actual impact of the imagination to take place through the 
feeling of knowledge. The brief moments during the beginning and the conclusion of 
sleep are decisive because they constitute the moment of intersection between the 
physical reality and the spiritual one. In these moments, the dreamer experiences what is 
best described as immediate cognition. It is a moment of absolute clarity and infinite 
knowledge that bears the possibility of improvement in all thinkable aspects of the life 
here and in the hereafter. The imagination in Clara’s case resembles almost a muscle that 
can and should be trained and exercised in order to become better at getting these 
glimpses of clarity, which, again, is crucial, for the overall wellbeing in the physical 
reality. At its best, it no longer requires the initial dream to access that world, but 
enables the person to access it at will. Parallel to his predecessors in this dissertation, 
this process is beneficial for both the improvement of the individual everyday life as 
well as the pursuit of scientific progress. As I contend, by redefining the philosophical 
dialogue into a fictionalized and narrativized novel-like conversation, Schelling ties 
back to Moritz’s attempt to disseminate his cause in the most comprehensive way, and 
inspire a recreation of the contents described in Clara by each individual. Thus, he 
empowers experts and laymen alike to engage in the pursuit of knowledge and secures 
intellectual and spiritual development in adepts of all backgrounds. 
 
Further Research 
 Though the intersection of literature and science as well as the discussions on the 
nature and function of the imagination have preoccupied generations of literary scholars, 
research on these issues is far from exhausted. First, additional works of the authors 
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examined in this dissertation can provide an even more nuanced understanding of the 
subject matter. Goethe’s novel Die Wahlverwandtschaften (1809), for example, 
introduces two aspects of the medical and psychological discourses. Ottilie, one of the 
leading female characters of this novel, is linked to the discourse on animal magnetism, 
which constitutes an important element of medical and psychological discourses at that 
time. Including the literary oeuvre of Jean Paul adds another author and a whole new set 
of premises and aspects to the discussion on these discourses. Two of his novels provide 
particularly ample material: his 1793 Die unsichtbare Loge as well as (1827 published 
posthum) Selina closely interact with the questions revolving mind-body-issues. More 
significantly however, these works exceed psycho-medical discourses by tying them to 
aspects of further aspects of natural science, astronomy, and religion for instance. In 
analogy to including further authors, examining additional genres is a productive 
endeavor. The medical didactive poem, for example, comes almost naturally to mind. 
Furthermore, examining additional journals and magazines covering medicine, 
psychology, and philosophy--all being highly popular but also popularly oriented—will 
provide an even more clear and lucid understanding of that time and its thought with 
their eclectic selection of topics and formats. In the same light, further intersecting 
discourses should be explored. Religious overtones are inherently present in all texts 
examined in this dissertation. The revisions made with regard to literature and science, 
for example, as just as valid for discourses on religion and religiosity—needless to say, 
both were prevalent in eighteenth-century German literature, culture, and thought.  
As this dissertation has demonstrated, approaching the discourse on imagination 
from a psychoanalytic point of view is valid but not sufficient. It has become clear from 
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my analyses that psychological and medical discourses are only one discipline of many 
that converge in the debates on the (creative) imagination. Rather, it appears to be useful 
and productive to approach it from the standpoint of cognitive science. Today’s 
understanding of the discipline of cognitive science hosts a number of intersecting topics 
and motifs that all lead to one goal: understanding how understanding processes come 
about and how they work. With this objective in mind, cognitive science incorporates 
disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, sociology, anthropology, medicine, or 
linguistics—to name but a few. Under the umbrella of cognitive science these disciplines 
maintain a dialogue with each other, a fact that is one of the main motifs in this 
dissertation, but more importantly the literary sources this dissertation explored. In this 
light, the examination of the role that literature played within a discussion on cognitive 
sciences would constitute a productive expansion of the subject matter.  
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